【作者】 宋盛楠；

【导师】 张瑞萍；

【作者基本信息】 北京交通大学 ， 产业经济学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 在我国,上市公司并购带有鲜明的政府主导色彩。随着证券市场化进程的不断深入,地方政府在上市公司并购中的作用和影响日益引起人们的关注。在参与和监管上市公司并购的过程中,地方政府以股东和监管者两种身份对并购产生影响,其行为形成正负两种效应。正效应表现在上市公司因为政府的扶持获得参与外部市场竞争的优势,而上市公司的成功并购同样给政府带来良好收益。正效应促使地方政府积极影响上市公司的并购。负效应表现为地方政府出于自利动因在履行经济职能时实施了政市不分、政企不分、干预过度等行为,并因此给政府自身、证券市场和上市公司带来不良后果。本文依据政府规制和企业并购的协同效应理论,运用时间序列分析法、博弈法、多元回归法对地方政府影响上市公司并购的模式、信息披露和绩效进行实证分析,提出改善建议,期待减少地方政府对上市公司并购模式选择、信息披露和短期绩效的不良影响,最终促进地方政府恰当地履行其经济职能。本文首先从地方政府影响并购的发展状况入手,定位了地方政府在并购中的地位和作用,分析了地方政府影响上市公司并购行为中出现偏差的原因和地方政府的影响形式,以及地方政府影响上市公司并购对地方政府、证券市场、上市公司的关联效应。为了研究地方政府对上市公司并购模式的影响,本文选取云南省昆明市19家上市公司2001年至2012年发生的116起并购事件为研究样本,分析昆明市政府对上市公司并购事件的影响比例,运用时间序列分析法,构建政府政绩指标与上市公司横向、纵向、混合并购收购金额一阶差分数据的误差修正模型,做出了若干结论。地方政府为了增加市区地方财政预算内支出和市区城乡居民储蓄年末余额,促使上市公司采取横向并购模式；地方政府为了增加市区地方财政预算内收入、市辖区在岗职工平均人数和市区社会消费品零售总额,促使上市公司采取纵向并购模式；地方政府为了增加市辖区单位从业人员,促使上市公司采取混合并购模式。为消除政府影响上市公司并购模式的负面效应,地方政府应降低影响程度,完善就业制度,改善政府预算内支出现状。本文主要运用非对称信息条件下的静态博弈模型,研究地方政府对上市公司并购信息披露的影响,分析地方政府、上市公司、上级监管机构之间的博弈行为。在地方政府的一般规制行为中,上市公司并购违规披露信息的溢出收益过高、地方政府的监管成本高和上市公司并购违规披露信息的惩罚太低导致上市公司违规信息披露屡禁不止。本文基于上述结论,进一步剖析出政府为了不当得利与上市公司合谋,参与违规披露信息时的影响因素是上市公司所要缴纳税率、上市公司并购违规披露信息而上级监管机构不规制(或规制力度小)时的溢出收益、政府机构或官员的寻租收益、地方政府和上市公司并购违规披露的惩罚及上级监管机构的监管成本。在此基础上,本文选取“广发证券借壳延边公路案”和“中山公用案”应用模型结论,并从地方政府的股东和监管者身份提出建议减少地方政府对上市公司并购信息披露的不良影响。在研究地方政府对上市公司并购模式和信息披露影响的基础上,本文运用多元回归模型分析地方政府、并购模式、信息披露三因素对上市公司并购短期绩效的影响。通过建立上市公司并购公告前后35个交易日的短期累计超额收益率与地方政府三个影响指数、横向、纵向、混合并购模式、信息披露是否合规之间的多元回归模型,分别分析地方政府、并购模式、信息披露对上市公司并购短期绩效的影响,做出了若干结论。提高市场分配经济资源的比重、减少地方保护主义和减少政府对企业的干预能增加上市公司并购短期绩效；上市公司违规信息披露的原因之一即违规披露被曝光前,虚假信息对上市公司的短期绩效起促进作用：横向、纵向、混合三种并购模式下,进行混合并购的上市公司并购短期绩效最好,横向并购次之,纵向并购最差。在此基础上,从提高市场分配经济资源的比重、减少政府对企业的干预和减少商品市场上的地方保护三方面提出建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Chinese listed companies’ M&As are government-led. With the securities market’s developing process, people pay more attention to the actions of local government in the listed companies’ M&A. As far as we know, local government impacts on the listed companies’ M&A as a shareholder or a supervisor in the process of participation and supervision. The government’s behavior results in both positive and negative effects. The positive effects are the competed advantage of the listed companies in the external market by the government’s support, and the good benefit from the successful M&A that could bring to the government. The positive effects make the government effect the listed companies’M&A actively. The negative effects are functions without a clear line between the government and the market, or the enterprises and the excessive intervention etc when the local government implements its economic function for benefits, which bring an adverse consequence to the government, the stock market and firms.Bases on the theory of the government regulation and M&A in the research, This paper uses the gambling method, time series method and multiple regression method to do the empirical analysis about the influence of the local government in the listed companies’ M&A’s modes, the information disclosure, and the performance. This paper proposes some improvement recommendations in order to reducing the negative influence, which taken by the local government’s behavior in choosing the M&A modes, information disclosure and the short-term performance of the listed companies. In the end, the paper promotes the local government implementing its economic function properly.From the development of M&A under local government influence, this paper positions the status and role of local government in M&A, analyzes the deviation reason of the local government’s affected behavior in the listed companies’M&A and its influence forms. Base on the above research, this paper analyzes the correlation effects of the government, stock market and the listed companies under the influence of the local government in the listed companies’ M&A.In order to study the influence of the local government in M&A modes, this paper chooses a number of116M&A cases, which from2001to2012about the19listed companies in Kunming as a sample, and analyzes the influence proportion of Kunming government in M&A cases, which using the time series method, to establish a error correction model between the first-order differential data of the local government performance indicators and the horizontal, vertical and mixed M&A modes. The local government impels the listed companies under the horizontal M&A mode, in order to increase the urban local government budget expenditure and saving deposit balance of the urban and rural residents at the end of the year (downtown). The local government impels the listed companies under the vertical M&A mode, in order to increase the urban local government budget revenue, the urban average number of employment staffs and urban retail sales of social consumer goods. The local government impels the listed companies under the mixed M&A mode, in order to increase the urban unit employees. Base on above results, this paper gives suggestions to reduce the government’s negative influence in the model of M&A. These are reducing local government’s influence, developing the employment system and improving the government budget expenditure status.In order to study the influence of the local government in M&A information disclosure, this paper uses static gambling model, which under the asymmetric information, to research the gambling behaviors by the local government, the listed companies and the upper regulatory commission. In the general regulation behavior of local government, this paper analyzes that the higher spillover benefits of the listed companies’illegal information disclosure, the high regulation cost of local government, and the lower punishment of the listed companies’illegal information disclosure brings out repeated violations of information disclosure of listed companies. Then this paper analyzes the factors of the illegal information disclosure in conspiracy between the local government and the listed companies for the reason of benefits. The factors are the payable tax rate of listed companies, the spillover benefits of the listed companies’illegal information disclosure without higher commission regulation (or less regulation), the rent income of Government agencies or officials, the punishment of the local government and listed companies’illegal information disclosure, and the higher commission regulatory costs. Base on above results, this paper chooses "GF Securities backdoor Yanbian Road Case" and "Zhongshan Public Utilities Case" to use the model results, and gives suggestions to reduce the local government’s improper influence in the information disclosure of listed companies under the role of shareholder or supervisor.Base on the analysis of the local government’s influence in M&A modes and the information disclosure of listed companies, this paper uses the multiple regression model to analyze how the local government, M&A modes and the information disclosure impact the short-term performance of the listed companies. This paper establishes the multiple regression model, which between CAR of35trading days before and after the M&A and the local government’s indicators, horizontal, vertical and mixed M&A modes, information disclosure desperately, to analyze how the local government, M&A modes and the information disclosure impact the short-term performance of the listed companies.The way of increasing the economic resources distribution’s market share, reducing the local protectionism and government intervention in firms, which could enhance the short-term performance of the listed companies’M&A. One reason for the listed companies’illegal information disclosure is the improving function of illegal information that makes a short-term performance of the listed companies, which before the illegal case exposed. Under the horizontal, vertical and mixed M&A mode, the best short-term performance of the listed company’s M&A is implemented by the mixed M&A mode, followed by the horizontal M&A mode, and the vertical M&A mode is the last. Base on the above results, this paper gives suggestions to increasing the market share of economic resources distribution, reducing local protectionism and the government intervention in firms.更多还原