【作者】 王文静；

【导师】 张志超；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 财政学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 税收作为财政要素之一,是现代政府进行社会管理的重要政策工具。税收不仅能够为政府筹集财政资金,而且能够发挥一定的经济调节作用。基于税收功能的角度,本文可以将税收政策目标分为“组织收入”与“调节经济”这两大类。在“调节经济”这一目标下,进一步细化为“效率”、“公平”、“行为调节”这三种经济调节目标。根据经济学理论,税收能够对经济个体产生激励或者抑制效应,从而改变经济个体的经济行为选择。不可忽视的是,尽管税收能够在“组织收入”和“调节经济”方面发挥重要作用,其扭曲性却不可避免。当经济运行遇到困难时,盲目寄希望于通过税收的经济调节功能达到既定的政策目标,很可能产生事与愿违的结果。首先,不能不考虑税收扭曲性所带来的效率损失；其次,在不完美的市场环境中,税收效应所产生的政策效果也可能并不显著。此外,政府往往以调节经济作为开征新税或者提高税率的理由,但实施中的税收政策很可能只发挥了组织收入的职能,具有敛财之嫌。本文以传统税收归宿理论与行为经济学理论为基础,对政府的税收目标权衡问题进行了讨论。本文从理论基础、理论分析、实证检验和政策建议这四个层面出发,深入探讨了税收实际效果与政策初衷之间产生偏差的主要原因、政府应如何有效制定税收政策目标、以及未来税制改革方向这三个核心议题。全文共分为八章。第一章为导论,介绍本文的现实背景和研究意义,研究的创新点与难点。第二章对税收归宿理论的基本发展脉络进行梳理,借鉴实验经济学的最新研究成果,对税收归宿理论与现实之间的偏差做出了解释。作为全文的理论根基,第二章还着重归纳了典型税种归宿的实证检验结论、以及针对税收理论研究的前提假设条件所做的实证检验结果,并且提炼出税收对经济增长、公平分配以及行为调节的典型效应。第三章以经济和政治这两个视角作为切入点,讨论了政府在“组织收入”与“调节经济”这两个税收目标之间的权衡行为。税收工具的效率性和目标性之间存在着重要的取舍关系,这与税收目标的设定密切相关。从我国现实来看,税收并非经济调节的万能工具。从根源上来讲,双重目标下的政府税收决策、税收目标错位对调节效果的影响、心理因素对税收效应的影响以及非完全竞争市场约束等诸多现实因素,都可能引发税收的“调节性扭曲”。有别于传统概念中的税收超额负担,税收“调节性扭曲”主要体现在税收目标错位造成的效率缺失。第四章在税收行为学的理论基础上,提出了“税收显示效应”的概念。本文将“税收显示效应”定义为：产生于税收政策与纳税人之间的、通过经济个体的心理性偏好路径进而传导到经济个体行为决策的税收效应。当税收显示效应不显著时,会直接抑制纳税人对税负变动的实际感知度,从而制约税收政策的经济调节效果。当税收显示效应显著时,则有助于发挥税收政策的经济调节作用。税收显示效应与价格的税收弹性,共同作用于税收对经济个体的传导机制,从而影响实际的税收效果。第五章构建理论模型,对税收和管制这两种政策工具的组合效应进行了数理推导。结论表明,政府的最优政策组合,将取决于政府在税收的“组织收入”与“经济调节”这两个目标之间的权衡。在此理论分析基础上,第五章以我国楼市调控为例讨论了最优政策工具组合问题。核心结论为：面对商品房市场中存在的房价过高、投机行为旺盛等问题,政府必须在组织收入和经济调节这两项税收目标中进行选择其一作为核心目标。如果政府以调节经济为核心目标,那么“减税、加强限购管制、加强限价管制”是最有效的政策组合。如果政府以组织收入为核心目标,最优的政策组合应为“增税、放松限购管制、加强限价管制”。由于微观数据的缺失,第六章对税收效应的实证检验侧重于双重税收竞争环境下的税收宏观效应。实证结果表明,从税收宏观效应的角度来看,我国税收政策的效率损失是较为显著的,且税收调节收入分配的作用空间较为有限。第七章从民主税制的角度出发,以消费税为例讨论了税收民主性问题,并且尝试性地探讨了政治选举对税收制度的作用影响。最后,基于我国当前税收改革的背景和有效税制理论,本文对我国“十二五”税制改革提出了相关的政策建议。第八章为结语。本文的创新之处在于,第一,立足于税收目标权衡的角度,本文对税收政策实际效果与税制设计初衷之间的偏离提供了有力解释。当政府采用税收作为政策工具时,政府在组织收入和调节经济这两个税收目标之间的权衡,将直接影响税收政策的实际效果。本文创造性地指出：税收的效率性与目标性之间存在重要的取舍关系；税收的组织收入目标与经济调节目标很可能无法同时实现,政府在这两项税收目标之间的取舍,关乎税收政策自身的有效性。第二,本文借鉴了实验经济学、行为经济学的最新研究成果,创造性地将心理学因素作为解释税收政策效果的一个重要原因,创新性地提出“税收显示效应”这一概念用以解释税收调节效果出现偏差的情形,并且将行为经济学的研究成果纳入到税制设计过程中。第三,本文创造性地拓展了关于税收与管制的理论模型,对从量税、从价税、数量管制、价格管制这四种政策工具进行了对比,提出了不同税收目标权衡下的最优政策组合,并且为我国楼市调控政策选择提供了理论依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 As one of the fiscal elements, taxation is an important policy tool of modern government social management. Taxation is not only able to raise financial revenue for the government, but also can play a role of economic regulation. In the perspective of function, we can divide the tax policy’s targets into revenue organization and economic regulation. The latter target concludes three aspects as efficiency, equity and behavior guidance. According to the economics of taxation, tax incentive or inhibitory effect can influence the economic choice, thus changing the economic agents’behaviors. But what cannot be ignored is that, despite the taxation’s roles of revenue organization and economic regulation, the tax distortions are inevitable.When the economic operation faces some difficulties, the government usually hopes to meet the policy objectives through the tax’s economic adjustment function. But the results may be undesirable. First, the loss of efficiency brought by the tax distortions cannot be ignored. Secondly, in the imperfect market environment, the tax effect is likely to be not significant. The government tends to take the tax’s economic adjustment function as the reasons for regulating economy. Unfortunately, the effect of tax policy is always ambiguous. These policies are likely to have only the revenue organization function.Based on the traditional economics of taxation and the economics of behavior, this paper discusses the tradeoffs between the above-mentioned taxation targets. Under the four perspectives of theoretical basis, theoretical analysis, empirical test and policy advice, this paper explores the major causes of the deviation between the theory and practice of tax incidence, in which way the government should formulate the taxation policy targets and the future reform on tax system.This paper concludes eight chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two is the literature review, learning from the latest research results of experimental economics to explain the deviation between the tax incidence theory and reality. As the theoretical foundation, the second chapter also summarized the empirical incidence results of the typical taxes, as well as the examinations on the assumptions of these empirical tests. This chapter extracts the typical effects of taxations on the economic growth, equitable income distribution and behavior regulation.In the perspective of both economics and politics, chapter three discusses the tax targets tradeoffs between the revenue organization and economic regulation. There are important tradeoff relationships between the efficiency of the tax instrument and its objectives, which are closely related with the government targets. Therefore, the tradeoffs of the tax targets can influence the actual effect of tax policy. Viewed from the reality, taxes are not universal tool for economic adjustment. The causes of tax distortions conclude the dual goals of government decision-making, tax targets dislocation effect, the impact of psychological factors on the tax effects as well as non-perfectly competitive market. This paper defines a conception of "tax regulatory distortions". Different from the traditional concept of tax excess burden, regulatory distortions primarily arise from the process of economic regulation with tax policies.Based on the theory of tax behavior, chapter four puts forward the concept of "tax presentation effect". This effect is similar to the tax salience effect, but the difference is that the former is defined as the effect arisen between the tax policy and taxpayers, and it will be influenced by psychological factors. When the effect is not significant, it will generate less incentive on the agents, which will restrain the results of tax policies. And when the effect is sufficiently significant, it will improve the results. Both the tax presentation effect and tax elasticity can. affect the results of tax policies.Chapter five builds some theoretical models in order to analyze the combined policy effects of taxes, quantity regulation and price regulation. The conclusions show that the optimal policy combination will depend on the government’s tax targets tradeoffs between revenue organization and economic regulation. On the basis of this theoretical analysis, this paper discusses China’s real estate market regulation. The paper points out that in order to control the excess prices of the real estate market, the government should choose only either of the tax targets as the core goal. If the government takes the economic regulation as the core goal, then the optimal polices should be "less taxes, more rigorous quantity regulation and more rigorous price regulation". If the government takes revenue organization as the core goal, it should be "more taxes, less rigorous quantity regulation and more rigorous price regulation".Due to the lack of micro-data, chapter six tests the taxation’s macroeconomic effects under double tax competition environment. The empirical results show that the coefficient of macro-taxation on the economic growth is significant and the taxation’s role of adjusting the income redistribution is limited.Taken consumption tax as an example, chapter seven discusses the issues of tax democracy and the effects from political elections on the design of the tax system. Based on the background of the current China’s tax reform and on the effective tax perspective, this chapter provides some policy advices for the China’s tax system reform during the Twelve-Five plan period. And chapter night is the conclusion.The innovation of this paper contains three aspects. Firstly, based on point of the tax targets tradeoffs, this paper explains the deviation between the actual tax effects and the designed targets. The tradeoffs will influence the final results of tax policies. This paper creatively points out that tradeoffs exist between the efficiency and objective of the tax. It may be difficult to reach both the efficiency and objective. The government’s tradeoff decision on this will directly affect the efficiency of the tax policies.Second, this paper adds psychological factors into the explanations of tax policy’s actual results and the design of tax system, which is learning from the latest research results of experimental economics, behavioral economics and creatively defining a concept of "tax presentation effect".Third, this paper creatively extends the theoretical model of taxation and regulation. On the contrast of specific tax, ad valorem tax, quantity regulation and price regulation, this paper derives the optimal policy options. Under different tax targets tradeoffs, this paper provides a theoretical basis for regulation policies on China’s real estate market.更多还原