【作者】 张振勇；

【导师】 杨学成；

【作者基本信息】 山东农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 我国现行宅基地制度是历史演变的产物，是在我国农业社会主义改造背景下发展起来的，这种无偿、均分、带有福利性质的宅基地使用制度为我国工业化发展、农民安居乐业、农村社会稳定发挥了积极的历史作用。然而，随着人口的增长和经济发展，特别是工业化城镇化的快速推进，农村土地资源日益稀缺，宅基地潜在价值迅速上升，出现制度失衡，擅自将耕地、甚至基本农田转为宅基地兴建小产权房、度假村等行为大量发生，村庄整理出现被上楼情况，土地征收发生群体性上访等事件，而另一方面，由于宅基地制度不能适应我国市场经济体制和城乡一体化的要求，出现了宅基地“摊大饼”式的盲目无序向外扩展、大量“空心村”等农村土地资源粗放低效利用现象。本文以演化经济学和制度经济学理论为基础，从一个全新的分析视角——制度演化作为研究切入点，将制度演化与我国农村宅基地制度有机结合，运用制度变迁理论、演化博弈论、自组织理论等具体理论和方法，探究和分析我国农村宅基地制度演化的轨迹、动力机制、路径和趋势，揭示我国宅基地制度演化的规律，探索农村宅基地制度未来变革的基本取向。主要研究内容和结论如下：第一，新中国成立六十多年来我国农村宅基地制度调整的历程，目前宅基地制度存在的问题，以及农户对宅基地制度满意度。建国以来我国农村宅基地制度划分为三个阶段：第一阶段（建国初期——二十世纪五十年代末）农民宅基地房屋私有化时期、第二阶段（二十世纪五十年代末——二十世纪八十年代初）从农民私有土地制度到合作社集体所有转变、第三阶段（二十世纪八十年代初——至今）宅基地使用权流转探索时期。每个时期的土地政策调整都体现了从制度不均衡向制度均衡过渡的特征。目前宅基地制度与现实不适应性主要表现在：①农村宅基地的非市场性，导致了宅基地的闲置浪费，利用效率低下；②农村宅基地的福利性，使得其财产效应没有得到体现，造成农民财产权益受损；③农村宅基地产权主体的“虚化”，造成集体财产流失和群众利益受损；④农村宅基地的分散布局制约了公共设施建设，阻碍了农民生活质量的提高；⑤宅基地缺乏合法的流转机制，造成隐性流转和灰色交易大量发生。通过实地调查，我们了解到农户对宅基地制度基本满意，但大多数希望建立农村宅基地自由流转制度。第二，我国农村宅基地制度演化的动力和逻辑思路。中国农村宅基地制度演化的基本动力来自于现行制度安排下无法获取的外部利润的出现，制度主体——地方政府、农村集体经济组织、农民之间的相互关系和互动博弈影响了我国农村宅基地制度演化的路径和轨迹。本文构建了两种解释制度演化的逻辑思路。逻辑思路之一是要素相对价格提高、外部利润的形成与宅基地制度演化。在工业化、城镇化、农村市场化及城乡一体化的进程中，农村土地资源日益稀缺，宅基地要素相对价格上涨，促使中央政府、地方政府、农村集体经济组织、用地企业、农户发现了潜在制度变迁收益，即现有制度安排下无法获取的“外部利润”，造成制度非均衡，引起集体经济组织、用地企业、农户形成初级行动集团通过追逐集体土地增值收益、寻求土地规模利用效应、优化土地资源配置效率、降低土地交易费用来首先响应“外部利润”；中央政府和地方政府感受到初级行动集团的影响从战略全局考虑，认为制度变迁的收益大于成本，主动引入权威、命令，构建正式制度体系，有意识的推动制度变迁，形成次级行动集团；两个集团共同努力实现制度创新，各利益集团获取潜在利益，制度复归均衡。逻辑思路之二是利益集团之间利益博弈、同意一致性的达成与宅基地制度演化。对经济当事人而言，要想获得现有制度安排下无法获取的“外部利润”，就必须改变现行的制度安排。而制度变革会影响相关当事人的经济利益。由于不同的利益集团具有不同的价值函数，因此可能会采用相互冲突的决策和行动。利益集团之间利益的耦合程度及其力量对比关系决定着制度演化的路径和维度。在经过一系列的成本——效益权衡与博弈之后，利益各方会达成某种妥协，形成新的博弈均衡，建立新的制度安排。本文运用上述两种逻辑思路剖析了山东省泰安市岱岳区良庄镇东延东村城乡建设用地增减挂钩项目能够顺利进行而西良庄村城乡建设用地增减挂钩项目却以失败告终两则案例。第三，农村宅基地制度演化的理性设计和自发演化的有机统一。本文认为政府理性设计是我国农村宅基地制度演化的主导力量，而农村宅基地制度本身又具有自组织的特征，制度主体（农户、村集体、政府）之间的互动关系决定了农村宅基地制度演化是一个复杂的自组织过程。开放性是我国农村宅基地制度演化的前提。随机涨落是中国农村宅基地制度自组织演化的诱因。在我国经济社会转型过程中，工业化、城镇化、农村市场化、城乡一体化等推动着农村宅基地要素相对价格的提高构成了一个随机涨落，正是这一微涨落通过放大形成巨涨落从而促使农村宅基地制度创新的发生和农村宅基地制度的自组织演化。竞争和协同是中国农村宅基地制度自组织演化的动力。政府、农村集体经济组织和农民之间的竞争与合作、互动与博弈从根本上推动了我国农村宅基地制度演化，而中国特定的制度环境决定了政府发挥的作用更大。第四，完善我国农村宅基地制度的政策建议。土地要素相对价格变化将长期决定宅基地制度变迁的方向。然而，中国特定的制度环境决定了政府主体在农村宅基地制度创新和演化过程中，具有重要影响力，中央政府的意愿及其政策偏好显得尤为重要，国家设计始终是决定制度变迁轨迹的众多力量中的主要方面。但是政府的制度安排意愿要考虑宅基地要素相对价格的变化趋势，只有让宅基地制度创新的路径和方向与宅基地要素相对价格变化的趋势相吻合，避免二者的相互冲突和抵消，才能使农村宅基地制度沿着不断优化的轨迹演进。政策建议是：第一，农村宅基地制度改革的方向是推行宅基地市场化改革，建立统一的城乡竞争性土地市场；第二，现阶段应该是治理结构改革代替产权结构改革，保持集体所有制，尽快把农村宅基地所有权确认到村集体经济组织，逐步把宅基地使用权证发放到农户，建立规范有序的宅基地流转制度；第三，未来农村宅基地最适产权安排是在市场经济体制逐步完善的条件下逐步推行农村集体建设用地国有化。更多还原

【Abstract】 The current homestead system of our country is the product of historical evolution, and itis developed in the context of China’s socialist transformation of agriculture. This kind of freecharge, sharing, with welfare properties homestead system played an important role in ourcountry’s industrial development and the rural society stability. However, with the populationgrowth and economic development, particularly with the rapid advance of industrializationand urbanization, the land resources in rural areas are becoming more and scarcer; thepotential value of the homestead rises rapidly. As a result, the imbalance appears, thebehavior of unauthorized transferring farmland, even basic farmland into construction land tobuild small property room and holiday village happens a lot, farmers are compelled to moveinto buildings, and people appeal to the higher authorities in the land expropriation. On theother hand, due to the fact that the homestead system can not meet the requirements ofChina’s market economic system and the integration of urban and rural areas, the phenomenonof homestead’s “pie-blind” disorderly outward expansion and extensive and inefficient use ofthe " hollow village "rural land resource appeared.In this paper, the theory of evolutionary economics and institutional economics are takenas analysis tools, from a new perspective of research analysis-institutional evolution,thispaper organically combines the system evolution and china’s rural home base systemtogether,using the concrete theory and method-theory of institutional change,evolutionarygame theory and theory of self-organization to explore and analyze the trajectory，dynamicmechanism, path and trends of the evolution of the of China’s rural homestead system, toreveal the law of our homestead system evolution and to explore the basic orientation of thefuture change of rural homestead system. The main contents and conclusions are as follows:Firstly, the article summarizes the sixty years’ history of our country’s rural homesteadsystem adjustment since the new China was founded, analyzes the current problems existingin China’s homestead system, and investigates the farmers’ satisfaction with the homesteadsystem.Since the new China was founded, our country’s rural residential land reform can bedivided into three stages: the first stage (the early days-the late1950s) is the farmers’homestead housing privatization period, in the second phase (the late1950s-the beginning of the1980s) the farmers’ private land system is transformed to the cooperatives collectivesystem, the third phase (early1980s-present) is the homestead using right circulationexploration period. Land policy adjustments in each period all reflect the characteristics of thetransition from the imbalanced institutional system to the balanced.The homestead system’s inadaptability with the reality are mainly shown as follows:Firstly, the non-market of rural homestead leads to idle waste and inefficient use of thehomestead; Secondly, the rural homestead has welfare properties, which makes it hard for itsproperty effects to be reflected, resulting in damage to the property rights and interests offarmers; Thirdly, the "blur" of the rural homestead property rights results in the loss ofcollective property and damage to the interests of the masses; fourthly, the dispersed layout ofthe rural homestead constraints the construction of public facilities, hinder the improvementof the farmers’ quality of life; fifthly, homestead lacks legal transfer mechanism, resulting in alarge number of recessive circulation and gray transactions occurred.Through field investigation, we learned that the farmers are basically satisfied with thehomestead system, but most of them want to establish the rural homestead freedomcirculation system.Secondly, the article analyzes the power of China’s rural homestead system evolution;build analytical framework and logical thinking for China’s rural homestead system evolution.The basic driving force of Chinese rural homestead system evolution comes from theemergence of external profit which can not be obtained in the current institutionalarrangements system, the subjects of the system-local government, rural collective economicorganizations, the relationship between the farmers and interactive game affect our country’shomestead institutional evolution path and trajectory. We build two logical thinking toexplain the system evolution. One of the logic thinking is from the relative price improvementand external profit formation to explain homestead system evolution. In the advance ofindustrialization, marketization of the rural areas and urban-rural integration, rural landresources are increasingly scarce, homestead relative factor prices increases, prompting thecentral government, local government, rural collective economic organizations, landcompanies and farmers found a potential institutional change revenue, which is the “externalprofit” that can not be obtained under the existing institutional arrangements, resulting in thenon-equilibrium of the system,which makes collective economic organizations, the landcompanies, farmers form the primary action group to chase collective land value-addedbenefits, to seek the effects of large-scale land utilization, to optimize the efficiency of theland resources allocation, and to reduce the cost of land transactions to first response to “external profit”; then from the strategic global considerations, the central government andlocal governments feel the impact of the primary action group, think that the benefitsoutweigh the costs of institutional change, take the initiative to introduce the authority andcommand to build a formal system of awareness to promote institutional change and form thesub-action group; two groups work together to achieve institutional innovation, variousinterest groups obtain the potential benefits and system return to equilibrium again. Thesecond logical thinking is gaming among the interest group, to agree to consistency and toreach homestead system evolution. To economic parties, in order to get the “external profit”which can not be got under the existing institutional arrangements, it is necessary to changethe existing institutional arrangements, and make institutional change. Institutional changewould affect the economic interests of the relevant economic parties, due to the fact thatdifferent interest groups have different value function, they may make decisions and actionsthat conflict with each other. The degree of coupling and its correlation of forces between theinterest group determine the system evolution path and dimensions. After a series of cost-benefit trade-offs and game, the interest parties will reach some kind of compromise to form anew game equilibrium, and establish the new institutional arrangements.This paper uses two logical ideas above to explain why the project of urban and ruralconstruction sites linked to changes can proceed smoothly in Dongyandong Village,Liangzhuang Town, Daiyue District, Taian City, Shandong Province, but failed inXiliangzhuang Village.Thirdly, the article realizes the organic unite of rational design and spontaneousevolution in the homestead institution evolution.This paper argues that government rational design is the dominant force in the evolutionof China’s rural homestead system; the rural homestead system has the characteristics of self-organization, and the interaction between the subjects of the system (farmers, villagecollective and government) decided that the rural homestead system evolution is a complexself-organizing process. Openness is the precondition of our country’s rural homestead regimeevolution.Random fluctuation is the incentive for self-organization evolution of China’s ruralhomestead system.In China’s economic and social transformation process,the industrializationand urbanization, the rural marketization and the integration of urban and rural drive the ruralhomestead elements relative price increases to constitute a random fluctuation, it is this microfluctuations, by amplifying, form the giant fluctuation that promote the occurrence of the ruralhomestead system innovation and the evolution of its self-organization. Competition andcollaboration is the power of self-organization evolution of China’s rural homestead system. The competition and cooperation, the interaction and game among the governments, the ruralcollective economic organizations and farmers is the inherent power of the evolution ofChina’s rural homestead system. The specific institutional environment determines thatgovernment should play the most important role.Fourthly, the article makes some useful policy recommendations to improve our ruralhomestead institution.The land factor relative price changes will decide the direction of homestead institutionalchange in the long-term.However, the specific institutional environment determines thatgovernment has an important influence on rural homestead system innovation and evolution,the wishes of the central government and its policy preferences is particularly important, andnational design always decide the trajectory of institutional change as the main aspects. Butthe government’s institutional arrangements willingness has to consider the trend ofhomestead elements relative price changes, to coincide the path and direction of thehomestead system innovation and its elements’ relative price change to avoid conflicting andoffset of both sides, to make it move forward that along constantly enhance and optimize thetrajectory of evolution. The policy recommendations: Firstly, as for the direction of thereform of the rural homestead, to implement the homestead market-oriented reforms andestablish a unified competitive market of the urban and rural land; Secondly, to substitute thereform of property right to the reform of the existing governance structure, to keep all thecollective ownership structure, to confirm the ownership of the rural homestead to the villagecollective economic organizations as soon as possible, according to the actual needs, confirmthe homestead warrants to farmers gradually, to establish a standardized and orderlyresidential land system; thirdly, to determine the optimal property rights arrangements of thefuture rural homestead, it is the best choice to implement the rural collective construction landnationalization after the gradual improvement of the future market economic system.更多还原