【作者】 丁克楠；

【导师】 雷涯邻； 沙景华；

【作者基本信息】 中国地质大学（北京） ， 管理科学与工程， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 证券行业的运营模式注定了高层次专业人才这一特殊群体将承担公司业绩提升的重要使命，较之其它行业的同类型人才其积极作用尤显突出。理论界对于我国证券公司的激励约束机制问题已颇有研究，其研究对象多为企业高管，研究视角多为管理学理论下的激励约束机制与高管需求或者企业绩效的相关性，而将证券公司高层次专业人才作为研究对象的知之甚少。因此，本文将高层次专业人才作为研究对象具有开创性的意义。以往的研究视角过多的聚焦于激励机制本身，即不同的激励方式产生的效果，本研究将视角延伸至我国证券公司的公司治理，并运用产权理论、委托—代理理论、激励理论、人力资本理论等相关理论在分析我国证券公司的产权结构导致的公司治理模式基础上，从公司治理概念范畴对于能够影响高层次专业人才工作绩效的激励因素进行论证，最终推导出高层次专业人才的激励约束机制，此为本研究的理论框架。本文首先在回顾了国内外相关研究文献，对于我国证券公司的产权、公司治理的成因、现状及与激励约束的关系进行理论探讨，公司治理层面的薪酬激励、股权结构、董事会特征等因素影响了高层次专业人才的激励效果，进而决定了工作绩效，由此提出理论假设和概念模型。其次，本研究通过问卷调查方式对于分布在华北、华东、华中、华南、西北、西南地区的27家证券公司的168名人员进行调研，分别采用小规模访谈、小样本检验、大样本调研的方式完成问卷调查。利用SPSS17.0软件对调查结果进行了相关性分析、多元回归分析。第三，本研究在获取有效数据的基础上对于高层次专业人才激励机制进行了实证研究，得出了以下结论：（1）薪酬激励依旧是我国证券公司采取的重要的激励手段之一，虽然短期货币激励已没有显著正相关关系，但是长期股权激励对于高层次专业人才具有显著的激励效果。（2）股权结构对于我国证券公司高层次专业人才激励约束机制具有较大的关联作用。国有股控股的证券公司与高层次专业人才的工作绩效相关性弱于法人股控股的证券公司。（3）董事会特征对于我国证券公司高层次专业人才激励约束机制具有隐性激励作用。董事会规模、两职合一、专业背景独立董事数量等特征均会不同程度影响高层次专业人才的工作绩效。更多还原

【Abstract】 The operation mode of the securities industry decides the important mission ofcompany performance improvements that the special group of high-levelprofessionals will undertake and their positive role is more remarkable compared tothe same type of talents of other industries. The theoretical circle has conducted quitea lot study on the mechanism of incentive and constraint of Chinese securitiescompanies with top executives as its research object.The research angle of viewmostly is about the correlation of the incentive constraints mechanism and executiverequirements or enterprise performance under the management theory. The high-levelprofessional talents of securities companies seldom are taken as research object.Therefore, this article taking high-level professional talents as the research objectpresents pioneering significance. The angles of view in previous research focus toomuch on incentive mechanism itself, namely the effect of different means of incentive.This research extends its perspective to the corporate governance of Chinesesecurities companies and applies property rights theory, principal-agent theory,incentive theory, human capital theory and correlation theory to the analysis of thecorporate governance mode resulting from property right structure of Chinesesecurities companies. From the angle of view of salary incentive, ownership structure,board characteristics of the corporate governance, the paper demonstrates themotivation factors which can influence the performance of high-level professionaltalents and finally deduce the incentive constraints mechanism of high-levelprofessional personnel. This is the theoretical framework of this study.First this paper reviews about the theories of the high level professional talents,corporate governance, incentive and constraint at home and abroad. On the basis ofthese theories, the paper demonstrates the cause and the present situation and theessence of high-level professional talents incentive theory of the securities companiesin China and puts forward the argumentation that the corpotate governance factorssuch as salary incentive, ownership structure, board characteristics affect the incentiveeffect of the high-level professionals, which determine the work performance. The resulting theoretical hypothesis and conceptual model thus formed. Second, this paperstudies168staff in27securities companies distributed in north China, east China,northwest, southwest, central and southern China through small-scale interview,questionnaire survey method, using SPSS17.0software to analyze the investigationresult through correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis. Third, on thebasis of the empirical study of the high-level professional talents incentive mechanism,the following conclusions are drawn:（1）Salary incentive is still one of the important means of incentive that Chinesesecurities companies adopt, and long-term equity incentive has a significant incentiveeffect on high-level professionals.（2）Ownership structure for Chinese securities companies has great correlationfunction to the high-level professional talents incentive constraint mechanism.（3）Board characteristics play an invisible role for the high-level professional talentsincentive constraint mechanism in Chinese securities companies.Its scale,configuration, and the number of independent directors affect the work performanceof the high-level professionals to different degrees.更多还原