家族企业控股股东与家族高管合作路径研究

【作者】 李枫；

【导师】 高闯；

【作者基本信息】 首都经济贸易大学 ， 企业管理， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 Berle和Means在1932年提出两权分离的问题，Ross在1973年将其总结为委托代理问题。很多学者受Berle和Means的影响，认为委托代理问题的产生是由于所有权与控制权相分离造成的，但实际上劳动分工也会产生这一问题。Jean-Jacues Laffont和David Martimort（2002）、何大安和苏志煌（2009）就提出了这样的观点。在家族企业中，随着企业发展壮大，创始控股股东由于没有足够的能力或者精力对企业实现理想的治理效果，所以必须聘请一些高管帮助自己经营管理。在中国家族伦理文化的影响下，形成的人际关系是以自己为中心的差序格局，因此创始控股股东在聘请高管时都是先聘请与自己关系最亲近的人，然后再按照差序格局的顺序聘请。这样家族企业在成长过程中往往都会有很多的家族高管，控股股东与家族高管间的委托代理关系就显得非常重要。与普通的委托代理关系不同，家族企业中的控股股东与家族高管往往属于一个家族，由于家族原因形成了特殊的联系，这就为两者的合作提供了更多机会。有些学者认为控股股东与家族高管的合作是理所当然的，家族成员的目标、利益都应该是一致的，因此团结是必然的。这种观点明显简单化，与实际差距很大。贺小刚，李新春和连燕玲（2010）研究后就提出，家族成员也是有个体概念的，个人间的人际关系也都不一样，情感关系也不同，他们也是会因为经济利益、控制权等问题反目、不合作。因此对家族企业中的控股股东与家族高管的合作问题进行研究就显得非常有价值，可惜现在还很少有学者关注这个问题。本论文在吸收、借鉴以前学者研究成果的基础上，结合社会资本理论、惯例演化理论、伦理文化理论对中国家族企业中控股股东与家族高管的合作问题进行研究，发现了双重合作路径理论，对解释中国家族企业的控股股东与家族高管的合作路径大有帮助。本论文首先通过大量的案例分析，对股东与职业经理人以及家族股东与家族高管、中国家族企业的家族股东与家族高管不合作的类型和原因做了深入分析，为后面的研究打下基础。然后，运用多学科比较研究的方法，将生物进化中的竞争合作理论与委托代理理论进行了比较分析，获得对激励约束理论的本质认识，并且概括出激励合作路径的实现机理。接着运用社会资本理论、中国家族伦理文化对中国家族企业控股股东与家族高管合作的问题进行研究，阐释了社会资本合作路径的实现机理，并进而总结出双重合作路径。此后，结合惯例演化的原理对双重合作路径进行了动态研究，说明合作路径在动态的实现过程中受到惯例的影响。最后结合三个大型案例证明以上结论。本论文的研究思路沿着提出问题、分析问题、解决问题的路线展开。具体来说，本论文的主要研究内容如下：1、文献综述与相关概念的界定。在查阅了大量国内外文献的基础上，对家族企业、社会资本、中国家族伦理文化等关键性概念进行了界定，为后面的研究打下基础。并且论述了委托代理理论产生的缘由和存在的不足。2、中国家族企业控股股东与家族高管不合作的分类与原因分析。首先阐述了中国家族企业中委托代理理论的复杂性，然后结合大量案例分不同情况分析了不合作的类型和原因，并在此基础上引出合作问题。3、探讨约束激励理论的本质，深入分析现有激励路径的本质和不足，总结出现有激励路径的实现机理。4、提出社会资本合作路径，并构建了双重合作路径框架。运用社会资本工具、结合中国家族伦理文化，深入分析了家族股东与家族高管间的特殊合作关系，并在此基础上提出社会资本合作路径及其实现机理。5、基于惯例演化的角度对中国家族企业控股股东与家族高管的双重合作路径进行动态研究，解释了在合作路径动态演化的过程中惯例起到了非常重要的影响作用。6、案例分析。通过对利丰集团公司、方太厨具有限公司、希望集团有限公司进行案例研究，对上面的研究成果进行证明。得到的重要结论有：（1）激励是促成股东与高管合作的重要路径。它利用制度的规范性特点提高高管对未来预测的准确度，增加高管对未来机会成本的判断，进而实现合作，它的特点是“对事不对人”。（2）在中国家族企业中控股股东与家族高管间存在着复杂的委托代理关系，社会资本个性化处理问题的特点是实现控股股东与家族高管合作的重要路径。（3）惯例本身有规范作用，会对双重合作路径的形成起到一定影响，这种影响可以是正面的，也可以是负面的。更多还原

【Abstract】 Berle and Means proposed the issue about the separation of two rights in1932.Rosssummarized it as principal-agent theory in1973.Many scholars are affected by Berle andMeans.They believe that the principal-agent is arised by the separation of ownership andcontrol.But in fact,the specialization of labor is one reason.Jean-Jacues Laffont&DavidMartimort（2002）,He Daan&Su Zhi huang have the same viewpoint.With the enterprisedeveloping,the founding controlling shareholders of family firms has no enough capacityor energy to realize the ideal control effect.They must hire some managers to help theirmanagement.In China family ethics culture,relationship is the structure of grade and thecenter ourselves.So the founding controlling shareholders is to hire the closestrelationship’s people and then developing as the structure of grsde.The family firm willhire many family managers.So the relationship between controlling shareholders andfamily managers is very important.It different the general agency relationship.The controlling shareholder of familyfirms is the same family with the family managers.So they will have more opportunities torealize the cooperation by the special link.Some scholars believe family shareholders andfamily managers should be cooperation.Because they have the same target andinterese,unity is inevitable.This view is obviously simplistic and a large gap with theactual.He Xiao Gang,Li Xin Chun and Lian Yan Ling(2010)believe that family membersalso have individual concept.The relationship and emotion is different.They may beenemies and uncooperation because of economic interests and control. So it’s veryvaluable to study the cooperation of controlling shareholder and family managers in familyfirms.There is few scholars pay attention to the problem.This paper absorb and draw on theprevious research achievements.It combined with social capital theory,routine evolutiontheory and ethical culture theory to research the cooperation of controlling shareholdersand family managers in family firms.The paper builds the dual path of cooperation theoryis to help to explain the cooperation of controlling shareholders and family managers infamily firms.The paper analysis the type and reason of uncooperation between shareholders andoccupation managers,family shareholders and family managers,family shareholders andfamily mangers in chinese family firms by a large number of case studies.It is thefoundation of the following research.The paper draw on the multi-disciplinaryapproach.The paper compare the evolution of competition and cooperation with principal-agent theory to get the essence of the incentive theory and summarize theimplementation mechanism of cooperation path.Then the paper study the cooperation ofcontrolling shareholders family managers in family firms by social capital theory andChina family ethics culture.The paper explains the mechanism of social capital cooperationpath and then sums up the dual cooperation paths.And then the paper explains that the dualcooperation paths is influced by routine.At last,the paper prove the conclusion by threelarge cases.The research ideas of the paper develop along the propose problem,analysisproblem and solve problem.Specifically,the main contents of this paper are as follows.1.Definition of literature review and related concepts.The paper define the keyconcepts of family firms,social capital and China family ethics culture and analysis thereason and insufficiency of principal-agent theory.2.The classification and reason analysis about the uncooperation between controllingshareholders with family mangers in Chinese family firms.The paper analysis thecomplexity of principal-agent in Chinese family firms.And the the paper analysis theclassification and reason of uncooperation in many cases by many cases.3.To investigate the nature of incentive and constraint theory,and then analysis thenature,insufficiency and mechanism of the existing path.4.To propose social capital cooperation path and build a dual cooperation pathframe.The paper analysis the special cooperation between family shareholders with familymanagers by social capital and China ethic culture,and then explains the mechanism ofsocial capital cooperation path.5.To analysis the dual cooperation paths of controlling shareholders and familymanagers in Chinese family firms by evolution of routine.And then the paper explains theinfluence from routine.6.Case Study.To prove the result by study Li&Fung company,Fotile KitchenwareCo.Ltd company and Hope Group company.The important conclusion：(1) Incentive is the important path to realize cooperationbetween shareholders with managers.It improves the forecast accuracy and increase theopportunity cost to guide cooperation.(2)The personal characteristics of social capital fit todeal with the complex interpersonal relationship between controlling shareholders andfamily managers in Chines family firms.(3)Routine can influence the conformation of dualcooperation paths.The influence can be positive or negative.更多还原