【作者】 彭艳芳；

【导师】 符启林；

【作者基本信息】 首都经济贸易大学 ， 国民经济学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 当今中国正在逐渐由一个“自产国家”向“税收国家”转型，对国家治理提出了新的要求。税权，是税法学与税收学研究的逻辑起点与核心，也是一种稀缺的资源。作为一项制度安排，税权配置问题对整个社会经济影响深远。事实上，近年来中国经济出现的很多问题都可以在税权配置上找到根源，强化对该问题的研究具有重要的理论与实践意义。已有的研究中，法学界与经济学界基本上是泾渭分明，鲜有将二者结合起来的学术成果。税权配置涉及国家的根本权力，具有复杂性与特殊性，单纯从法学或经济学的角度展开研究，并不足以将问题分析清楚。在目前学术界，特别是经济学领域，对税权的研究尚显薄弱的情况下，运用法经济学的研究思路与方法，深入探讨中国中央与地方税权配置问题就成为本文的一种尝试。本文所要解决的核心问题是：中国中央与地方税权配置是否符合效率、公平标准？其背后的制度成因是什么？围绕该问题，本文主要采用了文献调查、均衡分析、统计分析、历史分析、比较分析、博弈论等方法，以税收债务关系理论为研究始点，在法经济学理性选择范式下，分析中央、地方的行为选择与动因；从不同角度考察中央与地方税权配置是否效率以及是否公平；从制度供给、需求层面研究实践中税权配置出现不公平和效率损失的原因，并在此基础上阐述优化中国税权配置的路径选择。本文的核心观点是：当前中国税权配置的根本症结在于行政化的分权方式，税权法治以起点公平为始，总成本最小，也最有效率；优化中国税权配置应遵循法治的路径前行。创新之处有：（1）研究视角的创新。本文以税收债务关系理论作为研究的逻辑起点，将效率、公平作为衡量税权配置的标准；基于法经济学理性选择范式，通过分析中央政府与地方政府在税权配置中的行为，对中国税收分权进行动态考察，并从制度层面探讨现有税收分权模式的成因。与传统法学、经济学对中央与地方税权配置的分析路径相比，本文在研究视角与思路上有所突破。（2）税权配置的公平效率观。本文在运用效率、公平指标分别对中央与地方税权配置进行考量的基础上，进一步探讨当前中国税收分权中存在种种问题的根本原因正是由于制度安排的起点不公，即行政化的税权配置方式。税权法治则恰恰补正了行政分权的不足，起点的公平不仅有助于结果公平的实现，也有利于长期效率的提高。（3）将税权横向、纵向配置相结合。税权配置的两个维度间并非孤立存在。在探讨中央与地方政府间的税权配置时，将其与横向配置结合，认为中国税权纵向配置失衡源于横向配置的失控。因此，尽管纵向分权对经济的影响更为显著，但问题的解决却最终应归结于税收立法权的横向配置，这也使得所提出的税权法治化的路径选择更具说服力。（4）分析了所有制结构变动对税权配置的影响。市场经济环境下，私营经济的快速发展使得来自“私人部门”的税收收入在国家财政收入中的地位越来越重要，这大大提升了对税权的合法性、正当性等方面的要求。然而，中国的税权配置方式依然沿袭过往的行政化路径，没有适时调整及摆脱对“人治”路径的依赖，未能很好地适应当前经济发展的要求，从而导致实践中诸多问题的产生。（5）构建更加符合中国国情的税收分权指标——地方税收自给率，实证结果表明，近年来中国的税收分权状况并不利于经济增长。更多还原

【Abstract】 Today China is moving gradually from a homegrown county to a tax country. It growsnew demands on national governments. Taxing power is the logical starting point and corein tax law and tax studies. It is also a scarce resource. As an institutional arrangement, theallocation of taxing power impacts on the whole economics. In fact, in recent years, manyproblems in China’s economy can be found as the causes in allocation of taxing power.Strengthening the study of this issue has important theoretical and practical significance.In the existing studies, law experts and economists are clearly different. There israrely achievement combining the two academic fields. The allocation of taxing powerinvolves the fundamental power of the state, which has the complexity and particularity.Simply launching the research from the perspective of law or economics can not analyzethe issue clearly. In the current academic community, particularly in the field of economics,the study of taxing power is still rather weak. Using the research ideas and methods of lawand economics on discussing China’s central-local allocation of taxing power becomes anexploration in this thesis.The core issues we concerned in this thesis are whether China’s central-localallocation of taxing power meets the standards of efficiency and fairness and what are theinstitutional causes. Around these questions, this research mainly adopts the literatureinvestigation, equilibrium analysis, statistical analysis, historical and comparative analysisand game theory methods, etc. Based on the theory of tax debt relations, using the rationalchoice paradigm of law and economics, we analyze the behavior of the central and localgovernments and their motivation, examine their efficiency and fairness from differentangles. Then we research the causes of unfairness and efficiency losses from theinstitutional supply and demand in practice. Based on this, we point out the optimized pathon China’s taxing power allocation.The core idea in this thesis is the fundamental problem in China’s current taxingpower allocation is administrative decentralization. The allocation under the role of lawdisposes the fair at the beginning, minimizes total cost and also is the most efficient. Tooptimize China’s allocation of taxing power, we should follow the route of law. In thisthesis, the innovation points include:(1) The innovative research perspective. In this thesis, we adopt the theory of tax debt relations as the logical starting point of the research. Efficiency and fairness are used asstandards of taxing power allocation. By analyzing the behavior of the central and localgovernments, we investigate China’s tax decentralization dynamically and discuss thecause of the existing tax decentralization mode. We try to break through the path oftraditional law or economics on central-local allocation of taxing power field.(2) The view of fairness and efficiency in taxing power allocation. In this thesis, basedon using efficiency and fairness indexes respectively to the central-local allocation oftaxing power, we further explore current China’s tax decentralization and find thefundamental cause of the problems is the unfairness at the starting point of institutionalarrangements. Namely, it is also called the administrative configuration mode of taxingpower. The role of law just corrects the deficiencies of administrative decentralizationmode. The fairness of starting point will not only help to achieve fair result, but also beconducive to the long-term efficiency.(3) Combining the horizontal and vertical allocation. The two dimensions of taxingpower allocation do not exist isolately. In exploring the allocation between central andlocal governments, we should combine it with the horizontal configuration. We considerthat the cause of the imbalance in vertical allocation dues to the out of control in horizontal.Therefore, while the vertical decentralization impacts the economy more significantly, thefinal solution of the problem should be attributed to the horizontal allocation. It also makesthe proposed path of role of law more persuasive.(4) Analysing the impact of changes in China’s ownership structure on taxing power.Under the market-economy environment, the rapid development of the private economymakes tax revenue from the private sector in national finance income more and moreimportant, which greatly enhanced the requirements of justification and legitimacy abouttaxing power. However, China’s authority configuration mode still followed the old pathand did not adjust and get rid of the dependence on the path of rule of man. It failed toadapt to the requirement of the current economic development well, which leads to manyproblems in the practice.(5) Constructing a tax decentralization index under China’s reality. It is named asself-sufficiency rate of local tax revenue. The empirical results show that in recent years,China’s tax decentralization was not conducive to economic growth.更多还原