【作者】 张建忠；

【导师】 刘志彪；

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 ， 应用经济学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 中国产业安全度是提高了还是降低了?学术界对产业安全的研究侧重于多元视角分析,欠缺一个相对较统一的微观理论的支持。随着中国本土产业融入全球价值链低端环节的程度不断加深,早期通过代工、学习和模仿积累下来的各种要素被用于构建国内价值链。但这一构建的进程越来越受到价值链上链主和本土企业权力地位不对等性的影响。在此背景下,全球链主除了施加价值链治理的各项参数要求以外,还通过策略性行为来维护生产者驱动型和买方驱动型价值链中的核心利益。本论文运用全球价值链的分析方法,从链主控制的视角筛选出影响中国产业安全的主要因素,并在理论上和经验上回答这些因素作用于中国产业安全的内在机理。本论文的研究主线是：全球链主控制着价值链的高端环节,并对本土供应商侵害链主核心利益的行为施加策略性影响。对链主控制行为的分析主要集中在三个方面：(1)链主通过一个持续、稳定和合理的利润激励将本土企业长期锁定在全球价值链的低端,从而产生低水平的代工均衡；(2)链主利用发展中国家的不同国家之间和国家内部不同代工者之间的可替代性、造成代工者之间的竞争性,再利用代工所形成的专用性生产投资锁定特征,通过持续压低采购价来压榨处于价值链下游环节发展中国家代工者的利润空间；(3)链主通过技术授权收取技术租金以及更强的知识产权保护制度提高本土企业模仿和学习的成本,从而降低自创品牌的利润预期,最终将本土产业锁定在低端。随着本土企业加入全球价值链,链主将全球价值链网络的封闭性特征和技术领先优势转化为国内价值链整合的动力来源,并利用并购、合资等手段直接控制国内价值链的高利润环节,可能会导致国内需求难以持续、稳定提高。链主控制一方面引起最终产品垄断性定价,进而造成本土供应商利润的流失和工资持续下降,使整个产业陷入“代工-竞争-利润微薄-高端需求缺失-工资下降-代工”这一恶性循环的陷阱。通过设定链主控制相关的指标,本论文采用行业面板数据和省际面板数据对主要结论进行了验证。借助于省际面板数据模型,专用性投资和本土供应商的交互项显著地影响了地区技术市场的交易规模。在行业面板数据模型中,更多的专利申请数量不仅使本土企业的相对平均收益下降,而且拉大了本土企业同链主之间的技术差距。最后,在省际面板数据模型中,技术差距和网络的封闭性将显著降低实际工资水平。各项理论假说均通过了显著性检验。针对产业安全的系统性评价指标内在局限性,本论文构建了一个简单的基于价值链分工和链主控制的产业安全评价模型,结果表明,1999-2008年中国的产业安全度并没有出现总体趋好的态势,并且尽管技术控制力趋于下降,但链主对营销环节的控制力在最近几年存在上升的趋势,这表明链主对高端市场核心利益的保护在逐渐加强。本论文的政策建议是,在链主的策略性控制行为中实施反控制,一方面需要鼓励企业的跨区域整合,特别是通过跨区域并购的方式培养国家价值链“链主”,进而借助于本国链主的力量有效引导和实现国家价值链功能在区域间的分工、资源在区域间的优化配置；另一方面,鼓励装备制造业企业由组装制造功能向研发功能转型,并强调基础科学研究在构建国内价值链研发链条中的重要作用；最后,基于加入全球价值链的背景,亟需提高产业安全政策和反垄断政策的协调性和有效性。更多还原

【Abstract】 Is the degree of industrial security in China increased or decreased? The literatures analysis this problem usually from the perspectives of multi-dimensions but not based on a more consistent micro economic framework. With joining in the global value chains more deeply, the nation value chains are set up with production factors accumulated through earlier local firms’ subcontracting, learning and imitating. But this process is influenced by the asymmetric power relationship between the governors of global value chains and local firms in China. The governors not only enforce the parameters of a special value chain but act strategically to protect their core benefits both in producer-driven value chains and buyer-driven value chains. This dissertation screens some keys elements which influence China’s industry security from the perspectives of governors controlling and provides an economic analysis to its influencing mechanisms. The main ideal of this dissertation is that the global governors control the highest added-value stage of value chains and have a strategic influence to local firms.There are three aspects about this problem. First, local firms accept an incentive contracts with sustaining, steady and reasonable profits delivered by the governors and are locked in the lowest added-value stages of global value chains. Secondly, with the help of competition and alternative of subcontractors between countries and within countries, the governors squeeze the profits of suppliers persistently from developing countries. The governors increase the cost of local firms’learning and imitating and decrease the expected profits of setting up local firms’own brands by raising the degree of intellectual rights protection. As a result local industries are locked in the "catching-up trap". With local firms deeply joining in the global value chains, the governors transfer the leading position and advantage of governing the closed GVC networks to capability of controlling national value chains in developing countries. They control the highest added-value stages of national value chains with the tools of mergers and acquisitions, which enhance the ability of price controlling of downstream markets and causes local firms’profits losing and wage downsizing. The local industries are dropped in the trap of "subcontracting-competing-low profits gaining-high demand losing-wage downsizing-subcontracting ".By setting up indexes on GVC governors controlling, this dissertation delivers some empirical proofs to the main conclusions with inter-province panel data model or inter-segment panel data model. Interactive term between investment specificity and number of suppliers statistically obviously influences the transaction scale of local technology market based on an inter-province panel data model. Based on an inter-segment panel data model, the dissertation shows that more patent application decreases the average revenue of local firms and enlarges the gap between the GVC governors and local firms. Inter-province panel data model provided evidences about negative correlations between closed networks and real wages.To avoid the limitations to traditional measurement of industry security in China, this dissertation set up a new IS measurement model considering the problem of intra-GVC division and governors controlling. It shows that the degree of industry security in China from1998to2008doesn’t turn for the better. Although the technology controlling strength is downsizing gradually, there exists an upsizing trend for brand and marketing stages in recent years, which gives a sign that the protection for the core market benefits is strengthen. The policy implication for this dissertation is setting up a counter-controlling mechanism to countervailing the governors’ power. On the one side, encouraging the cross-region mergers and acquisitions in China will foster many national value chain governors and those governors will allocate resources more efficiently between different regions. Encouraging machinery manufacture segment realizing function upgrading will get rid of the guidance and controlling of GVC governors. Promoting basic science research activities is a good suggestion to extent the research and development chains in national value chains. The coordination between Industry policy and competition policy is an important problem to be considered by policy makers in the near future.更多还原