节点文献

我国农村未观测金融风险管控研究

A Study on the Risk Management and Control of Non-observed Finance in Rural China

【作者】 高之岩

【导师】 任碧云;

【作者基本信息】 天津财经大学 , 金融学, 2013, 博士

【摘要】 未观测金融是我国农村金融的重要组成部分,对我国农村经济社会发展的重要意义逐步显现。尤其是其对于解决我国“三农”问题的特殊重要性,越来越引起人们的高度重视。然而,不时爆发的区域性系统风险以及崩盘、跑路、自杀等恶性事件,又使人们对之有讳疾忌医的心理趋向。为了更加全面客观地认识我国农村未观测金融的实质,更好地对其风险进行有效管控,在金融发展、农村金融、风险管理和金融监管理论的框架下,证实了其内生性,实证检验了其与我国农村经济社会发展的密切关系,揭示了其风险的微观机理和系统性风险的成因,在借鉴他国经验和总结历史教训的基础上,本文着重从监管角度对我国农村未观测金融风险管控问题进行了探讨。首先,在阐述我国农村未观测金融和已观测金融关系基础上,分析农村投融资主体的收益函数,运用激励相容模型研究比较农户的各种融资机制,发现农村未观测金融参与机制具有显著的比较优势。利用信息经济学方法分析了农户融资的信贷问题,由于逆向选择和道德风险的广泛存在,农户通过已观测金融贷款融资时面临严重的信贷配给。利用信号传递模型研究了农村信贷市场效率问题,证明了在农村未观测金融参与下,信贷市场只有已观测金融的市场完全失败和部分成功类型,转变为已观测金融和未观测金融共同参与下的市场完全成功和部分成功类型,市场效率得以提高。也就是说,我国农村未观测金融具有显著的内生性。其次,以我国农村未观测货币和信贷规模指标,作为反映我国农村未观测金融发展指标,农村经济增长量GDP、货币总量M2和农村万人大学生数量,作为反映我国农村经济社会发展指标。在回顾总结学术界关于未观测经济测算方法的基础上,结合学者已有对未观测货币和信贷测算方法的研究成果,对于我国农村未观测货币和信贷规模进行了测度,运用相关分析、因果关系分析,发现我国农村未观测金融和我国农村经济社会发展间存在较强的相关关系和因果关系。进而构建联立系统方程模型,通过模型估计,发现我国农村未观测金融与农村经济社会间具有显著的相互作用关系,进一步证明了我国农村未观测金融的内生性特征。第三,以我国农村广泛存在的“标会”为例,在实际发生案例引导的基础上,总结了风险的具体表现形式,对我国农村未观测金融的风险问题进行了系统研究。一是利用现金流分拆简约模型,在不失一般性的前提下,通过研究一对一关系,认为信息不对称是造成微观风险的原因。二是对于“标会”倒会风险的微观机理进行了深入研究,通过不同情况下当事人的策略选择,得出了“标会”人数、会金规模、会首素质、退出成本等因素是“标会”倒会的主要原因。三是论证了标会系统性风险的成因,认为广泛存在的套利机会形成了对投机者的激励,信息屏蔽和信号发送是其主要手段,高退出成本则构成了及时止损的障碍。第四,在回顾了我国对于农村未观测金融的风险管控历史之后,对于我国农村未观测金融风险管控存在的问题进行了深入分析。国际上美国、日本、孟加拉和我国台湾地区对农村未观测金融的风险管控各有特色,值得借鉴。进而从原则、方式和机制三方面构建我国的农村未观测金融风险管控体系,认为在坚持监管法治、适度与效益并重和差别化监管原则的基础上,运用政府、行业和自身三种风险管控方式,通过信息检测与征信建设机制、基于信息共享的风险管控主体协调磋商机制、风险预警机制和突发事件的预案处置机制以实现对我国农村未观测金融的有效监管和风险控制。最后,对于上述分析的结论进行了系统总结,提出了政策建议,包括要积极促进我国农村未观测金融的良性发展、积极防范我国农村未观测金融的风险、强制退出机制的建立,以及强化法治、依法监管等。本文在理论与实证研究上均有不足,随着市场化进程的加快、人的城镇化建设的推进、金融体制改革的不断深入,以及相关理论的演进和研究方法的改进,本文的研究必将推向新的高度和深度。

【Abstract】 Non-observed finance is an important part of rural China’s finance. It is attracting more and more attention because of its important significance to the social and economic development of rural China and special importance to the issues of agriculture, rural areas, and farmers. However, unexpected systematic regional crises and accompanying malignant events such as financial crashes, avoidance of debt payments by running away, and suicides make people tend to "hide the sickness for fear of treatment". In order to have a more comprehensive and objective understanding of the nature of the non-observed rural finance and a better management and control of its risks, this paper, restricted to such areas as the development of financial services, rural finance, risk management, and financial regulation, by proving its endogeneity, testifying its close relations with the social and economic development of rural China, revealing the micro mechanism of its risks and the causes of its systematic risks, and referring to related experiences and historical lessons of other countries, attempts to probe, from the viewpoint of regulation, into the risk management of the non-observed finance in rural China.First, by stating the relations between non-observed and observed finance in rural China, this paper analyzes the payoff function of both the lenders and borrowers, compares, using the incentive compatibility models, the possible financing mechanisms of the farmers, and discovers the comparative advantages of non-observed rural finance. By analyzing, through the information economics approaches, the farmers’ financing credit, this paper concludes that, due to prevalent adverse selections and moral hazards, the farmers’financing suffers a severe credit rationing through the observed finance. A study in this paper on the market efficiency of rural financing through signal transmission models, shows that without the participation of non-observed finance, only complete market failures and partial market successes could be observed, but complete and partial market successes could be observed with both observed and non-observed finances participating, and market efficiency was improved. In another word, non-observed rural finance has obvious endogeneity to rural China. Second, this papers takes the scale of non-observed money and loans in rural China as the indicator of the development of the non-observed finance; and the rural economic growth (GDP), monetary aggregate (M2), and the number of tertiary students per ten thousand people as the indicator of rural economic and social development. On the basis of a review and summery of the non-observed economy measurement techniques by the academia, together with the current achievements of measurement techniques of non-observed money and loans in China, the paper makes a projection of China’s rural non-observed money and loan scale, screens out the indicators reflecting development of China’s rural economic society, analyzes their correlation and causation, and finally finds out that they are in strong correlation and causation. Based on the conclusion, the paper establishes a synthesized system equation model, and through this model, finds that non-observed money and loans in rural China are remarkably correlated, providing further proof that China’s rural non-observed finance is endogenous.Third, the paper takes for example the"Biaohui", loan clubs prevalent in rural China, and, through case analyses and a summary of the specific forms of possible risks, systematically researches the risks of non-observed finance in rural China:1. Through basic cash flow splitting models with appropriate generality and one-on-one research, it is found that information asymmetry is the cause of micro risks;2. Profound research of micro mechanism of the bankruptcy of "Biaohui" and the different strategy choices of different subjects shows that the number of "Biaohui" members, size of the fund, qualifications of "Biaohui" leaders, and exit cost are the main causes of the bankruptcy of "Biaohui";3. Through a careful study of the forming mechanism of the systematic risks of "Biaohui", this paper holds that the wide spread arbitrage opportunities are the incentive for the speculators, that information shielding and signal sending are their means, and that the high exit costs constitute and barrier for stop-loss orders.Fourth, through a review of the regulatory history of Chinese government over the rural non-observed finance, this paper makes a detailed analysis of the issues of the unobserved finance in rural China. Internationally, coutries such as the United States, Japan, Bangladesh and China’s Taiwan region each are all object lessons in risk management and control for non-observed rural finance. To construct our own financial risk management system for the non-observed rural finance, we should take into consideration of principles, methods, and mechnisms. Effective regulation and risk control could be achieved by adhering to principles of legal regulaiton, attaching equal importance to both strictness and benefits, and differentiated regulation; through governmental regualtion, trade regulation and self-regualtion; and by mechanisms of information detection and credit reference systems, coordination between regulatory bodies based on information sharing, risk warning, and emergency contingency plans.Finally, with a systematic summry of the above conclusions, the paper puts forward its policy suggestions:development of non-observed rural finance in China should be promoted; risks of non-observed finance should be positively prevented; and mechanisms of forced exit and legal regualtion and supervision should be strengthened. There are of course flaws in both theoretical and practical studies in this paper. Together with the quickening of the development of the market, urbanization, and reform of the financial system, and with the improvement and innovation of related theories and research approaches, this paper will pursue a new height and depth in research.

  • 【分类号】F832.1
  • 【下载频次】283
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络