【作者】 张汉江；

【导师】 陈收；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 一个产业是由市场连接起来的企业组成的一个系统。产业内企业的行为选择受到哪些因素的影响,企业行为的结果及其绩效又是由哪些因素透过什么过程或机理来确定,这是一个既具有理论意义又具有现实价值的研究课题。凡系统必有结构,系统的结构决定着系统的功能,系统功能的实现程度即性能或绩效由系统的运行机制来决定。本文从系统科学的基本理念出发,重新审视和考察新产业组织理论。从理念上提出了产业的组织结构、产业组织的运行机制、企业拥有的私有信息、企业行为决策与绩效等若干方面相互影响相互关联的闭合的产业组织理论分析范式SCIMP,该范式综合了系统理论、决策分析、产业组织的微观分析等重要方面,为产业组织理论研究提供了更为有效的分析范式。并围绕上述方面展开研究,建立了若干产业组织理论的对局模型,求解和分析了其中的短期均衡结果,证实了本文提出的产业组织理论分析范式的合理性、适应性和针对性。从产业组织结构入手,研究了横向产业组织即通常意义上的产业和纵向产业组织即线性供应链等两类线性结构的产业组织,建立和求解了其中任意N个企业行为优化选择的库诺特对局和三重线性供应链上价格-价格的斯塔克尔伯格对局两类模型,其中N个库诺特均衡结果的微观分析很好地解释了贝恩的传统横向产业组织的宏观分析结果,三重线性供应链的均衡结果发现了一个具有较强实用价值的结论：在一定的条件下,先行决策的企业比后行决策的企业多得到一倍的利润。这个结果很好地解释了铁矿石开采等资源性产业的定价行为,和大型连锁零售商的抢占和扩展终端网店以争夺话语权的行为。同时建立了非线性结构的一些典型性的产业组织,求解了其短期均衡,很好地解释了产品供应商在招商零售商加盟时的定价行为选择,以及产业组织结构与企业行为选择的互动,即柔性供应链上企业行为与绩效。提出了以博弈规则表述的产业组织运行机制的概念,建立和求解了一条和两条即寡头和寡头垄断竞争的线性供应链上的上游先动和下游先动机制的短期均衡,结果分析表明不同的市场需求函数左右着其中的企业生产经营决策及其绩效的内在机理,即先发优势和后动优势存在的条件分别是线性的市场需求函数和幂次函数的市场需求函数,以及这种先发优势和/或后动优势的程度随着产业竞争激烈程度的加剧而减小。建立和求解了政府补贴回收再制造行为营造的闭环供应链运行机制内生化与再制造商与回收商的最优激励契约设计模型,得到了政府政策营造的产业组织运行机制内生化是外生参数的最优结果的结论,给出了运行机制内生化研究的价值判断。分析指出了企业拥有的私有信息在市场竞争中的重要的不可或缺的作用,对现实存在的企业私有信息如何影响企业行为和绩效的机理展开了一系列的研究。首先就比较简单的企业同时决策的产业组织运行机制进行研究,即针对横向产业组织结构,分别建立和求解了含有企业单位生产成本这一个私有信息的产销量优化决策的库诺特对局和产品价格优化决策的伯川德对局模型,结果分析揭示了该私有信息对企业经营决策行为及其绩效的重要影响,即不拥有优势成本私有信息的企业可以因此获得较大的市场绩效,所以有假冒的内在动机,得到了假冒行为得以付诸实施的斯潘塞条件。拥有优势成本信息的企业可能在竞争中遭受无妄之灾,所以有积极揭示自身优势成本信息的动机。其次研究了企业非同时决策的产业组织运行机制,即纵向产业组织结构。建立和求解了关于市场需求信息的信号传递对局和信息甄别对局模型,其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡揭示了其中企业私有信息的价值,及其对企业经营决策行为和绩效的影响。最后扩展到两条线性供应链之间的链间竞争策略优化问题,建立和求解了下游零售商私人拥有市场需求信息的不完全信息动态博弈,均衡结果的分析揭示了不确定信息影响复杂产业组织中企业行为及其绩效的机理。更多还原

【Abstract】 An industry is a system composed of enterprises which are linked by the market. What factors affect the behavior choice of the enterprises in the industry, what factors determine the results and performance of the enterprises’ behavior, which is the research topic that has the theoretical significance and the realistic value.Every system must have structures, system structures decide the function of system, the system’s function realization degree that the performance is determined by the operation mechanism of the system. This paper starts with the basic idea of system science, reviewing and examining the new theory of industrial organization. Putting forward from the concepts, the organization of industry, the movement mechanism of intra-industry, the private information owned by enterprises, the behavior decision and performance of enterprises and so on, which are influenced and related each other in many aspects, closed analysis paradigm SCIMP of industrial organization system, this paradigm combines system theory, decision analysis, the microscopic analysis of industrial organization and other important aspects, providing a more effective analysis for the study of the theory of industrial organization paradigm. We study around the above aspects, establish a number of industrial organization theory game models, solve and analyze the equilibrium results of the short-term market, confirm the analytical paradigm of industrial organization theory in this paper, which is rational, adaptive and targeted.From the perspective of the structure of industrial organization, we study the horizontal industrial organization, that is usually in the sense of industry and vertical industry groups, namely, the linear supply chain etc and two classes of linear structure of industrial organization, establish and solve two kinds of models of N enterprises’ behavior:The optimal selection behavior of Cournot game and Stackelberg game about price on the triple linear supply chain, in which the Cournot game’s equilibrium results N of microeconomic analysis well explains the macroeconomic analysis results that the traditional industrial organization theory of the Bain, the equilibrium results of the triple linear supply chain find a conclusion that is strong and practical value: under certain conditions, the enterprises of leading decision get twice the profits than the enterprises that are after decision. It explains the pricing behavior of the resources of iron ore mining and other industries well, as well as the behavior of the large chain retailers that grab and extend terminal shop for the voice. At the same time, we study some typical industrial organization of the nonlinear structures and solve its short-term equilibrium, which is a good way to explain the choice behavior of pricing when the products supplier invest the retailers to join, especially for the interaction of the industrial organization structure and the enterprises’ behavior choice, which is the enterprises’behavior and performance on the flexible supply chain.We put forward the concept of the operating mechanism about industrial organization described by the game rules, moreover, we establish and solve the short-term equilibrium of the upstream and downstream to move first mechanism on the one and two linear supply chain as respectively, namely on the Linear oligopoly and monopoly competition linear supply chain, finding the internal mechanism that the enterprises’production and management decision and performance are affected by the different market demand functions, that is to say the existence condition of the first mover advantage and the late-mover advantage is the linear demand function and the exponential function of the market demand function, what’s more, the degree of the first mover advantage and/or the late-mover advantage decreases when the competition of industry became fierce.We also establish and solve the mechanism of remanufacturing and recycling behavior are subsidized by the government that is endogenous, the design model of optimal and incentive contract, which do with the remanufactures and recyclers, we conclude that the endogenous mechanism of government are the optimal results of exogenous parameter, which gives the value judgment of endogenous mechanism is researched.We point out the important role of the enterprises’private information in the market competition, study how the enterprises’private information to affect the enterprises’behavior and performance in our real life. Firstly, we research for the simple market mechanism that the enterprises decide at the same time, it is in view of the horizontal structure of industrial organization, establish the Cournot game with production optimization decision-making and the Stackelberg game with the products price optimized under the condition of the private information, namely the unit cost of the enterprises’ products, which the equilibrium results fully show the private information makes the influence on the enterprises’ management decision-making behavior and their performance, that is to say, the enterprises without cost advantages and private information have more market performance, so there are fake of intrinsic motivation, getting the fake Spencer conditions. The enterprises have the advantage of cost information may suffer from an accident in the competition, so they have a positive motivation to reveal their own advantages of cost information. Secondly, we study the simple market mechanism that the enterprises decide not simultaneously, with the vertical structure of industrial organization, establishing and solving the information signaling game and screening game models about the market demand information, which the Bayesian Nash equilibrium shows the value of private information, also the influence on the enterprises’ management decision-making behavior and their performance. Eventually, we extend to the problem of strategy optimization with the competition between the two linear chains, we establish and solve the dynamic games of incomplete information that the downstream retailers own the market demand information privately, the equilibrium results of analysis reveal that the uncertain information has an impact on the enterprises’ behavior and performance in the complex industrial organization.更多还原