【作者】 苏志煌；

【导师】 何大安；

【作者基本信息】 浙江工商大学 ， 企业管理学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 企业道德风险是一个涉及经济学、管理学以及伦理学等多个学科的交叉性分析对象。近年来,围绕企业是否应该承担以及承担何种社会责任、企业为什么出现道德风险以及如何治理等问题,学术界展开了广泛的探讨和研究。从管理学角度来看，企业道德风险是一个值得关注的问题。基于它在企业内部治理和外部约束等方面表现为不同的层次,也基于它贯穿于委托代理的整个过程,本文针对企业道德风险层次及治理问题展开分析,并力图从委托代理视角将这种风险层次及治理纳入管理学的分析范围。本文认为,企业无论是内部组织运转,还是外部经济社会往来中的交易关系,从道德风险层面展开理解,其本质都在于利用信息以及其他方面所具备的优势,而有可能采取败德行为来实现自身利益的最大化。委托代理契约实际上是一种利益相关者之间的契约,利益相关者的多元化关系导致了交易中的道德风险层次,这可以在广义上理解或界定为企业道德风险。以这种风险的层次特征而言,可以把利益相关者与企业之间的效用冲突程度看成是企业道德风险的层次。本文对这种层次的内涵、决定因素以及机理展开了分析,在此基础上,依据企业类型差异和利益相关者多元化构建针对企业道德风险问题的委托代理的分析框架,试图比较系统地考察企业道德风险的内在机理。本文的研究划分为四大模块：一是导论和文献评述部分。该部分主要介绍和评述有关企业道德风险研究的基本概况,对这方面研究可能涉及到的几个关键概念进行了特定理解和说明。第二部分是理论分析。该部分对企业道德风险的层次特征进行了解说和剖析,构建了企业道德风险的委托代理分析框架,对利益相关者之间的利益冲突、决策相关性、企业内部权力结构和交易结构等几种特定情形展开了分析,从中推导出企业道德风险内在机理的几个命题和部分推论。第三部分是理论分析的应用。该部分对我国企业道德风险进行了概要性解说,并利用中国上市公司数据对相关分析假设进行了验证。第四部分是全文的总结。该部分归纳了主要分析结论,提出了针对企业道德风险防范和治理的几点政策建议,并对本文分析所存在的不足及研究展望进行了说明。本文认为,企业类型差异是有关企业道德风险治理合约机制设计的重要因素。这个重要因素的特殊性,是利益相关者在成本可控的前提下,能否基于信息的真实性进行合约机制的设计,从而反映出企业道德风险的治理效应；企业道德风险的层次特征对利益相关者和企业选择行为具有显著影响,但作用机制相当复杂,本文的理论分析倾向于认为,利益相关者的投入选择与层次特征呈正向关系,而企业道德行为的概率与层次特征呈反向关系。这些观点或许有着进一步研究的价值。关于企业道德风险的治理机制,本文认为,监督、监管、保证、信任等企业道德风险的治理机制存在作用边界,治理机制能否产生预期效应不仅与治理力度相关,而且在不同程度上受企业与利益相关者交易关系的层次特征影响；另一方面,利益相关者是否存在利益冲突及决策的相关性会对企业的道德选择行为产生影响,在通常情况下,利益相关者的利益冲突有可能成为防范企业道德风险的潜在机制,企业有可能因这种潜在机制而获得额外的套利空问,从而降低败德行为倾向。在笔者看来,这些分析观点体现了管理学理论和经济学理论在某种程度上的融合。作为对问题进一步分析的延伸,本文认为,对委托代理契约下的代理人,不应仅仅局限于经理角色的考虑,也要考虑他们掌握监督权力的一面,具有监督权的代理人与经营者之间存在着合谋的动机,这可以通过监督行为的成本、监督权力的大小与激励机制的当期分配比例所形成的动因来解释,显然,这样的解释会涉及到企业道德风险的另两个重要层面,即交易结构和规模报酬特征也是影响企业道德风险的重要变量。就交易结构而言,当交易为有限次时,企业一旦出现败德行为,其在后续交易中的最优选择将是继续选择败德行为,且良好的历史交易记录不足以保证其在后续的交易中继续选择道德行为；重复交易具有比较优势,并体现为对企业选择行为的“修复”和“保证”功能。规模报酬特征对企业选择行为的约束效应,则是通过对企业努力程度边际产出的决定,从而影响企业的预期效益来实现。本文在以上理解的基础上,对我国上市公司委托代理过程中的企业道德风险问题进行了实证分析。分析结果表明,上市公司是否存在国有股、国有股持股比例、第一大股东相对持股权重、投入资本回报率、可持续增长率、成长性(托宾q)、董事会规模、独立董事缺席或委托出席会议比例、内部员工持股、是否聘请四大会计师事务所、流动比率、速动比率、是否引进职业经理人以及上市年限在不存在多重共线性下与我国上市公司道德风险存在显著相关。尽管这一相关性检验尚存在一些值得推敲的地方,但它基本上揭示了我国委托代理视角下企业道德风险的某些症结性问题。从层次和治理角度来研究企业道德风险,委托代理视角是一个相对新颖的观察点,如果说本文有可能存在的创新,那便是通过对企业类型、交易结构、代理人监督权与利益相关者相结合的分析,一定程度上拓宽了企业道德风险的分析范围。当然,这种有可能存在的创新也会引致本文的分析不足和疏漏,这有待笔者今后逐步加以完善。更多还原

【Abstract】 Enterprise moral hazard is an interdisciplinary issue involving economics, management and ethics. In recent years, around whether the enterprises should undertake social responsibilities or not and undertake what kinds of social responsibilities, why the enterprises trap into moral hazard, how to govern and manage enterprises’moral hazard and so on, the academia have make a wide range of researches. From the perspective of management, the enterprise moral hazard is a concern issue. Based on its level reflection in internal corporate governance and external constraints, and based on it throughout the whole process of principal-agent, this paper analyzed the level characteristic and governance of enterprise moral hazard, and tried to take it into the scope of management research from the perspective of principal-agent.This paper argues that the essence of internal or external trade relationships, lies in the possibility for enterprise to use of information and other aspects of advantage taking moral-hazard behaviour to achieve the maximization of self-interest. Principal-agent contract is actually a kind of contract among stakeholders and the diversity of stakeholder relationships lead to the level characteristic, which can be broadly understood or defined as enterprise moral hazard. To the risk level in terms of characteristic, the degree of utility conflicts between stakeholders and the enterprise can be put as the level characteristic of the enterprise moral hazard. This paper analyzed the connotation, determinants and mechanism of the level characteristic. On this basis, we built analysis framework of principal-agent moral hazard issue according to the enterprise type difference and diversified stakeholders, and tried to study the inner mechanism of the enterprise moral hazard systematically.This paper can be divided into four main parts. The first part involving the introduction and literature review mainly introduced the basic condition of the study and the present research situation of this issue, especially gave the specific understanding of several key concepts involving in this paper. The second part which is the core part of this paper has explored the level characterisic of moral-hazard relationship and its explanation function, and has constructed the simple and expansion model of enterprises’ moral hazard in the view of principal-agent which helped the paper analyze the enterprises’ moral-hazard choices and achieved some useful propositions and inferences. The third part explained the moral hazad of Chinese enterprises based on the main theoretical conclusions of this paper and made a simple empirical analysis on the basis of Chinese listed companies. The forth part put forward the main conclusions of this paper, some suggestions on the governance of enterprises’moral hazard and research outlook of this study.This paper argues that enterprise type difference is an important factor related to moral hazard management contracts. And the particularity of this factor is that, whether the stakeholder can design the management contract based on the authenticity of information in the premise of cost control, so as to reflect the corporate governance effect of moral hazard. The level characteristic of the enterprise moral hazard has a significant influence on stakeholders and enterprise choice, but the mechanism is very complex and the theoretical analysis in this paper inclined to think that the relationship of stakeholders and level characteristic is positive, while the probability of enterprise ethics behavior features an inverse relationship. These views may have the value of furthure research.On governance mechanism of enterprise moral hazard, this paper argues that supervison, regulation, guarantee, trust and so on will encounter role boundary. Whether the governance can produce expecte effects is not only related to the regulation force, but also affected by le level characteristic of trade relationship between stakeholder and enterprise to some extent. On the other hand, the conflict and decision relevance among stakeholders will affect enterpirse’s moral choice, in most cases, the conflicts among stakeholders has the potential to be mechanism to guard against enterprise moral hazard, because it can get additional arbitrage to reducing the probability of moral hazard. In my opinion, these views reflected the mix of the management theory and economics theory to some extent.As an extension of the further analysis to the issue, this paper argues that, the agent under the principal-agent contract should not be confined to the manager role, the agent with supervision power also need to be considered. And there is collusion motivation between agent with supervision power and manager, this can be achieved by the size of the supervision cost, power and motivation which is formed by the incentive mechanism of the current allocation proportion to explain. Obviously, such and interpretation would involve two other important factors of the enterprise moral hazard, that is the deal structure and scale of return are also important variables influencing enterprise moral hazard. In terms of deal structure, in the limited-time deal, once the enterprise appear moral-hazard behaviour, its subsequent optimal choice is to quiq echical choice again, and the good historical transaction records are not sufficient to ensure that the enterprise to make ethical decision again. Repeat deal structure has comparative advantage. Scale return feature affects the enterprise’s choice by the marginal output mechanism.Based on the above understanding, on the basis of the principal-agent in the process of Chinese listed company, this paper make and empirical analysis of the enterprise moral hazard problem, and find that the state-owned shares and its proportion, the relative shares proportion of the first major shareholder, return on invested capital, sustainable growth rate, growth ability (Tobin q), the size of board, meeting-attending condition of independent directors, internal employees shareholding, market governance, debt-paid capacity and the listed time are the main factors which are in significant correlation to the enterprieses’moral hazard without multicollinearity. Although the correlation test is still worth investigating in some aspects, but it is basically reveals the Chinese enterprise moral hazard problem on the principal-agent perspective.To study the enterprise moral hazard from the level characteristic and governance on the principal-agent perspective is a relatively novel observation point. If there is some possible innovation, it maye be the combined analysis of type of enterprise, deal structure, agent with supervision power and stakeholders to some extent. And it broadens the scope of the enterprise moral hazard research. Of course, this possible innovation will also lead to the deficiency and defect of this paper, which remain to be perfected in the future.更多还原