【作者】 卢涛；

【导师】 林继肯；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 金融学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 “诚信”对于转型经济,特别是转型经济中的资本市场有着至关重要的作用。资本市场作为资源配置、价格发现、资金筹集的场所,其功能的有效实现很大程度上依赖于上市公司的信息披露质量。上市公司财务报告舞弊引起的股价波动、内幕交易和市场操纵等问题严重损害资本市场功能,打击投资者信心、损害市场效率,甚至会危害国家经济乃至政治安全。因此,系统研究上市公司财务报告舞弊及其监管机制,在宏观上有利于提高资本市场效率,维护投资者利益,在微观上有利于促进上市公司治理结构的完善,提高上市公司信息披露质量和公司的诚信意识。论文第一章为导论。该部分提出本文的研究动机和研究意义,界定相关概念,明确研究内容和研究方法。本章阐述了财务报告舞弊的普遍存在及其巨大危害,借鉴前人研究成果,对财务报告舞弊进行了准确的概念界定,总结了与财务报告舞弊相关的概念,包括盈余管理、会计错误和会计信息失真等。该章指出本文研究内容：在对财务报告舞弊相关文献进行综述和对基本理论分析之后,研究了财务报告舞弊的识别,并对中美财务报告舞弊识别进行了实证分析,在分析了我国上市公司财务报告舞弊的成因后,提出了基于我国国情的上市公司财务报告舞弊监管路径。本文使用了规范分析和实证分析相结合的研究方法。第二章为文献回顾,具体包括财务报告舞弊的成因、财务报告舞弊的侦测识别,和财务报告舞弊的监管。从已有研究成果来看,国外特别是美国的研究已经比较深入、系统,形成了财务报告舞弊理论,在研究方法上多采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的办法。由于我国资本市场只有20多年的历史,相比美国而言,我国对上市公司财务报告舞弊的研究尚处于起步阶段。除此之外,中美两国财务报告舞弊比较研究在已有研究成果中比较少见,本文在这方面则进行了初步尝试,通过比较研究,试图从美国经验中获取一定参考价值。因此,通过对已有文献的梳理,本文确定从财务指标角度进行财务报告舞弊的识别研究,并基于和美国对比角度提出中国上市公司财务报告舞弊监管思路,在研究方法上,采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的研究方法。第三章,笔者分析了财务报告舞弊的经典理论,包括信息不对称和利益驱动理论、产权理论、博弈论、“有限理性”理论和其他财务报告舞弊理论。信息不对称和利益驱动理论认为财务报告舞弊的动机是利益驱动,而信息不对称则是财务报告舞弊的必要条件；产权理论认为上市公司所有权和经营权分离而导致的“委托一代理”问题是导致上市公司特别是中国国有上市公司财务报告舞弊的根本原因；博弈论理论认为财务报告的提供者和需求者存在不完全相同的利益诉求,再加上相关制度的不完善,报告提供者和需求者会就会计信息真实性进行博弈,而信息的真实性将取决于博弈双方最终所达成的均衡；“有限理性”理论从过程理性和结果理性角度来分析财务报告舞弊的发生,该理论认为现行的财务评价指标体系是以结果为导向的,这是财务报告舞弊的诱因。此外,本章还从白领犯罪、烂苹果理论和外部性理论角度分析了财务报告舞弊。第四章介绍了财务报告舞弊的识别。第一节总结了财务报告舞弊七种常见手段,并介绍了各种手段的具体操作方法；第二节介绍了财务报告舞弊的识别方法,包括关注审计风险较大的会计账户、从外部观察财务报告舞弊、从报表勾稽关系观察财务报告舞弊行为和移动指标波动预警等；第三节介绍了财务报告舞弊识别模型,包括单变量分析、多元判别分析、逻辑回归模型、线性概率模型、专家系统、递归分割算法、神经网络模型和逻辑回归模型等,并指出了这些模型的优点和缺点。第五章对财务报告舞弊的识别进行基于中美比较的逻辑回归分析。这一部分笔者对上一章提出的各种模型进行了优劣对比,并最终选择了逻辑回归模型作为本文的实证模型。实证研究了与财务报告舞弊有关的因素,试图分析与财务报告舞弊相关的客观指标。通过对中美两国的样本分别进行分析,以期发现两国之间的差异。在变量的选择方面,出于数据可获得性和可度量性考虑,本文实证研究使用了可从上市公司财务报告中直接获取的舞弊动机指标而不是环境控制指标。在研究中,本文将样本分为舞弊公司和非舞弊公司。美国样本59个舞弊公司和51个对比公司的逻辑回归分析表明,操控性应计账目在三年内的波动(财务报告舞弊发生当年以及发生前两年)与财务报告舞弊有正向关系。结果还显示财务报告舞弊与舞弊发生当年及前一年经营状况恶化程度有关系。通过单变量分析与多变量分析,分别生成一个二维模型和一个四维模型,来判别并归类110个公司的样本。实证结果表明,四维模型的表现优于二维模型。对中国样本69个舞弊公司和58个对比样本公司进行同样的逻辑回归,发现应收账款在三年内的波动情况与财务报告舞弊有正向关系,而存货在三年内的变化与总资产收益率ROA和财务报告舞弊有负向关系。通过单变量分析和多变量分析,分别生成一个二维模型和一个三维模型,来判别127个样本。实证结果表明,三维模型的表现优于二维模型。根据中美差异,我们可以看出美国舞弊公司更倾向于采用虚假销售、提前确认销售或有意扩大赊销范围调整利润总额等方式进行财务报告舞弊。而中国舞弊公司则倾向于通过非营业活动提高净利润的方式进行财务报告舞弊。第六章分析了我国上市公司财务报告舞弊的产生因素。第一节指出,利益驱动是上市公司财务报告舞弊的根本原因,而最主要的利益驱动则来自于上市公司、地方政府和会计师事务所、投资银行等中介机构。第二节从我国资本市场的融资制度角度分析了我国企业偏好股权融资。再次,本文比较了股权融资和债务融资并指出股权融资的低成本性、低风险性和无偿性是我国上市公司偏爱股权融资的重要原因。第三节指出了我国上市公司财务报告舞弊的决定性因素,并指出道德和制度是财务报告舞弊的决定性因素。在分析了道德的内涵和道德对人类观念和行为的影响之后,本文从证券市场的约束机制和监管机制两个方面分析了我国财务报告舞弊的原因。在分析制度因素之后,本文从道德角度对财务报告舞弊的决定性因素进行了分析：本文阐明了道德的内涵特别是职业道德的内涵,在分析职业道德时,本文重点分析了会计职业道德在财务报告舞弊中的决定作用,并从三个角度分析了我国会计职业道德引发财务报告舞弊的可能性。第七章探讨财务报告舞弊的监管路径。第一节介绍了基于博弈主体的财务报告舞弊治理模型,广义的财务报告舞弊治理参与方包括监管机构、外部审计者、内部审计者、公司高层管理者、董事会、审计委员会等。监管机构包括证券监督委员会和会计准则制定者,他们在上市公司财务报告舞弊治理中起着极其重要的作用,本文也正是从这一角度来分析上市公司财务报告舞弊的治理。第二节回顾了“安然事件”之后美国财务报告舞弊监管政策。《2002年萨班斯一奥克斯利法案》的出台不仅是在新形势下对19世纪30年代大萧条出现之后美国制定的《1933年证券法》和《1934年证券交易法》的补充和修改,而且对会计和审计行业规范、公司治理责任、上市公司信息披露、分析师合规尽责和证券交易委员会的职责和权力等给予了新的诠释。第三节从股权分置后我国资本市场环境变化和我国上市公司信息披露所存在问题的角度分析了基于中国国情的上市公司监管环境。第四节提出了基于美国经验和我国国情的上市公司财务报告舞弊监管路径。监管层面应该借鉴美国经验,建立健全证券评级制度、强化上市公司信息披露制度和完善上市公司诚信机制。通过这些措施,以达到对中国资本市场财务报告舞弊行为加强监督管理的目的。本文最后一章总结了本文的研究结论、主要贡献和研究局限性,指出未来的研究方向。更多还原

【Abstract】 Credibility has a vital role for the economies in transition, especially for the transformation of the capital market in the economic like China.Capital markets have functions of resource allocation, price discovery and fund-raising. And the realization of these functions is heavily dependent on the effective implementation of information disclosure of listed companies. Stock price volatility, insider trading, market manipulation and other problems caused by listed companies’ financial reporting fraud had seriously damaged capital market, eroded investors’ confidence and undermined market efficiency, and it could even threaten the national economy and lead to certain political crisis. Therefore, a systematical study of listed companies’ financial reporting fraud and its regulatory mechanisms has its positive significance, from the macro view, it is beneficial to improving the efficiency of capital markets and maintaining investors’ interest in the market; from the micro view, it is beneficial to promoting the improvement of the governance structure of listed companies and improving the overall quality of listed companies.The introductory part of this paper presents the motivation and research significance of this study, defines the relevant concepts and points out the contents and research methods of this study. The study motivation stems from the widespread presence of financial reporting fraud and its enormous harm. From the research sense, the study of financial reporting fraud is significant to investors, creditors, regulators and financial report providers themselves. In this chapter, a precise definition of financial reporting fraud was made and this part summarizes the concepts which are related to financial reporting fraud, including earnings management, accounting errors and accounting information distortion. In order to define these concepts, this article refers to previous statements of the appropriate summaries of them. At the end of this chapter the writer describes the contents and research methods of this study.In the second part of this thematic study, this paper combs previous studies firstly. The review of the literature mainly focuses on causes of financial reporting fraud, detection identification and supervision of financial reporting fraud. From the existing research point of view, foreign countries, especially the United States have done more sophisticated study than China and have formed a more comprehensive theory of financial reporting fraud. Compared with the domestic study, the foreign research likes to use a combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis to make research while the domestic research is at the initial stage and the research methods are also more oriented to normative analysis. In addition, the comparative study of financial reporting fraud between the two countries in research is relatively rare in the existing research. Therefore, combing through the existing literature, this article decided to make recognition of financial reporting fraud from the perspective of financial indicators. Based on the angle of comparison with the United States, some regulatory thinking of financial reporting fraud for China’s listed companies is made.In the third chapter, the paper analyzes the classical theory of financial reporting fraud, including information asymmetry, profit-driven theory, property rights theory, game theory, Simon’s "bounded rationality" theory and other theories of financial reporting fraud. Asymmetric information theory and interest-driven theory points out that profit-driven is the motive of financial reporting fraud and information asymmetry is a necessary condition for financial reporting fraud; Property rights theory points out that the separation of ownership and management in listed companies may lead to the problem of "principal agent", and that is the root cause of the financial reporting fraud in listed companies, especially in state-owned listed companies, In order to clarify financial reporting fraud, game theory points out that different interests and aspirations between providers and demanders of financial reporting, coupled with the imperfections of related systems, makes providers and demanders game at the accuracy of information, and the authenticity of the information will depend on the final equilibrium reached by the two sides who join the game."Bounded rationality "comes from the perspective of process rationality and result rationality to analyze the occurrence of financial reporting fraud. Bounded rationality points out that the current financial evaluation index system is based on results-oriented, and this is the incentive to financial reporting fraud, In addition, this chapter also analyzes financial reporting fraud from the perspective of white-collar crime, rotten apple theory and externality theory.Chapter In studies the identification of financial reporting fraud. Section I of this chapter summarizes seven common means of financial reporting fraud and describes their specific operational methods; Section II describes the identification method of financial reporting fraud, including greater attention to the higher risk of accounting accounts audit, focusing on the external implementation of the financial reporting, the observation of financial reporting fraud on articulation report and early warning indicators of volatility. Section III describes the identification model of financial reporting fraud first, including the univariate analysis, multivariate discriminate analysis, logistic regression models, linear probability models, expert systems, recursive partitioning algorithm, neural network model and logistic regression models, and than points out the advantages and disadvantages of these models. The final section of this chapter compares the pros and cons of these models and selected logistic regression model as an empirical model of this article.Chapter V makes a logistic regression analysis on financial reporting fraud. In this part, the paper makes an empirical research on the factors which related to financial reporting fraud and attempts to analyze which objective indicators lead to the financial reporting fraud. Samples of listed companies from China and the USA were analyzed to find differences of financial reporting fraud between the two countries. This paper uses the method of comparative analysis in the study, which means the sample is divided into fraud companies and Non-fraud Companies. Logistic regression analysis is based on the American sample of59fraud companies and51compared companies, the empirical results shows that the fluctuation of manipulative accruals accounts within three years (Which means the year when financial reporting fraud occurred and two years before the it.) has a positive relationship with financial reporting fraud. The results also shows that financial reporting fraud has relationship with deteriorated business conditions in the year which financial reporting fraud occurred and the former year. By a univariate analysis and a multivariate analysis respectively, the research generates a two-dimensional model and a four-dimensional model to determine and classify the samples of110companies and four-dimensional model outperforms the two-dimensional model. Similarly, Logistic regression analysis based on the Chinese sample of69fraud companies and58compared companies is also made and we find that the fluctuation of receivable accounts within three years has a positive relationship with financial reporting fraud, changes of inventories within three years and return on total assets ROA have a negative relationship with financial reporting fraud. By univariate analysis and multivariate analysis, the research generates a two-dimensional model and a three-dimensional model to determine the127samples and the three-dimensional models outperforms the two-dimensional model. According to Sino-US differences, we can see that U.S. firms tend to use false sales, confirming sales in advance, broadening the scope of credit to adjust the total profit while the Chinese companies tend to make financial reporting fraud by non-business activities to increasing the their profit.Chapter VI analyzes the factors of the generation of China’s listed companies’financial reporting fraud. In the first section, it is pointed out that the root cause of this fraud is the drive of interests, which mainly come from listed companies and accounting firms, securities companies and other intermediaries. Section II of this chapter points out that Chinese enterprises have the preference for equity financing,then the author discusses the reasons why listed companies in China prefer equity financing and the problem that while state-owned enterprise have resolved their thirst for fund rising, there comes a new problem of financing for small and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, the article compares equity financing with debt financing and identified that it is the qualities of low-cost, low risk and non-reimbursement of equity financing that explained for the preference for it. Section III lists out the decisive factor in China’s listed companies’fraud, and points out that moral and system are decisive factors of the frauds.Chapter VII describes the regulatory path to financial reporting fraud. The first section of this chapter describes the listed company governable model of financial reporting fraud based on the main game participants, the broad financial reporting fraud management participants include regulators, external auditors, internal auditors, company executives, board of directors and the audit committee. Regulatory agencies include the Securities Commission and the Accounting Standards-setting bodies which play an important role on the company’s financial reporting fraud management, so this article analyzes the governance of listed companies’ financial reporting fraud on this perspective. Section II reviews the "Enron case" and its effects on the U.S. financial reporting fraud Regulatory policy. The third quarter analyzes the situation of China-based regulatory environment of listed companies by studying changes in China’s capital market environment and information disclosure problems which are happened after split share structure reform. This paper focuses on the information disclosure problems of listed companies including inadequate disclosure of information, late information, the disclosure of false information and the overall poor quality of information. Section IV puts forward to financial reporting fraud control strategy based on the American experience and the listed companies in Chinese national conditions. China should learn from American experience to establish and improve the security rating system, to strengthen information disclosure system of listed companies and to improve the integrity of the mechanism. Through these measures, we believe we can strengthen supervision of financial reporting fraud in Chinese capital markets.This final chapter points out the conclusions and limitations of this study and puts forward to future research.更多还原