【作者】 谭有超；

【导师】 程新生；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 会计学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 针对实践中公司投资总是偏离最优投资水平的现象,大量学者分别从不同角度进行了研究。其中,自Bushman and Smith(2001)以来,财务信息能否以及如何影响企业投资效率成为人们关注的热点问题。理论上讲,高质量的财务信息可以降低道德风险、缓解逆向选择以及帮助管理者和投资者甄别更好的投资项目,消除各种“噪音”对企业投资效率产生的不利影响,因此能够抑制公司的非效率投资行为,从而提高企业投资效率。大量的经验证据也表明高质量的财务信息有助于提高企业投资效率、增加公司价值。然而,财务信息只是对企业历史经营情况的“图像反映”,由于受到会计确认、计量等因索制约,很多重要信息无法传递给投资者,所以随着投资者对企业信息需求的不断增长,传统的财务信息越来越难以满足其投资决策的需求,因此鼓励上市公司自愿披露更多的非财务信息尤其是有关未来发展前景的信息以增强财务报告的有用性已经得到了理论界和实务界地广泛认同,并被各国政府和相关机构所采纳。然而,虽然此类非财务信息在相关性和及时性方面优于财务信息,但很难被立即审计或证实,可鉴证性较差。那么在这种情况下,其能否影响投资者决策并进而对公司投资效率产生作用呢?本文以非财务信息披露动机为切入点,结合我国新兴市场的特殊制度背景,通过理论分析与实证检验的方法,探讨了上市公司自愿披露的有关未来发展前景的非财务信息对企业投资效率的影响以及作用机理和发展趋势,并进一步考察了这种影响是否具有“状态依存性”的特点。本文共分为六章。第一章是绪论,介绍了本文的研究动机、研究意义、研究思路、框架、方法、技术路线图以及创新点。第二章是文献综述,分别从公司投资效率和非财务信息披露两个方面对国内外相关文献进行了梳理,并根据已有研究文献的不足和我国新兴市场的特殊环境,阐述了本文进一步的研究方向。第三章在上市公司非财务信息披露动机的基础上,研究了非财务信息与企业投资效率二者之间的关系、内在机理以及发展,趋势。第四章和第五章分别从公司治理和深交所信息披露考评的视角研究了非财务信息、对企业投资效率的影响是否具有“状态依存性”的特点并提供了相应的经验证据。第六章总结了本文的主要发现并据此提出了相应的政策建议,并指出了论文的研究局限和未来研究方向。通过理论分析和实证检验,本文主要得到以下结论：第一,对于总样本,上市公司自愿披露的低质量的非财务信息也可以获得投资者的信任,从而扭曲了市场资源配置,使得那些披露了较多数量但低质量的公司获得了更多资源,在建立“商业帝国”等自身利益驱动以及外部政府干预的压力下,管理者趋向于扩大非效率投资规模,导致了过度投资,最终损害了企业投资效率。本文还发现也有一部分公司虽然利用获取的超额市场资源投资了一些高收益项目,缓解了投资不足,但同时也还会通过资金占用的方式转移外部融资以享受控制权私有收益。通过进一步分年度的子样本回归发现,由于近年来爆发的一系列虚假陈述案以及随着投资者能力的不断增长,低质量的非财务信息已经越来越难以赢得投资者信任,所以即使公司披露更多的非财务信息也不能起到缓解融资约束的作用,因此也就无法进一步影响企业投资效率。第二,当公司治理比较完善时,管理者披露动机的机会主义观被抑制,而信息观得到增强,所以这类公司披露的非财务信息质量较高。然而,在2004-2008年的子样本中,本文并未发现质量较高的非财务信息可信性也随之增强,所以与其他公司相比,治理更加完善的公司披露的非财务信息并没有更加显著地缓解融资约束。而在2009-2010年的子样本中,治理更加完善的公司披露的非财务信息更能获取投资者信任,所以与其他公司相比,更能显著地缓解融资约束,从而使得公司可以投资于那些高收益项目,避免了投资不足,提高了企业投资效率。第三,对于信息披露考评结果为优秀或良好的公司,无论是总样本还是各个时间段的子样本,非财务信息都与过度投资显著负相关,并且以前年度一直被评为优秀或良好的公司披露的非财务信息更能抑制过度投资,但这种差异并不具有统计上的显著性。本文同时还发现与信息披露考评为合格或不合格的公司相比,信息披露考评为优秀或良好的公司披露的非财务信息更能够显著降低融资约束,有助于公司获得更多的市场资源,从而可以避免投资不足,并且对于以前年度一直被评为优秀或良好的公司而言,披露的非财务信息相比于仅上一年度被评为优秀或良好的公司,更能赢得投资者信任,并且这种差异通过了统计上的显著性检验。更多还原

【Abstract】 A lot of studies have examined the deviation of corporate real investments from the optimal level. In particular, the issue of whether and how financial information can affect investment efficiency has been widely discussed and debated since Bushman and Smith (2001). In theory, high quality financial information, by mitigating information asymmetry and reducing agency costs, can help enhance the efficiency of capital market, reduce the impact of all kinds of "noise" on investment efficiency, and restrain firms’sub-optimal investment behavior, thereby improving investment efficiency. A number of empirical evidence demonstrates that quality of financial information will certainly contribute to improving investment efficiency and increasing firm value. However, with the growing demand from investors on the knowledge of corporate information, financial information as an’image reflection’ just reveals a profile of the corporate operation history. Due to the constraints resulted from accounting recognition and measurement, a lot of important information could not be passed to investors for reference in their investment decision-making process. Thus, it is widely agreed by both academic and practical circles, as well as governments and organizations, that listed frms are encouraged to voluntarily disclose more non-financial information, especially the information of firm’s perspective on future development, in order to enhance the usefulness of financial reporting. Such non-financial information is superior to financial information in terms of relevance and timeliness. However, it is difficult to immediately audit or to confirm its authenticity. In the circumstances, does non-financial information affect investors’ decision-making process and subsequently the investment efficiency? Starting from the motivation of firms’voluntary disclosure and considering the special institutional settings of China as an emerging market, the influence of non-financial information concerning the prospective of firms’future development voluntarily disclosed on the investment efficiency, the influential mechanism and developing trend have been discussed in this thesis, using the method of theoretical analysis and empirical testing. Whether this effect has the characteristics of ’state-dependency’has been further investigated.This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter is introduction, briefly introducing the motivation, implication, idea, framework, methodology and technical map of this research. The second chapter is literature review, including the relevant literature on investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure of non-financial information. Given the literature gap and unique institutional setting of China as an emerging market, this chapter further elaborates the direction of the research. Chapter three:on the basis of the motivation of voluntary disclosure of non-financial information in listed firms, the relation between non-financial information and investment efficiency, the inherent mechanism as well as the trend, have been investigated. Chapters four and five:from the perspective of corporate governance and the evaluation on information disclosure of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, whether the influence of non-financial information on the investment efficiency has the characteristics of’state-dependency’ has been examined and provided with relevant empirical evidence. Chapter six summarizes the main findings of this research and put forward suggestions on policy making, and pointed out the limitations of this thesis and future research directions.Through theoretical analysis and empirical tests, the following conclusions are reached:Firstly, for the full sample, the non-financial information with low quality which is voluntarily disclosed by listed firms, can also gain the trust from investors, and thus distort the market allocation of resources, making the firms that disclosed more information but of poorer quality obtain more resources. Driven by self-benefits such as establishing a "business empire" and intervened by the government, managers tend to expand the size of the non-efficient investment, which leads to excessive investment. And this research also finds that, although some firms using the excess market resources invest in certain high-yield projects and temporarily relieve the financing stress; at the same time, they tend to tunnel the external financing in the way of capital occupation and enjoy the private benefits of control. Further regression on the yearly subsample reveals that, with the outbreak of a series of false statements case in recent years, as well as the investors’ability being improved, the non-financial information with low quality can no longer gain trust from investors, therefore, difficult to further affect investment efficiency.Secondly, with better corporate governance, the opportunist perspective of managers in disclosing information is suppressed, while the information perspective is reinforced. Thus non-financial information of these companies is of higher quality. However, in the2004-2008subsample, it is not found that high-quality non-financial information enhances its credibility. Compared with others, companies with more comprehensive corporate governance measurements do not significantly ease financing constraints nor gain more market resources. However, in the2009-2010subsample, the non-financial information disclosed by better-governed companies help firms get more trust from investors, and more significantly ease the financing constraint in comparison with other firms. As a result, these companies can avoid the insufficiency in investment, invest in high-yield projects, and thus improve the efficiency of investment.Thirdly, for those firms whose information disclosure is evaluated as excellent or good, regardless of full sample or each time interval subsample, non-financial information is significantly negatively correlated with excessive investment. For those also rated as excellent or good in previous years, the non-financial information tends to better curb excessive investment; however, not statistically significant. This research also finds that the companies of which information disclosure is evaluated as excellent or good, their non-financial information is more credible than other companies. Therefore, it is possible to significantly reduce the financing constraints, help the company gain more market resources and thus avoid investment inefficiency. For companies rated as excellent or good in previous year, their non-financial information disclosed could gain more trust from investors, and the difference has passed the significant test.更多还原