【作者】 王元芳；

【导师】 马连福；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 公司治理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 当今世界绝大多数国家的中央和地方政权由政党来掌握,并利用其执政地位,影响政治、经济、社会的方方面面。政党在现代社会政治生活中发挥着重要作用。我国的政党制度更是不同于西方国家竞争性政党制度,是马克思政党理论同中国实际国情相结合的产物,是独一无二的。国有企业是我国国民经济的支柱,国有企业改革和发展关系着国家的经济安全和中国特色社会主义制度的发展与完善。当前,伴随着现代企业制度的建立,国有企业的发展及其党组织发挥政治优势都面临着巨大的挑战。在建立现代企业制度的同时,要充分考虑我国的政治、经济、社会基本制度,其中,充分发挥党组织的政治核心作用,是我国国有企业最大的特色的优势,也是建立中国特色的现代企业制度的本质特征。因此,在充分借鉴国际公司治理经验的基础上,深入开展新时期背景下的党组织在现代公司治理中的有效性研究这一课题,对不断丰富中国特色社会主义的实践特色和理论特色,具有重大的理论价值和现实意义。由于与其他国家典型的公司治理模式相比,我国国有企业的公司治理有着非常重要的一个特征——党组织参与公司治理。特别是我国的《宪法》、《公司法》和《中国共产党章程》的有关规定使得国有企业党组织具备了参与公司治理的主体资格,成为我国国有公司治理的一大特色,但也使得现代公司制企业治理结构的主体框架——董事会、监事会以及管理层与传统企业制度中的党委会关系更为复杂；同时,由于目前我国国有企业存在着“内部人控制”、外部治理机制缺失等问题,也为国有企业中党组织参与公司治理提供了现实基础。面对越来越突出的董事会与党委会职能定位模糊、权力和角色冲突等问题,本文以国有上市公司中党组织参与公司治理这一行为为研究对象,将政治干预主体区分为“政府”与“政党”,研究视角从外部政府部门扩展到企业内部的基层党组织,研究国有企业中基层党组织参与公司治理的制度背景、相关理论、参与方式以及对企业决策和行为的影响,构建了党组织参与公司治理有效性的理论模型。通过构建新的关于党组织参与公司治理程度的指标体系,依次检验了党组织参与公司治理这一行为对公司内部人控制导致的代理问题、高管薪酬契约以及公司冗余雇员的影响,并最终如何发挥治理效应和价值效应。根据实证分析结果,本研究的主要结论如下：(一)我国国有上市公司中,党组织参与公司治理有助于对经理人行为产生制约,抑制内部人控制问题产生的代理成本；降低公司高管人员的绝对薪酬,抑制高管攫取超额薪酬的行为,同时缩小高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距。本文的结果进一步支持了卢昌崇(1994)、李稻葵(1999)和Qian(2000)的观点,即党的人事任免权是国有企业内部人控制的最重要的平衡力量,党组织部门会对经理人员构成严重的制衡。在来自内部治理和外部市场的激励和约束机制都不能有效发挥作用之前,行政手段不会被市场手段取代,职位、仕途和社会目标等的激励和约束机制仍发挥重要的作用。(二)党组织参与公司治理会为企业带来额外的政治成本——冗余雇员。随着党组织参与公司治理程度的增加,公司雇佣的员工数量增加,形成冗余雇员。这一结果证明了除国有股东、政府带来的政治干预以外的第三种干预途径——通过国有企业内部党组织对企业进行干预的存在。党组织形成的系统网络,覆盖了全部社会单位,包括我国的国有企业,并对国有企业的经营决策构成影响和制衡,本文验证了其对国有企业雇佣行为的影响。(三)党组织在不同的参与程度下发挥的治理效应不尽相同,较高或较低的参与程度均不利于公司治理水平的提高。这是因为国有企业承担的代理成本、薪酬成本以及政治成本会随着党组织“双向进入”的程度呈现此消彼长的变化,最终企业的公司治理水平与党组织参与程度呈倒U型曲线关系。但党组织参与公司治理最终体现在公司价值上,表现为公司价值的降低。本研究是基于党组织参与公司治理这一我国国有公司治理最大的特点而开展的探索性研究,其创新点就在于突破了以往对政治干预公司这一行为的研究,从公司内部基层党组织的视角考察了国有企业中党组织参与公司治理对公司行为和价值的影响。研究结果证明除政府部门、国有股东外,企业基层党组织也是政治干预的另一主体,通过企业内部基层党组织依然可以对公司进行干预,为政治干预相关研究提供了新的视角,丰富了相关领域的研究成果以及中国特色的公司治理理论。本文的研究意味着,在现阶段不断丰富和深化中国特色的现代企业制度的实践特色和理论特色的背景下,如何有效开展党组织参与公司治理的具体内容和方式,需要在实践上对这一行为进行制度化的设计,并进一步关注高管薪酬激励机制的有效性以及对“双向进入”人员的考评体系。更多还原

【Abstract】 The central and local governments in most of countries in the world today are mastered by the political parties and use its ruling position to impact political, economic and social aspects. Parties play an important role in the modern social and political life. Party system in China is different from the competitive party system in western countries; it is the combination of Marxism political party theory with China’s actual conditions and it is unique. State-owned enterprises are the backbone of our national economy, the reform and development of state-owned enterprises are related to the country’s economic security and the development and perfection of Chinese characteristics socialist system. Currently, with the establishment of modern enterprise system, the development of state-owned enterprises and the political advantage of party organization are faced with great challenges. When establishing modern enterprise system, we must fully consider our country’s political, economic, social basic system, and let the party play political role fully is the major features and the unique advantages of state-owned enterprises in our country, it is also a distinctive feature and the essential requirements of modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics.2009national state-owned enterprise party construction work conference stressed that since the founding of new China, especially since the reform and opening up30years ago, the state-owned enterprise development process shows that the party construction work has always been the unique political resources of state-owned enterprises, is an organic part of enterprise core competitiveness, and the key factor to realize scientific development. It is also an essential feature of establishing a modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics. Therefore, on the basis of fully using the experience of international corporate governance, the study of party organization’s effectiveness in modern corporate governance in the new period has important theoretical value and practical significance in enriching the characteristics of the practice and theoretical of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Comparing with the typical corporate governance models of foreign countries, the corporate governance structure of China’s state-owned companies has a very important characteristic:party organization participated in corporate governance. Especially through the provisions of the Constitution, the Company Law and the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, the Communist Party Committees of China in state-owned enterprises are entitled the qualification in the corporate governance. This is the most prominent character in the corporate governance of our country, at the same time, it is also make the relationship between the main frame of the structure of modern corporate governance and the traditional enterprise system more complicated. At the same time, because there are problems such as insider control, lack of external governance mechanism in state-owned enterprise now, provides the realistic foundation for party organization to participate in corporate governance in state-owned enterprises. Facing the increasingly prominent problems of the duty of the board of directors and party committee are not clear, power and role conflict, this paper take the behavior of party committee participate in corporate governance in state-owned listed companies as the research object, separate the body of political intervention into "government" and "political party", extended the research perspectives from the government sector outside to the grass-roots party organizations in the enterprises, research the system background, related theories, participation ways and the influence on business decisions and actions of the party organizations participated in corporate governance in state-owned enterprises, build the theory model of party organization participating in corporate governance effectiveness. By constructing a new index system of the party organization participating in corporate governance, examine the effect of the behavior of the party organization participate in corporate governance to agency problem from the insider control, executive compensation contract and labor redundancy, and how to exert governance effect and value effect finally. According to the results of empirical analysis, the main conclusions of this study are as follows:1. In the state-owned list companies in our country, the party organizations participate in corporate governance will restrict the managers’behavior, prevent agency cost from insider control problems, reduce executive compensation, and restrain executives grab excessive compensation; reduce the salary gap between executives and ordinary employees. In this paper, the results further support the previous scholars’view, that the power of the party’s personnel appointment and removal is the most important balance power to insider control in the state-owned enterprises; the party organization department will restrict the managers. Before the incentive and restraint mechanisms from the internal governance and external market work effectively, the administrative measures will not be replaced by market means, position, career, political and social objectives will still play an important role.2. The party committee participate in corporate governance will bring extra political burden, redundant employees to the enterprise. With the increase of the level of party committee participating in corporate governance, the number of employees increases, resulting labor redundancy. The result shows that except for the state-owned shareholders and government’s political intervention, there is a third type of intervention approaches:through the party organization to intervene the enterprise. The party network covering the entire social units, including state-owned enterprises in our country, and influence the business decision. This paper verifies the impact on employment behavior in state-owned enterprises.3. The governance effect of party committee is different in varying participation degrees, higher or lower participation degrees are not conductive to raising the level of corporate governance. This is because the agency cost, salary cost and political cost in state-owned enterprises will change with the degree of the party’s "two-way access", and has an inverted "U-shaped" relationship with the level of corporate governance, but has a negative impact on corporate value.This study based on the largest corporate governance characteristics in China’s state-owned enterprises, which is party committee participating in corporate governance. The innovation is to break the study of political intervention, examining the effect of party committee participating in corporate governance to corporate actions and results from the perspective of internal party organization. The research results show that in addition to government departments and state-owned shareholders, the grass-roots party organizations are also another main political intervention, through the internal party organization, the enterprises can still be intervened. The research provides a new perspective for political intervention, enriched the research achievements in the field and the Chinese characteristics corporate governance theory.更多还原