【作者】 于博；

【导师】 汪炜；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 西方经济学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 风险投资是高新技术产业发展的“助推器”、经济增长的“发动机”,在支持创新活动的开展和高新技术产业化方面的作用不可替代。在过去二十年间,中国的风险投资不仅支持了高新技术产业的快速发展,对缓解中小企业资金短缺也发挥了非常重要的作用。我们如何以新的思维去认识风险投资这一仍在不断完善中的新生事物、总结经验教训并提出新的发展道路,从而使我国在知识经济时代的竞争中立于不败之地?这一问题的回答需要我们能在微观层面更清楚的理解风险资本是如何与中小企业有效结合并参与企业的价值创造过程的。本文从信息不对称的视角构建了风险投资参与企业价值创造的理论分析框架,该框架是通过回答以下三个基本问题的方式来完成的。第一个问题是风投如何筛选出适合其投资的企业,并锁定投资风险的?第二个问题是在投资入股后,风投如何帮助企业实现价值提升,具体表现又有哪些?第三个问题是在风投在企业价值市场化、风投实现退出的过程中,其退出方式和时机的决定机制是怎样的?本文分六章对上述三个问题来进行解答,得到以下结论：一、风险投资机构能比商业银行更有效地解决与企业(家)之间的信息不对称问题、发掘具备较高成长潜力的初创期企业并对其价值作合理评估。其中经营或战略风险较高、知识产权价值较大、清算价值较低、无形资产比重较大或高风险策略下企业控制权溢价较高的企业,更倾向于向风投而非银行获得融资,他们也更易受到风投青睐；而投资条款则是风投控制投资后风险、实现对企业家激励的重要手段,较为典型的条款有阶段投资、联合投资、可转换证券与估值调整协议条款。二、风投能够有效提升董事会的运作效率,使被投资企业的股权结构更为分散,这减小了控制入股东一股独大的可能性；同时,风投持股企业的董事会规模更大、独立性更强、董事经验更为丰富。风投还能够向市场传递有关企业价值的信息,虽然由于我国现行股票发行制度和定价规则存在缺陷,该信息难以在企业股票的发行价中得以体现,但风投能使该信息在上市首日收盘价中反映出来,我们称之为风投的“市场力量功能”。三、风险投资的有效退出有赖于其对外部投资者与企业家之间信息不对称问题的有效解决,风投解决该信息不对称问题的条件与能力决定了风投的退出方式和退出时机。成熟期高融资需求的企业、合伙制或具备银行背景的风投,包含阶段投资与联合投资条款的合同,都将更有利于风投实现上市退出；而初创期第融资需求、合伙制或投行背景的风投、风投对企业控制度较高,都将会导致投资持有期更长。基于上述结论,本文提出了相应的政策建议：一、应积极鼓励风险投资行业的发展,并相应的改善风险投资行业的发展环境,这有赖于我国合同法、知识产权保护法、破产法等一系列法律法规体系的健全和完善,从使投融资双方的合法利益得到应有的保护。二、应合理引导我国股市目前已经出现的风投市场力量成为“理性的”市场力量,既要改善二级市场信息不对称,进一步提高股票交易的定价效率,也要警惕二级市场借助风投题材的短期炒作,有效防范过度投机和价格操纵行为。三、应尽快出台三板市场和中小企业股权转让市场的建设和相应监管规章制度,同时积极加强合同法、合伙企业法等相关法律制度建设,从而实现合理引导风投机构对中小创新企业的投资和退出,实现中小企业的良性成长及其与资本市场的衔接。更多还原

【Abstract】 As the booster of high-tech industries, venture capital is the engine of economic growth. It has played an irreplaceable role in supporting the innovation activities. In the past two decades, China’s venture investment not only supports the rapid development of high-tech industries, but also alleviate the shortage of funds for small and medium enterprises.How do we continuely get better knowledge of venture capital, learn from past experience, and propose a new path of development, to be invincible in the competition in the era of knowledge economy? To answer this question we need to more clearly understand that, on the micro level, how venture capital effectively combines with small and medium enterprises and participate in their value creation process.From the perspective of information asymmetry, this study has built a theoretical framework by answering the following three questions. First, how does venture capital filters out the enterprises suited, and control the investment risk? Second, after the capital infusion, how does venture capitalists add value to the enterprises, and what is the specific performance of the enterprises? Third, when venture capital make enterprise value marketable, what determines its exit decision?This study is orgnized with six chapters to discuss and analysis these three issues. The conclusions are as followed. Firstly, venture capitals can solve the problem of information asymmetry better than commercial banks, and more effectively filter and evaluate the enterprises. Enterprises with higher strategic risk, larger intellectual property value, lower liquidation value and higher control premium is preferred by venture capital. And venture capital contracts can effectively achieve the important means of incentives for entrepreneurs. Secondly, venture capitalists can effectively enhance the operational efficiency of the board of the enterprises. Venture capital backed enterprises have dispersed shareholding, reducing the possibility of controller’s encroachment of minority shareholders’rights. They also have larger and mor independent and experienced board. Althoug the defects of the current stock issuing system and pricing rules hinder the venture capital backed enterprises having higher issuing prices, but venture capitals’ market power can rise their IPO underpricing up. Thirdly, the effective exits of venture capital is determined by their condition and ability to solve the information asymmetry problem between new buyers and the enterprises. Those mature enterprises with large capital demand, invested by venture capitals of limited partnership or with banking background, with contracts of stage financing or sydication, will have greater probability of IPO exit. Those initial enterprises with low capital demand, invested by venture capitals of limited partnership, with investment banking background or large control rights of the enterprises, will lengthen the investment duration of venture capitals.Based on the above conclusions, policy recommendations are proposed. Firstly, the development of venture capital industry should be encouraged and supported by a series of legal protection. Secondly, the market power of venture capital in China’s stock market should be reasonablely guided to be a rational market forces. Last but not leas, the Third Market and SME equity transfer market and the corresponding regulatory rules should be introduced as soon as possible, to reasonablely guide venture capitals’ investment and exit, achieving the interface between small and medium enterprises and capital market.更多还原