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稳健性与上市公司财务信息透明度

Conservatism and the Transparency of Listed Companies’ Financial Information

【作者】 吴锡皓

【导师】 周晓苏;

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 , 会计, 2013, 博士

【摘要】 本文以财务信息透明度为研究切入点,探讨稳健性对公司信息披露行为的影响。首先,本文在回顾前人研究的基础上,对稳健性以及财务信息透明度的概念进行界定。其次,本文采用理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法,分析和检验稳健会计政策的不同应用如何影响财务信息透明度。在此基础上,论文从我国特有的资本市场淘汰制度出发,进一步分析和验证上市公司滥用稳健会计政策进行大清洗(造成“过度稳健”的表象)以及公司财务信息透明度低下的制度成因。最后,根据论文研究结果,得到一些相应的启示,同时指出论文的研究局限性,以及展望未来的研究方向。概括起来,全文的主要研究结论如下:在适度范围内,稳健性的增强有助于提升财务信息透明度,而由极端向下盈余管理引起的“过度稳健”则导致财务信息透明度的下降,稳健性和财务信息透明度之间呈倒U型关系。此外,当剔除了盈余管理的影响因素后,稳健性的增强有助于提高财务信息透明度。也就是说,稳健会计政策的不同应用,对公司财务信息透明度产生了不同的影响:当企业真正实施了稳健的会计政策时,其内部人更倾向于选择高透明的财务信息披露,这种透明的财务信息不仅能够降低外部投资者由于信息不足而引发市场负面反应的风险,同时能够向外部投资者传递其会计结果是稳健的和可靠的信号,有利于降低信息不对称和增强公司的正面市场效应;而当企业假借稳健会计之名实施极端向下的盈余管理时,为了掩饰其极端操纵盈余的动机,其内部人会降低财务信息的透明度,引发更严重的信息不对称。研究还发现,在以会计数字为基础的淘汰制度(包括ST制度和退市制度)安排下,那些受到淘汰制度威胁的公司,更有可能降低其财务信息透明度以及发生“过度稳健”现象,但“过度稳健”现象仅仅与退市制度有关,而与ST制度的关系并不显著。同时,那些受到退市制度威胁的公司(主要是ST公司),更有可能通过“过度稳健”的中介作用,间接导致其财务信息透明度的降低。基于上述研究结论,本文提出了一些相应的政策建议。

【Abstract】 This paper investigates the impact of conservatism on disclosure from the perspective of transparency of financial information. Firstly, the concept of conservatism and transparency is defined on the basis of the previous studies. Secondly, how the conservative accounting policy impacts the transparency is analyzed theoretically and tested empirically. And from the Chinese elimination system this paper further analyzes and tests the system-formation causes for which the listed companies abuse conservative accounting policy for big bath and the lower transparency. Lastly, according to the result of this research some revelations are shown, the limitation is pointed out and the future research direction is given.To sum up, the main conclusions are as follows:with the increase of conservatism, the transparency of accounting information is also improved within a proper scope. However, when conservatism exceeds a certain degree, the transparency is falling instead of rising, which takes on an inverted-U relationship. After eliminating the disturbance of earning management, the transparency is improved with the enhancement of conservatism. These results show that the transparency of financial information will vary with the different using of the conservative accounting policy. That is, insiders are inclined to choose high transparency, which can mitigate IA when the company really implements the prudent accounting policy. The transparent financial information can not only reduce the risk that the capital market has a negative reaction due to insufficient information of the outsider but also deliver the message that the company’s accounting result is conservative and reliable, which helps to mitigate information asymmetry (IA) and improve a company’s positive market effect. However, when a company implements extremely downward earnings management under the guise of conservatism, its accounting information will be opaque in order to ensure the discovery of their behavior, which leads to more serious IA.The study also finds out that those companies threatened by elimination system (ST system and delisting system), based on accounting numbers, are inclined to reduce transparency hence result in "excessive" conservatism. However,"excessive" conservatism is only related to delisting system, not to ST system. At the same time, those companies are more likely to reduce transparency through the "excessive" conservatism. This article also puts forward some policy recommendations correspondingly based on the above findings.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 南开大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2014年 07期
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