【作者】 周菁；

【导师】 孙明贵；

【作者基本信息】 东华大学 ， 企业管理， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 当前,经理股票期权计划被认为是一种解决代理问题的、有效的薪酬工具,成为学术界和实务界关注的焦点。然而,盈余管理在上市公司中普遍存在,这给股票期权的效果带来一定的不利影响,甚至使其成为经理人侵占股东利益的工具。为了最大化股票期权的激励效果,在我国上市公司大规模实施股票期权计划之际,有必要深入了解股票期权计划下盈余管理的特点及其影响因素。本文试图从两个层面厘清股票期权计划与盈余管理的关系：其一,股票期权计划本身固有的契约特点,可能导致经理人员的盈余管理呈现出哪些独有的特征。其二,股票期权计划中具体的契约要素设计不同,又会导致盈余管理具有哪些差异。本文用六个章节展开论述。第一章为绪论。阐述了本文的研究背景、研究目的、研究贡献和技术路线。第二章是文献综述。在国内外文献综述的基础上,梳理了研究的主流和新兴的发展趋势,确立本文的研究内容(不单纯地研究授予比例对盈余管理的影响,而是全面研究各项契约要素的影响)和研究视角(不孤立地研究盈余管理,而是将其置于管理层权力框架下)。第三章是基础理论研究。首先辨析了盈余管理约束的必要性、约束目标和约束路径,为本文通过完善契约来约束盈余管理奠定理论基础；随后分析了会计信息与盈余管理的关系,并根据会计信息嵌入股票期权的方式不同将盈余管理的目的分为两类,探讨了不同目的的盈余管理在程度和影响因素等方面的差异,为后面两章分别对两种目的的盈余管理进行研究提供理论支持。第四章,对以最大化股票期权收益为目的的盈余管理的研究。通过博弈模型构建,探讨了经理股票期权计划下盈余管理的程度及其影响因素,提出假设,并以我国2006年正式实施股权激励以来实施股票期权计划的上市公司为研究样本,进行了实证检验,提出改善契约治理的建议。第五章,对以达到业绩条件为目的的盈余管理的研究。探讨了管理层权力、契约要素和盈余管理三者的关系,着力分析了契约要素对盈余管理影响的类别。本章基本结构和第四章相同,包括理论分析和研究假设、研究设计和假设演绎、实证检验三个方面。第六章,结论和建议。综合前面章节的内容,系统构建了管理层权力对盈余管理的影响路径,在提炼结论的基础上提出了相应的建议。通过研究,本文发现：(1)由于股票期权计划的激励机理存在某些固有特点,这一薪酬契约下的盈余管理的确存在不同于传统薪酬契约的特点,主要表现为盈余管理目标的多元性、盈余管理行为的阶段性、盈余管理方法的多样性和盈余管理程度的目标指向性；(2)在公告阶段,除激励强度外,同时授予监事会或董事会成员会增加经理盈余管理的动机；(3)在行权阶段,决定盈余管理程度的主要因素是经理对盈余管理的需要状况和盈余管理能产生的收益的大小,而盈余管理的成本不影响经理盈余管理决策,可见,在我国经理盈余管理的边际成本较小。因此,提高股票期权治理效应的建议是：(1)既然经理在缔约阶段寻租的一种主要手段是提高激励水平,那以我国上市公司在考虑用股票期权契约取代业绩奖金契约时,一种简单可行的做法是：保持原有激励水平的等价效用。这样,缔约双方能按照原有的分配比例分享帕累托效率,也不会扩大经理寻租的动机。(2)应该将授予经理人和授予董事会成员的股票期权计划分离,并在不同时点授予,以免股票期权成为增强管理层权力的工具。(3)进一步健全内、外部监管和相应的惩罚机制,以免其成为我国上市公司股票期权计划契约治理的“短板”。本文在研究视角和研究方法上都有一定程度的创新。本文的主要理论贡献是：(1)提出“契约中会计信息的嵌入方式决定盈余管理的特点”这一观点。契约治理中产生盈余管理的原因是契约对会计盈余信息的依赖。契约中往往会主动或被动地、直接或间接地嵌入了会计盈余信息。基于此,将经理股票期权计划下的盈余管理按照会计信息的嵌入方式不同分为两类进行研究。(2)构建了“权力决定薪酬契约设计从而决定盈余管理”的影响路径,并根据对盈余管理的影响方式不同将契约要素分类。(3)提出授予对象的结构会对管理层权力产生反作用。这种作用既影响缔约时董事会代表股东与经理谈判的意愿,也会影响缔约后对经理的监督。更多还原

【Abstract】 Nowadays, the traditional manager compensation system is getting more difficult to adapt to the actual needs of enterprise management. Executive Stock Option Plan (ESOP) is considered to be an effective compensation contract to solve the Agency Problem. However earnings management in listed companies is widespread, which impacts on stock option plan. Since2006, more and more listed companies in China have implemented stock option plan. In order to maximize its incentive effect, it is necessary to study managers’earnings management behavior. This paper studies the characteristics of earnings management in ESOP from two aspects. First, the stock option plan could make earnings management different from that in bonus scheme. Second, the contract elements of stock option plan can also affect earnings management.This paper constructs with six chapters.Chapter1is the introduction which gives the research objectives, research contents, technical route end research methods.Chapter2is literature review on (1) the governance effect of stock option plan,(2) the earnings management and (3) earnings management in the stock option plan.Chapter3is the theoretical basis of this paper. Thirst, discuss the necessity and the method to restrain earnings management. Then, divide the purpose of earnings management into two categories according to the role of accounting information in the ESOP.Chapter4studies on the earnings management for the purpose to maximize the stock option income. I first develop a CEO equity incentive contract model in the presence of earnings management, then present assumptions, and finally come to a conclusion by empirical study.Chapter5studies on the earnings management for the purpose to be qualified to award or exercise. I discuss how contract elements in the the stock option plan affect earnings management with Managerial Power theory. Then I study earnings management in ESOP of Chinese listed company in different stage with Total Accrual Model and Distribution Model.Chapter6is the last chapter which gives conclusions and proposals.The main findings are as follows:Firstly, The earnings management in the ESO is different from that in the bonus scheme in three ways. That is (1) it has pluralism objectives,(2) its objectives will change by stages and (3) it has clear and definit goals in each stage. The ESOP will, to a certain extent, inhibit earnings management behavior.Secondly, the extent of earnings management depends on the managerial power of the company. Different power will lead to different contract elements and consequently different extend of earnings management. The contract elements can be divided into4groups. The first group in turn affects the managerial power, such as vesting object. The second group affects the requirement of earnings management, such as the requirment of performance. The third group affects the benefit which managers can get by managing earnings, including incentive level and exercise price. The last group affects the cost of earnings management, including assessment indicators and effective date. I find that the last group doesn’t affect managers’ decision in Chinese listed company, which means that the marginal cost of earnings management is low because of inefficient mornitoring and punishment.Therefore, I propose the following suggestions:Firstly, managers usually use their power to increase the incentive level during the process of drafting contracts, which consequently increase the extent of earnings management. To avoid this situation worse, a simple and feasible way is to keep the same equivalent utility with original incentive level while Chinese listed company intends to replace the bonus scheme with the equity incentive one. In this way, both parties of the contracts can share the Pareto Efficiency per the original ratio, while managers’ motivation for rent-seeking will not increase.Secondly, the shareholders should contract different SOP with different person in order to avoid weakening the efficiency of corporate governance.Compared to the prior study, the contributions of this paper are as follows:Firstly, this paper makes integrated and systematic research on earnings management in ESOP. This paper studies all the cc itract elements related to earnings management insead of incentive level only. Meanwhile it studies the contract period and the valid period as a whole under the managerial power theory instead of studying separately.Secondly, this paper contributes to Earnings Management Theory and Managerial Power Theory. It divides the purpose of earnings management into two categories according to the role of accounting information in the ESOP. It also constructs the path model that managerial power influences earnings management.更多还原