【作者】 张标；

【导师】 罗琦；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 金融学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 在完美市场假设下,公司投资支出和增长不取决于融资资金来源,而仅与投资机会多寡有关(Modigliani and Miller,1958)。在放松了MM一系列严格的假设后,Jensen and Meckling (1976)认为管理者与股东之间的利益偏差将影响公司融资行为,进而影响投资支出。Myers and Majluf (1984)也分析得出投资者与公司之间的信息不对称导致公司外部融资成本过高,引发投资不足问题。这些研究以分散的股权结构为背景探讨信息不对称对公司投融资行为的影响,所考虑的代理问题也是由管理者与股东之间的利益偏差引起的。事实上大量研究都发现在世界上的大部分国家中,上市公司的股权都较为集中,存在一个或多个大股东对上市公司进行控制。获得控制权的大股东有能力和动机侵占公司资产、损害其他投资者利益,在这种情况下公司治理的核心问题是如何解决控股股东与其他投资者之间的代理问题,从而有效保护其他投资者利益。我国的情况更是如此,上市公司股权高度集中、外部治理环境不够完善,导致控股股东侵害其他投资者的事件频频发生。除了直接通过关联交易、资金占用等方式侵占公司资产外,控股股东还有可能操纵公司日常经营活动,并在此过程中获取控制权私利。控股股东操纵上市公司日常经营活动的行为主要体现在,通过过度融资、过度投资来增加控制资源规模,从而获得更大的控制权交易或转移时的溢价。本文从三个方面考察了控股股东对公司投融资行为的影响：第一,探讨了控股股东对上市公司现金持有行为的影响,并进一步分析了控股股东控制下现金持有量影响投资支出的机理过程；第二,探讨了控股股东对上市公司债务融资行为的影响,并进一步分析了债务融资对投资支出的影响；第三,探讨了控股股东对上市公司股权再融资行为的影响,并进一步分析了股权再融资行为对投资支出的影响。在回顾和总结已有投融资相关理论和控股股东侵占行为的相关理论和文献后,本文通过构建控股股东控制下的上市公司融资模型,从理论上分析了控股股东对上市公司现金持有量、债务水平以及股权再融资决策的影响。进一步本文分析了控股股东融资行为影响投资支出的机理过程,并采用我国上市公司2003-2011年的经验数据进行了实证研究,本文的研究主要得到了如下几个方面的结论：第一,被西方学者理论和实践证明有效的公司治理机制,如董事会治理、管理者股权激励以及多个大股东股权制衡等不能有效遏制控股股东侵占行为,因而不能起到公司治理、保护投资者利益的作用。主要原因在于上市公司处在控股股东的超强控制之下,董事会、管理者出于控股股东利益实施财务决策,其他大股东持股较低、股权制衡力量有限。第二,通过模型分析和实证检验,本文发现控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突显著影响公司现金持有量。控股股东两权分离系数高、控股股东为国有属性时,公司持有更多的现金资产。进一步研究发现在控制了投融资行为的内生性后,控股股东代理问题较为严重的公司所持有的现金持有量对投资支出的影响更大。以上研究结果说明控股股东出于侵占动机将更多的现金留存于公司内部,并可能将现金资产用于过度投资以获得控制权私利。第三,控股股东与债权人之间的利益偏差显著影响公司债务水平,控股股东控制权与现金流权的分离程度越大,公司债务水平越高。在控股股东代理问题较为严重时,公司的债务策略更为激进,表现为公司会在现金流增加的情形下以更大比例偿还债务,而在现金流减少的情形下以更大比例增加债务。负债融资并没有发挥相机治理作用而减少投资水平,相反在控股股东代理问题较为严重时,公司举债导致了投资支出的增加。按照这一分析逻辑,当公司已经存在过度投资时,增加债务加剧了过度投资程度。第四,控股股东与潜在股东之间的利益冲突显著影响公司股权再融资计划,控股股东仅会在自身利益增加的情况下发行股票,导致公司股权再融资实施的概率与控股股东两权分离程度成正比。进一步的研究发现,相比于未进行股权再融资的公司,进行了股权再融资的公司投资水平将显著提升,控股股东两权分离程度越大,再融资资金对投资支出的正向影响越强,并且不同程度代理问题下公司增加投资支出所导致的经济后果也存在差异。这些结果说明了控股股东通过股权再融资行为侵占新股东利益,并且通过将融资资金用于投资以增加控制权私利。总的来讲,本文通过对控股股东控制下上市公司的融资行为以及融资影响投资支出的机理过程进行研究,发现在股权集中的情形下,投资者法律保护水平较差时,控股股东自利动机导致公司融资行为、投资行为扭曲。控股股东通过过度融资、过度投资来侵占公司资产,获取控制权私利。控制权与现金流权的分离加剧了控股股东利益侵占行为,损害了其他投资者利益。为了能够有效监督控股股东行为,保护投资者利益,我国必须完善资本市场建设,为各项公司治理机制效应的发挥提供条件。同时还需要提高投资者法律保护水平,引导资源流向效率高的行业和企业,优化资源配置效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 In a world of perfect capital market, firms’ investment and growth do not rely on the way of financing but only relate to investment opportunity (Modigliani and Miller,1958). After release the premise of MM’s research, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that conflicts between manager and shareholders affect corporate financing behavior and investment. Myers and Majluf (1984) also find out that information asymmetric between investors and firm raises the financing cost and leads under-investment. Examining dispersed ownership structures, previous literature finds that information asymmetric and agency problem affect corporate investment behavior.However, it has been widely documented that the ownership structure of most listed companies worldwide are concentrated. There is a controlling shareholder or multiple large shareholders in the firm. This controlling shareholder has incentive to divert corporate resources for his private benefit. Thus, corporate governance in this firm is how to mitigate the agency problem between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders and protect outsider investors’ rights. Especially in China, ownership structure is concentrated. The controlling shareholder always expropriates other investors by related bargaining, embezzlement. Except this, the controlling shareholder also can realize private benefit of control by manipulating corporate financing and investment behavior.This dissertation examines how the controlling shareholder affects corporate financing and investment behavior in three aspects. First, we investigate the impact of the controlling shareholder on corporate cash holdings. Then we analyze how this cash policy of the controlling shareholder affects corporate investment. Second, we investigate the impact of the controlling shareholder on corporate debt financing. Then we analyze how debt ratio affects corporate investment. Third, we investigate the impact of the controlling shareholder on the probability of seasoned equity offering. Then we examine the efficiency of resource allocation in these SEO firms. Based on the theory of corporate financing and investment and previous research of controlling shareholders’divert behavior, this dissertation uses a model to explain how the controlling shareholder affects corporate financing. Then we examine the impact of the controlling shareholder’s financing policy on corporate investment behavior. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies in2003to2011, this study finds the following results:Firstly, all corporate governance mechanisms which are efficiency in American capital market such as board of directors, management ownership, and balance of power are inefficiency in China. These corporate governance mechanisms cannot decrease expropriation and tunneling of the controlling shareholder. The main reason is that directors and managers are controlled by the controlling shareholder. They make decision in the interest of the controlling shareholder not minority shareholders.Secondly, our model predicts that interest conflict between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders affects corporate cash holdings. Firms with a wider divergence between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights hold more cash. State owned enterprise holds more cash than other firms. Furthermore, we find that the high cash holdings increase corporate investment in firms with more server agency problem. Our results indicate that firm holds high level of cash in the interest of the controlling shareholder, and these cash holdings are used for over-investment.Thirdly, the interest conflict between the controlling shareholder and creditors affects firm’s debt ratio. Firms with a wider divergence between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights will have a higher level of debt. Agency problem between the controlling shareholder and creditors leads a higher cash flow sensitivity of debt, which means firms rise financial leverage when cash flow decrease and repay debt when cash flow increase. Furthermore, we find that debt financing cannot mitigate over-investment in firms with agency problem between the controlling shareholder and creditors. In these firms, high level of debt ratio leads over-investment problems.Finally, the interest conflict between the controlling shareholder and potential shareholders increases the probability of seasoned equity offering. Our model shows that the decision of share issue is put forward to so long as the interests of the controlling shareholder increase, leads the probability of seasoned equity offering positively relate to divergence of control rights and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder. Furthermore, we find that SEO firm’s capital expenditure is higher than no-SEO firms. In firms with more server agency problem, SEO leads a higher level of investment increasing and a lower asset return. These results indicate that the controlling shareholder expropriates potential shareholders by SEO and increases capital expenditure to realize benefit of control.To sum up, this dissertation examines the financing policy and investment behavior of firms on the background of concentrated ownership structure. We find that agency problem of the controlling shareholder leads distortion to firm’s financing and investment behavior. The controlling shareholder divert firm’s resource through over-financing and over-investment, thus he can realize private benefit of control. In order to monitor the controlling shareholder and protect other investors, we have to enhance corporate governance and mitigate the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. At the same time, we must protect investors’ rights and increase the efficient of resource allocation.更多还原