【作者】 张旭辉；

【导师】 彭其渊；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 资源优化管理， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 公司治理一直是近些年来学者们研究的重点问题,其中股权结构又是公司治理的重点问题,合理的股权结构有利于公司治理的完善和中小投资者利益的保护。随着我国股权分置改革的完成,我国上市公司的股权结构逐渐趋于合理,并且随着终极控股股东控制权的减少和次大股东控制权的增加,次大股东在公司治理中的地位逐渐显现出来,其在加强对控股股东的监督与制衡和保护投资者利益方面已经开始发挥着重要作用。特别是在我国2008年发生的国美控制权之争,使人们再次认识到了次大股东在公司治理中的重要作用。本文按照终极控制人的性质将我国的上市公司分为国有、家族和其他三种类型,同时按照能够追索到的次大股东终极控制人类型将次大股东分为国有、家族、机构投资者和其他四种类型,分别研究了在不同的股权结构下,不同类型的上市公司里次大股东对公司投资、代理成本、公司透明度和公司价值的影响。本文的主要研究内容如下：(1)在绝对控股股权结构下,次大股东不能对控股股东的投资行为发挥有效的监督作用；当控股股东与次大股东性质相同时,次大股东能够影响公司的投资过度；当次大股东为机构投资者时,不能够减缓公司的投资不足与投资过度现象；当负债水平低时,次大股东会促进公司的投资过度行为。(2)多个大股东股权结构下,次大股东没有发挥降低经理层和公司股东之间的代理成本,而且有可能增加经理层的机会主义倾向,尤其是次大股东控制权增加时,对股权代理成本具有显著的影响；大股东之间控制权制衡度和现金流量权制衡度均对股权代理成本有显著的正向影响,控制权制衡度的变化对股权代理成本的影响更大。(3)次大股东不能够提高我国上市公司的信息透明度,相反,随着次大股东持股比例的增加,公司的透明度反而会降低；当次大股东为机构投资者时,公司的透明度较高；当次大股东与控股股东类型相同时公司的透明度会较低；当上市公司类型为国有时或者是股权结构为控制性股东股权结构时,次大股东此时由于自己的能力有限更多的选择是不作为,此时不能够影响公司的透明度。(4)绝对控股的股权结构下的次大股东对公司价值的影响较小。在多个大股东股权结构和股权分散的情况下,Z指数越小,越有利于提高公司价值。另外,当次大股东类型不同时,其对公司价值的影响也不相同,并且他们之间存在着显著的区别。次大股东控制权与公司价值显著的负相关,次大股东控制权越高,公司价值也就越低。前两大股东性质的异同也会对公司价值造成影响,当控股股东与次大股东性质相同时,次大股东控制权与公司价值显著负相关。公司规模对公司的价值也会造成影响,当控股股东与次大股东性质相同时,公司规模越大,越有利于公司价值提高,当控股股东与次大股东性质不相同时,公司规模越大,越不利于公司价值的提高。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, corporate governance has always been a (the) research focus among scholars, and ownership structure is the key issue of corporate governance, reasonable ownership structure is beneficial to the perfection of corporate governance and the protection of small investors’interest. With the completion of split-share reform, the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies was more reasonable. As the reduction of ultimate control right and the increase of the second largest control right, the function of the second largest shareholders on corporate governance showed up, especially on the supervision and balance of controlling shareholders and the protection of investor’s interest. The battle for control of Gome in2008, made people recognize that the second largest shareholder plays an important role in corporate governance.According to the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholders, listed companies will be divided into state-owned, family and others, and according to the available types of ultimate control on second largest shareholders, second largest shareholders will be divided into state-owned, family, institutional investor and others. This paper studied the influence of second largest shareholders on corporate investment, agency cost, corporate transparency and corporate value in different listed companies and under different ownership structure, respectively. The main content of this paper is as follows;(1) Under absolute holding ownership structure, second largest shareholders couldn’t play the role of supervising effectively on the investment behavior of controlling shareholders; when the nature of controlling shareholders and second largest shareholders is same, the latter could affect companies’overinvestment; however, when the latter become institutional investors, it can’t slowdown companies’overinvestment and underinvestment; second largest shareholders would boost overinvestment behavior under low debt levels.(2) Under multi-large shareholder ownership structure, second largest shareholders can’t reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders, and would increase managers’opportunism tendencies instead. Second largest shareholders have significant influence on ownership agency cost as it’s controlling right increase; the balancing power of control and cash flow rights among large shareholders, both have significant positive effect on ownership agency cost, and the variation of the balancing power of control has larger effect on ownership agency cost.(3) Second largest shareholders can’t improve information transparency of listed companies, the transparency would be reduced as the shareholding ratio of the second largest shareholders increases; when second largest shareholders are institutional investors, the transparency would be higher; corporate transparency is low with the same nature of controlling and second largest shareholders; in state-owned listed companies and the companies with ownership structure of controlling shareholders, the second largest shareholders choose to do nothing due to the limit of their ability, thus they have no effect on corporate transparency.(4) Under absolute holding ownership structure, second largest shareholders have less impact on corporate value. Under multi-large shareholder and dispersed ownership structure, lower Z-index is more conducive to increase corporate value. Moreover, second largest shareholders with different types have different effect on corporate value, and the difference among these shareholders is significant. There is a significant negative correlation between the control of second largest shareholders and corporate value. The higher the control, the lower the corporate value. The differences and similarities between the first and second largest shareholders have influence on corporate value, that is, if the nature of controlling shareholders and second largest shareholders are the same, there is a significant negative correlation between the control of second largest shareholders and corporate value. Corporate size also effect corporate value. With the same nature of top two shareholders, the larger the corporate size, the corporate value higher; while the corporate value lower with different nature of top two shareholders.更多还原