【作者】 陈鑫；

【导师】 谢阳举；

【作者基本信息】 西北大学 ， 中国史， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 本文旨在开展一场佛教唯识学与胡塞尔现象学的对话,对话的中心问题是意识与对象问题。围绕这个问题,本文在以下五个方面进行了探讨。第一,唯识学与现象学概述。首先,介绍了唯识学在印度和中国的渊源和流变,包括唯识学在原始和部派佛教中的起源,无著、世亲的创立,古学和今学的谱系,在中国的传承的三个阶段：地论、摄论和唯识论阶段。其次,描述了现象学的脉络,包括现象学的先行者布伦塔诺的意向性学说,胡塞尔现象学的三个阶段：描述现象学、先验现象学和发生现象学,以及现象学运动的诸维度：舍勒的伦理学和价值论之维、海德格尔的存在之维、萨特的存在主义之维、梅洛庞蒂的身体之维、列维纳斯的他者之维。最后,揭示了唯识学与现象学的一个共同问题域,即意识和对象问题。第二,意识和对象的概念及其关系。这部分首先探讨了佛教唯识学与胡塞尔现象学的两对核心概念：“心识”与“意识”以及“境相”与“对象”,并进行了初步的比较。其次,叙述并比较了二者对于意识与对象的关系的论述,包括“攀缘”与“被给予”、“四分”说与“意向性”理论、“唯识无境”与“现象学还原”。第三,意识的功能：时间与构建。探讨意识的功能不能离开时间之维。意识在时间之中展开,又构成构成着时间。佛教唯识学和胡塞尔现象学都是从意识角度探讨时间问题。唯识学主张“三世”皆不离识,胡塞尔则揭示了“内时间意识”的“滞留”、“原印象”和“前摄”三重视域结构。唯识学主张心识最根本的功能是“转变”,境相是心识“转变”的产物。现象学则主张意识最根本的功能是“构成”,对象是由意识构成的。佛教唯识学与胡塞尔现象学在探讨意识功能时都以目的论为指引。对于唯识学来说,心识虽比境相本源,但凡夫之识为烦恼和所知二障所遮蔽,不能达到涅槃与菩提之境,故需“转识成智”。对于胡塞尔的现象学来说,意识的时间性和构成等问题的探究都是为了理性的重建,现象学本身就是理性的实现。第四,对象的展开：自我、他者与世界。对象是相对于意识而立的东西,而意识总是“我”的意识,自我既是主体,又是客体,是连结意识和对象的拱顶石,它通过“统觉”作用把诸意识行为和诸对象统一起来。佛教唯识学认为末那识将阿赖耶识执为自我,是我痴、我见、我慢、我爱四烦恼的根源。只有破除我执,才能断绝烦恼。胡塞尔现象学的自我概念则经历了“经验自我”、“纯粹自我”和“人格自我”三个阶段的发展。这与他现象学发展的三个阶段是一致的。佛教唯识学的自我学说是一条解构之路,而胡塞尔现象学的自我学说则是一条建构之路。“他者”即自我之外的存在者,包括“他物”和“他人”。他者是自我的界限,他者问题是自我问题的变异和延伸。佛教唯识学主张他者是阿赖耶识所藏种子变现出来的。胡塞尔现象学主张他者是由先验自我通过“结对”、“共现”和“移情”三个环节构成的。自我变现或构成他者,他者也可以变现或构成自我,在交互作用中我们建构了一个“主体间性”的世界。从意识和对象关系角度看,世界是主体间性共同体意向地构成的对象之整体,又是在一切意向构成之前先行被给予的终极视域。佛教唯识学与胡塞尔现象学对世界的探讨可以分别用“缘起世界”和“生活世界”两个概念来标识。前者是“四缘”和合所成有情世间,后者是前科学并为“科学世界”奠基的直观的、主观的世界。第五,意识哲学的两条道路。通过整体比较,笔者认为作为佛教唯识学与胡塞尔现象学作为意识哲学的两种样式,其主要差异在于视域不同,这集中体现在两个方面：一是二者生存论关怀与认识论探究的不同旨趣,二是二者宗教性与科学性的不同特征。这两种意识哲学从属于各自思想视域,对它们进行比较不能脱离一个更普遍的视域——历史。因此,笔者对唯识学与现象学的兴衰进行了一些反思。最后,从以上内容出发,初步探讨了意识哲学的现状与未来,即立足于差异,展开对话,实现互补。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation is, in essence, a dialogue between vijnaptimatrata and Husserl’s phenomenology, in which the leading issues are the consciousness and object. In the dissertation, the issues are discussed in five steps:1) summarizing the development routes of vijnaptimatrata and phenomenology. First, introducing the generation and development of vijnaptimatrata in Indian and China, which includes its origin in Early and Sectarian Buddhism, Asanga and Vasubandhu’s creation, the genealogy of ancient and contemporary theories, moreover, the three stages of its inheritance in China:Dashabhumika, Mahqyqnasagraha and Cittamatra. Second, sketching the tread of phenomenology, which includes the Intentionality Theory of Brentano (forerunner of phenomenology), Husserl’s phenomenology (descriptive, transcendental and genesis phenomenology), and various dimensions of the phenomenological movement:ethical and axiological dimension of Scheler, existential dimension of Heidegger’s, existentialism dimension of Sartre, body dimension of Merleau-Ponty,"others" dimension of Levinas, etc. Third, revealing a common "issue domain" between vijnaptimatrata and phenomenology:consciousness and object.2) consciousness and object:concepts and relation. First discussing and comparing two groups of core concepts in vijnaptimatrata and Husserl’s phenomenology:"vijnana" with "consciousness", and "artha" with "object". Then describing and comparing several groups of approximate theories of both sides upon the relation between consciousness and object, including the "alambana" and "be given","four functions" and "intentionality","vijnapti-matrata-a-artha" and "phenomenological reduction".3) conscious functions:time and construction. Consciousness unfolds itself within time, meanwhile, latter is constructed in the same process. Both vijnaptimatrata and Husserl’s phenomenology have chosen the perspective of consciousness as the starting point of their study of time. Vijnaptimatrata believes in "vijnana within trayo-dhvanah", yet Husserl revealed the internal structure of "inner temporary consciousness":"Retention","Urimpression" and "Protention". Vijnaptimatrata advocates that the basic function of vijnana is "transformation", which produces the artha. But in phenomenology, objects are constructed by consciousness, which means the "construction" is the basic function. Both vijnaptimatrata and Husserl’s phenomenology are guided by a certain teleology in their study of consciousness functions. In vijnaptimatrata, vijnana is considered more ultimate than artha, but the consciousness of common people cannot achieve the nirvana and the bodhi because of the shadowing of "worry" and "knowledge", unless "turn vijnana into prajna ". In Husserl’s phenomenology, the final purpose of the consciousness is the reconstruction of reason, even the phenomenology itself is nothing but a realization of reason.4) the unfolding of object:ego, others and the world. Object is something holding opposite position against the consciousness, but the consciousness is always something about ego. Ego, as a keystone connecting both sides, is not only subject, but also object. It unifies consciousness behaviors and object through "apperception". In vijnaptimatrata, manas-vijnana considers alaya-vijnana as ego, it is the root of four Mesa:atma-moha, atma-drsti, atma-mana, atma-sneha. Only break away with egocentrism, we could cut off klesa. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the concept of ego has experienced three stages:"empirical ego","pure ego" and "personal ego". It is accordant with the three stages of his phenomenology. In vijnaptimatrata, ego is a way leading to deconstruction, but in Husserl’s theory, ego is constructive."Other" is something besides ego, including other things and persons."Other" is the boundary of ego, therefore, the issue of "other" is actually a variation and extension of the issue of ego. In vijnaptimatrata,"other" is generated from the "seed" within alaya-vijnana. In Husserl’s theory,"other" was constituted by transcendental ego through "pairing","co-presentation" and "empathy". Ego becomes or constitutes "other", and so does "other". We construct a world of "intersubjectivity" through the interaction of ego and "other". From perspective of the relation between consciousness and object, the world is not only a whole of the objects constructed intentionally by a complexity of intersubjectivity, but also an ultimate horizon pre-given before all intentional construction. In vijnaptimatrata, the world itself is a world of pratityasamutpada based on "four conditions". However, Husserl’s world is a "life world":intuitive, subjective, pre-scientific and laying foundation for "scientific world",5) two approaches of consciousness philosophy. Through an overall comparison, the author thinks that the main difference between vijnaptimatrata and Husserl’s phenomenology lies in horizons:different purposes in existential-Ontology and epistemology, different features in religiousness and scientificalness. These two theories of consciousness philosophy originated in their own horizons of thought, therefore, the comparison of them cannot be done with the absence of a more universal horizon:the history. That means some reflection about the rise and fall of each theory would be necessary.At the end, discussing the current situation and possible approach of the consciousness philosophy, which can be concluded as "facing the differences, applying communication, realizing complementation"更多还原