【作者】 夏涛；

【导师】 谢德体； 魏朝富；

【作者基本信息】 西南大学 ， 农业资源与环境， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 1987年12月,深圳市首次公开拍卖—宗国有土地使用权,这次土地拍卖是建国后中国第一次把土地使用权作为资产进入市场,这意味着土地开始作为商品走向市场,宣告了土地市场的诞生。之后在较长的时间内,协议出让的方式长期占据国有土地出让方式的主导地位；由于土地协议出让的方式是市场化程度较低的交易方式,在加上各级地方政府的自由裁量权过大,这就使得寻租行为和腐败行为频发,造成政府无法获得正常市场化的土地出让收益,致使巨额国有土地资产流失,严重制约了土地市场的健康发展,危害巨大。为改变这种状况,为营造公正、公开、公平的土地出让市场,规范国有土地的出让行为,获取正常市场化的土地收益：中华人民共和国国土资源部于2002年5月9日发布了《招标拍卖挂牌出让国有土地使用权规定》,之后中华人民共和国国土资源部和监察部于2004年3月联合下发了《关于继续开展经营性土地使用权招标拍卖挂牌出让情况执法监察工作的通知》,该文件明确要求从2004年8月31日开始所有经营性用地都要采用招标拍卖挂牌公开竞价的方式出让,这意味着《招标拍卖挂牌出让国有土地使用权规定》这一制度在全国全面展开施行。随后2007年9月28日国土资源部依据物权法及其他相关法律法规的法理原则,发布了39号令《招标拍卖挂牌出让国有建设用地使用权规定》。这些就助推了土地市场的进一步深入发展。土地出让招拍挂制度的实施确实进一步优化了土地资源配置,显化了土地的正常市场价值,地方政府土地出让的收入也在不断增长,而且土地出让经济收益极大化的好处也充分显现,这样“土地财政效应”逐渐异化为各级地方政府追逐的目标,为了获得更高的土地出让收入,地方政府广泛运用“价高者得”的拍卖和挂牌出让方式,这样各地土地出让价格不断上涨,从而引发房地产价格非理性过快上涨。党中央和国务院充分意识到问题的严重性,一直都在致力于调控。面对日益严重的地价和房价形势,从2010年开始党中央和国务院加大了调控力度,出台了一系列的调控措施：如明确要求各地要合理确定土地供应方式和内容,探索土地出让综合评标方法；明确要求在坚持和完善土地招拍挂制度的同时,要积极探索“综合评标”、“一次竞价”、“双向竞价”等出让方式。中央政府的调控目的是进一步完善土地出让制度,改进当前国有土地市场化出让的方式,以期稳定地价和房价。土地使用权招标出让是国有土地市场化出让中的重要方式,因而研究土地市场化下国有土地使用权招标出让是必然的现实需求。当前直接专门研究国有土地使用权招标出让的文献较为少见,它们或是综合笼统地分析国有土地招标出让的现状与问题,或是简要分析国有土地使用权招投标的价格均衡策略,或是浅显的定性探讨国有土地使用权招标出让与地价、房价的关系；这些零散、不系统的研究还不能满足现实需求。本研究从理论上扩展了国有土地使用权招标出让的研究视角,丰富深化了国有土地使用权招标出让的研究内容和研究框架,提出了应对当前国有土地使用权招标出让系列问题的措施与思路,能为政府进一步规范和完善土地出让制度的实践提供相应的参考与借鉴。国有土地使用权实行市场化出让是土地市场化发展的必然趋势与要求,经营性国有土地使用权招标出让是国有土地使用权实行市场化出让的重要方式和手段,本文以土地市场化背景下国有土地使用权公开招标出让为研究对象,主要采用文献研究法、案例与实例分析法、定量实证研究法、博弈研究法等方法进行研究；其中主要以委托代理理论为分析研究的依据,对经营性国有土地使用权公开招标出让中的几大主要参与主体(政府部门直接招标出让人、评标人及投标人等)的激励和约束机制进行了深入研究,最终本论文得出以下主要研究结论。(1)把市、县国土资源行政主管部门或其指定授权的下属事业单位当作具有同一性质的政府部门直接招标人来进行分析。得出了在中国现有政治行政体制下,国有土地产权形成了如下行政性委托代理链：全国人民——全国人民代表大会——中央政府国务院——各地方政府——各地方政府国土资源行政主管部门——地方国土资源行政主管部门具体的工作人员。具体到国有土地使用权招标出让中,当地方政府国土资源行政主管部门直接作为招标人时的激励、约束会出现如下主要问题：由行政性委托代理引发的上级委托人难于考核下级代理人,上级委托人对下级代理人约束软化和政治激励不兼容以及出现短期和机会主义行为等。然后主要运用主成分分析法和回归分析法从全国层面和以重庆市、上海市、甘肃省为例的地方政府的层面对现有土地出让委托代理激励、约束的问题进行了较为详尽的实证解释与验证。在现有的行政委托代理下政府的国土资源行政主管部门既是国有土地产权的代表也是土地的管理者,既承担国有土地所有者的经营职能也承担政府行政管理部门的土地管理职能,集经营职能与管理职能于一身,必然会造成职能错位,行为失范、责任模糊、激励不兼容、约束软化等内生性问题。基于此笔者提出了现有上地产权委托代理激励、约束的改进设想,构建土地产权的市场性委托,把土地的经营职能从政府国土资源行政主管部门剥离出去,建立国有土地经营公司,政府与国有土地经营公司之间通过市场性委托合约进行连接,然后对政府部门直接招标出让人的激励约束就换化为对国有土地经营公司经营代理人的激励和约束。(2)国有土地使用权招标出让中招标人与评标人的委托代理关系中存在的主要问题有：评标劳务报酬固定化,总体报酬水平不高,报酬的正向激励缺乏；评标人的主观随意行为倾向可能性大,影响评标结果的公正公平性；评标人所拥有的权利和应承担的责任反差大、不对等。虽然固定报酬模型理论上对评标人的激励是可行的,但是具体实际度量满足评标人参与约束与激励相容约束是很困难的,而结合目前施行的评标报酬普遍偏低的情况来看,固定报酬模型存在先天的激励缺陷,需要进一步改进；因而笔者提出了定酬+奖励(f+j)的激励报酬模型,并分析了激励模型的求解。之后以评标人的激励报酬机制为基础,构建了基于声誉影响函数的激励机制,而且声誉激励机制也验证了实行激励报酬机制的必要性。然后对激励机制进行了具体的算例数理验证分析；研究表明激励报酬激励机制相较于固定报酬对评标人能有更大的激励动力,能有更好的激励效果。之后从制定并完善对评标专家进行统一管制的法规、建立并完善具体的管理制度、追加对评标人的后期评估、对评标专家进行动态管理这四个方面探析了评标人约束机制的构建。(3)依据当前地价、房价的实际情况和国家宏观调控的需求导向,对国家调控所提倡的国有土地使用权综合评标出让法从商务标评价体系表和技术标评价体系表两个方面进行了较为详尽的例举综合分析；然后运用层次分析法和模糊综合评价法进行了具体的实例分析,并对两种方法的结果进行了对比分析与探讨；这些实例分析对当前国有土地使用权出让方式的改进作出了有益的探索。(4)之前经营性国有土地使用权协议出让的制度有先天的重大缺陷,该制度的实行给市场需求主体、土地资源的配置和利用、党和政府的公信力、社会的福利水平和社会的运行都带来严重的负面影响,而且正是这些因素推动了国有土地使用权出让制度的变迁。于是原有制度被变革为经营性国有土地使用权实行招标、拍卖和挂牌公开出让的制度,相对于以往的经营性国有土地使用权实行协议出让的制度,国有上地使用权实行公开招标出让,这对土地潜在购买利用人或投标人来说就是天然的最有效的激励方式。与协议出让相比当国有土地使用权实行公开招标出让时,这能减少土地潜在购买利用人或投标人的交易成本、提升他们参与公平竞争的信心,提高他们公平经营获利的可能性和概率；因而土地潜在购买利用人或投标人有强烈的正向参与激励。然后以2004年为分界点,主要运用相关分析和回归分析等方法从土地的供给方地方政府和土地的需求方房地产开发企业这两个方面,采用全国层面的数据和重庆市层面的数据,对经营性用地协议出让为主的制度激励效果与招拍挂出让的制度激励效果进行了对比实证分析。(5)在国有土地使用权招标出让的具体活动实践中,投标人采用单边支付的合谋机制具有有效性和激励相容性,是有效率的,单边支付成为投标人合谋时的占优现实选择。国有土地使用权招标出让中投标人合谋的危害性巨大,不容小视,必须要积极应对。以上述分析为基础,建立国有土地使用权招标出让中投标人围标合谋的动态贝叶斯博弈模型,再对投标人的围标合谋行为进行相应的信号博弈分析,再结合具体的实际案例对动态贝叶斯博弈模型进行了相应的验证分析。之后依据动态贝叶斯博弈模型的分析结论,从吸引更多的投标参与者、合理设置出让底价、适当控制单次出让土地的面积、完善招投标的相关法律制度、构建市场诚信体系等方面提出了约束投标人合谋行为的措施。(6)依据国有土地使用权招标出让的实际情形,再进一步分析了国有土地使用权招标出让中存在的监察方政府、投标人、评标人及招标出让人这几个主要的参与主体；然后从四大方面详细阐释了投标人、评标人及招标出让人多方合谋的形成原因,并解析了他们多方合谋的三种主要发起方式。再分类型分别构建了他们多方合谋的不同博弈模型进行分析,之后结合多方博弈分析的结论,从监察体系的建设、交易信息的公开透明、监督与举报奖励机制的建立、合谋成本的增加、合谋参与方惩罚力度的强化等方面提出了约束多方合谋的措施。综上所述,本文结合现实需求,主要依据委托代理理论来系统深入地研究土地市场化背景下国有土地使用权招标出让的问题,这是全新的研究视角；分层分类详细深入地解析了国有土地使用权招标出让中几大主要参与主体之间委托代理的主要问题,然后主要以激励机制和约束机制为研究的突破口提出了应对国有土地使用权招标出让系列问题的措施与思路；这些都是新的研究探索,具有一定的创新价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 The fist public auction of a state-owned land use right was happened in Shenzhen city in December1987, this auction was the first time the land use right was brought into the market as assets after the founding of new China, which meant that the land was brought into the market as a commodity, and announced the creation of the land market. After that, the way of agreement selling occupied the dominant position of the state-owned land selling mode in a long period of time. Due to the agreement selling mode was the low market-oriented way to trade, combined with too much free discretion of the local government at all levels, this agreement selling made the frequent rent-seeking and corruption, caused huge loss of the state-owned land assets, seriously restricted the healthy development of land market; the harm was great. In order to change this situation, to create a fair open land market, regulate the behavior of the selling of state-owned land, obtain normal marketization of land revenue, on May9,2002, the ministry of land and resources issued the order 《the provision that state-owned land use right must be sold through bidding, auction and listing》.Then in March2004, ministry of land and resources, ministry of supervision jointly issued 《the notice that the supervisory work of the business land use right’s selling through bidding, auction and listing must be continued》. demanding that from August31of the year2004. all the profit-oriented land must be sold through public bidding, auction and listing, this means the provision was implemented throughout the country.Then on September28,2007, on the basis of legal principle of property law and other relevant laws and regulations, the ministry of land and resources issued39th dictate 《the provision is that the state-owned construction land use right must be sold through bidding, auction and listing》. These will help the further development of land market. This land bidding auction listing system brought the following effection, optimizing the allocation of land resources, manifesting the normal market value of the land; and the local government’s land selling income was growing, and then the land selling revenue’s maximization economic benefits was fully revealed, so "land finance effect "was gradually alienated to all levels of local governments goal. In order to get higher land selling income, the auction and listing which meant the man who gave the highest price would have the land were widely used by the local government; so the land price was improved to a high level, and the real estate price was also triggered to rise in a quick irrational way. Fully realizing the seriousness of these problems, the central committee of the communist party of China and the state council have been making the control. Facing the increasingly serious situation of the land price and housing price, the CPC central committee and the state council issued a strong series of control measures from the year2010, such as resonably considering the land supply way and supply content, exploring land comprehensive evaluation method;requiring clearly that the system of land’s bidding auction listing must be continued,at the same time the "comprehensive assessment","one-bid","two-way bidding" selling mode must be explored too. Central government’s regulation goal is to perfect the land selling system furtherly, modify the current market selling mode of the stated-owned land, so as to stable the land selling price and housing price. Land use right’s bidding is an important way of the stated-owned land market selling, So the study of the stated-owned land use right bidding sale under the background of the land marketization is the inevitable realistic demand.The current literatures directly devoted to study the state-owned land use right bidding sale are rare. Some of them analyzed the situation and problems of the land use right bidding from comprehensive general perspective,or some discussed the balancing price of the land use right bidding sale briefly, or some discussed the qualitative relationship between the land use right bidding sale and the land price and the housing price. These scattered unsystematic study can’t meet the demands of reality. This study extends the research pespective of the state-owned land use right bidding sale in theory, and also enrich and deepen its research content and framework.Some measures and ideas to cope with the stated-owned land use right bidding sale problems are put forward, these can provide references for the government’s further regulating and perfecting land transfer system.The state-owned land use right’s selling through marketization way is the inevitable trend and requirement of land marketization. The operating state-owned land use right’s bidding is an important way and mean of the state-owned land use right’s marketization selling. The research object is the state-owned land use right’s public bidding under the background of land marketization. The literature methodology, case study and instance analysis, empirical research method, game method are used to do this research. And the principal-agent theory is the basis of the analysis and research. The incentive and constraint mechanism of the major players(the government department as the direct tenderer, the bid evaluation.the bidder and so on) are studied furtherly. Finally this paper concludes the following main research conclusion.(1)The land resource administrative department and its designated authorized subordinate institution in the city or county are considered as the direct tenderer in the government department. Combined with the current existing political administrative system, the state-owned land property right in China has formed the following administrative principal-agent chains:the people of the whole country--the national people’s congress--the central government of the state council--local governments--the administrative department of land resources of local government--the specific staff in local land resource administrative department. Specific to the state-owned land use right bidding transfer, the local government land resources administrative department as the direct tenderer, the problems triggered by administrative agent will also appear such as that the superior client is difficult to inspect the agents at a lower level, softening the constraint to the agent at lower levels and incentive system to the agent is incompatible, and short-term and opportunism behavior problems will appear. The current incentive and constraint problems of the land selling’s principal-agent are explained and verified in detail by the empirical principal component and regression analysis from two levels of the whole country and the local government in Chongqing,Shanghai and Gansu.In the current existing administrative principal-agent. the government’s administrative department of land resource is representative of the state-owned land property right and land managers, has state-owned land owner’s management function and government administrative departments of land management function, which is bound to cause functional dislocation, behavior anomie, responsibility fuzzy, the incentive incompatibility, constraints softening and so on naturally. Based on this the author puts forward a modified idea of land property rights entrusted agency, constructing land property rights market principal agent, stripping the land management functions from government, establishing state-owned land management company. And the government and state-owned land management companies are connected through the marketability contract. And then the research to the incentive and constraint mechanism of the direct government department(as the direct tenderer) is changed to the research of the incentive and constraint mechanism of the state-owned land management company’s operating agent.(2)The main principal-agent problems of the tenderer and the bid evaluation in the stated-owned land use right bidding sale action are:the bid evaluation labor remuneration is fixed, the overall pay level is not high which lacks of the positive incentive; the arbitrary behavior of the bid evaluation is in a high probability which likely affects the justice and fairness of the bid assessment results; the bid evaluation’s rights and his responsibilities is inequality.Although the fixed compensation model for the evaluation’s incentive is feasible in theory, but the actual measurement of the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint for the evaluation is difficult. And combining with the current general implementation of the evaluation’s low remuneration, the fixed compensation has inherent incentive defects. Therefore the author puts forward the pay+bonus (f+j) of incentive compensation model, and the solution to the incentive compensation model is analyzed. Then based on the evaluation’s incentive reward mechanism, the incentive mechanism of reputation influence function is constructed, and the necessity of the implementation of incentive reward mechanism was verified by the reputation incentive mechanism.The incentive model’s effection is also verified by using specific example analysis, the research shows that compared with fixed compensation mode the(f+j) incentive model has a greater incentive motivation. After that the constraint mechanism to the evaluation is analyzed from maim four sides:formulating and perfecting the unified laws to regulate the evaluation, establishing and perfecting the specific management system for the evaluation, assessing the evaluation’s work after the item is finished, making dynamic management of the evaluation experts.(3) According to the actual situation of the current land prices and housing price and the national macro regulation’s demand guide, the national regulators advocate that the comprehensive evaluation selling method of state-owned land is a good way. Then as that the comprehensive evaluation selling method of state-owned land is analyzed in detail through the actual case from sides of the business standard evaluation system and the technical bid evaluation system. Then the comprehensive evaluation selling methods combining with the analytic hierarchy process method and the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method are used to analyze the actual concrete example.And the results from the two different methods are analyzed and compared. These actual example analysis on the improving way for the current state-owned land use right’s selling has made beneficial exploration.(4)The previous system of the operating state-owned land sale by the way of agreement has significant defects. It makes bad affection to the main market body, the use of land resources, the ruling party and the government’s credibility, the operation and welfare level of the society. And it is these factors that promoting the changes of the state-owned land use right transfer system. Then the original agreement system was changed to the new system which calls for that the profit-making stated-owned land’s sale must adopt public bidding, auction and listing. Comparing with the previous agreement system, the transfer of state-owned land use right is by the way of public bidding, this is the natural most effective incentive for the potential purchase or the bidders. The stated-owed land use right’s public biddng sale can reduce the potential purchase’s transaction costs, can give them more confidence to join the fair competition.can increase the possibility and probability of their fair business profit.So The potential purchase or the bidder has a strong positive participation motivation. Seeing the year2004as the cut-off point, according to the national data and the data from Chongqing city, the incentive effect of the agreement system and the incentive effect of public bidding auction listing system are compared by the empirical correlation and regression analysis from two sides of the supplier local government and the demander the real estate development enterprise.(5) In the practical bidding action of state-owned land selling, the bidders in collusion using unilateral pay mechanism is effective and incentive compatibility and also efficient. Unilateral pay mechanism becomes the dominant reality choice when the bidders choose making collusion. The danger of bidders’collusion in the state-owned land use right’s selling action is huge. This must be reckoned. Based on the above analysis, the dynamic bayesian game model of the bidders’collusion in the state-owned land use right selling is built, and the bidders’bid collusion behavior is analyzed in detail by the signal game theory, then the dynamic bayesian game model were analyzed with the specific actual cases. According to the verification and analysis of the dynamic bayesian game model, several measures for restraining the bidder’s collusion are put forward as the following:attracting more bidding participants, setting up reasonable land base price, controlling a single transfered land’s area appropriately, perfecting the relevant legal system of bidding, constructing market credit system.(6) According to the actual situation of the state-owned land use right bidding sale, it analyzes the main existing main players(the government’s supervising representative, bidders, the bid evaluation and the tenderer) in the state-owned land use right bidding sale action. Then it illustrates the reason of the bidders,the bid evaluation and the tender’s multipartite collusion in detail from four aspects. And their three main collusion ways were analyzed too. Then their multipartite collusion’s game models were constructed respectively to study. With the combination of the multipartite collusion’s game analysis conclusion, several main measures for restraining the multipartite collusion in the state-owned land use right bidding sale action are put forward as the following:building the supervising system, making trade information open and transparent, constructing the reward system of exposing and supervising, increasing collusion cost, emphasizing punishment’s degree largely.In conclusion, according to the real demand this paper studies the state-owned land use right bidding sale under the background of land marketization deeply and systematically with the principal-agent theory, this is a new research perspective. It analyzes the main principal-agent problems of the several major players in the state-owned land use bidding action respectively. Then the research of the incentive mechanism and constraint mechanism was seemed as the key to solve the series problems of the state-owned land use right bidding sale action. These are the new research and exploration.It has certain innovative value.更多还原