【作者】 林毅勇；

【导师】 王幼松；

【作者基本信息】 华南理工大学 ， 结构工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 受宏观调控影响，项目成本领先已成为房地产企业的核心竞争力之一，一些房地产企业提出价值创造的理念，把成本管理的重心前移，进行目标成本管理，然而，国内很多企业的“目标成本”并非由价值工程分析，而是由造价指标测算得来，实际上是“责任成本”，由于项目前期阶段非对称信息普遍存在，这种“目标成本管理”不能满足的成本管理的需要。本项研究以非对称信息条件下的房地产企业成本管理为切入点，采用博弈、数学规划及统计数值分析等方法，通过理论及实证分析发现，在非对称信息下，采用目标成本管理，会扩大代理双方的博弈，引发棘轮效应，不利资源整合及价值创造，也会造成成本得到控制而品质却下降的局面，因此，房地产成本管理需要改变以“控”代“管”的现状。首先，总结归纳了国内外成本管理及激励理论的研究结果，论述了成本管理的发展历程及相关方法，分析了我国的房地产成本管理现状，阐述了激励机制的理论分析及应用型模型。其次，在理论分析的基础上，针对项目开发的不同阶段、不同代理事务、信息对称与非对称的不同情况，提出不同的成本管理策略，并对精细化成本管理作出新解，指出精细化成本管理的误区，进而增加成本动因分析，提倡目标成本与作业成本管理相融合。然后，在非对称信息下，引入激励管理方法，以激励替代责任成本的控制，减少博弈，鼓励代理人整合资源及价值创造。最后，对当前项目成本管理流程进行了改善，提出新的管理流程，在可研策划及方案设计阶段引入激励管理，以适应项目前期成本的特点。由于传统的激励机制存在参数过多、激励力度不合理、不符合经营习惯等局限性，阻碍了其推广和应用。因此，本论文构建一种新型的应用型主动激励模型，改变传统模型的线性激励，加大激励力度，使奖罚机制渐趋科学；解决传统模型的局限性，可减少代理双方的博弈风险；能有效防止棘轮效应，使得代理人保持努力工作成为常态，从而能更好适应房地产前期非对称信息条件下的成本管理。另外，采用主动激励模型能够有效的替代斯宾塞劳动力市场模型分析模型，降低信息传递的偏离，有利房地产企业甄别出能力强又愿意为代理事务付出较高努力水平的代理人。本研究对该模型下的逆向选择及道德风险问题分别建立最优规划问题模型进行分析，并有以下发现：1.逆向选择的问题上，模型使得高专业水平代理人和低专业水平代理人的产出水平与信息完备时比均未发生扭曲，能有效避免高专业水平代理人模仿低专业水平代理人的倾向，而且使得低专业水平代理人的产出也保持在较优水平，使得房地产企业不需抬高产出标准，因而，代理人会更愿意接受主动激励机制所构建的合同，能有效促使代理人加大人力及资源配置，使得代理人的工作效率得以改善。2.道德风险问题上，主动激励机制可用较小的提成比例来激励代理人达到信息对称时同样的努力水平，能够引导代理人在合同初期勇敢地报出真实的产出水平，在代理事务实施时，理性的代理人会按自身的能力和资源采取真实的行为。同时本研究还指出了激励效果及风险的影响因素，这些因素包括：努力影响系数、外界不确因素、绝对风险规避度量及提成比例等，并分析了各因素之间的相互作用关系。针对施工单位可以把剩余价值全部占有，激励机制对其可能会失去作用的情况，本论文又提出一体化和长期合作的策略，作为激励机制的延伸和补充。经建立模型分析表明一体化策略将外部代理转为内部代理，可扩大激励的力度，尤其能解决激励机制对外部施工单位没最优解的问题。通过动态博弈分析表明长期合作中代理人为了将来获取更多的收益，会保持更好的声誉，保持努力工作的状态。最后，通过对广州地区23个房地产开发工程成本数据进行方差分析，发现各分项工程的系统误差比较离散，最低的项目前期工程为14.9%，最高的的机电工程是81.8%，这表明不同项目的工程成本存在较大的不确定，导致项目开发前期非对称信息普遍存在，证实传统单一的责任成本管理存在一定的弊端。同时，通过算例分析证实主动激励机制能很好地应用于房地产企业的内部及外部代理事务中，具有较好的实操性，可以取得良好的效果，能在一定程度上解决逆向选择和道德风险的问题。综合上述，现在房地产企业已把成本管理的重心移至项目开发前期，虽然把握好了成本控制的“时间”，却忽略了成本控制的“空间”，对非对称信息的影响及成本成因考虑不足，本文分析了非对称信息条件情况下成本管理的特点，提出以激励代替控制的理念，以适应新形势下，房地地产企业成本管理的需求。宏观上，有利于优化资源配置，减少社会经济的浪费。微观上，有利于房地产企业进行价值创造，增强竞争力。更多还原

【Abstract】 Impacted by macro-control, project cost leadership has become one of the corecompetencies in real estate business. A number of real estate enterprises have proposed theconcept of value creation, shifting the cost management focus forward and conducting the targetcost management. However, the "target cost" of many domestic enterprises is not analyzedthrough value engineering; instead, it is estimated from the construction cost index, thus it isactually the "liability cost". The "target cost management" cannot meet the needs of costmanagement due to the ubiquitous asymmetric information at the project early stage. This studytakes the cost management in real estate enterprise in the context of asymmetric information asthe starting point, adopting game theory, mathematical programming, statistical and numericalanalyses and other methods. Through the theoretical and empirical analysis, it is found that inthe context of asymmetric information, the use of target cost management will expand the gamebetween the agent and the principal, causing the ratchet effect, which is unfavorable for resourceintegration and value creation, and resulting in deteriorating quality though the costs are undercontrol. Therefore, it is necessary to change the status quo of "controlling" instead of“managing” in the cost management of real estate.Firstly, the findings of cost management and the incentive theories at home and abroadhave been summarized, the development process of cost management and related methods havebeen discussed, analyzing the status quo of China’s real estate cost management, elaborating thetheoretical analysis on incentive mechanism and application-oriented model. Secondly, on thebasis of the theoretical analysis, various cost management strategies have been proposedrespectively for different stages of project development, different agent services and differentsituations of symmetric and asymmetric information. Moreover, new solutions have been madefor refined cost management, pointing out the pitfalls in refined cost management, thusincreasing the cost driver analysis and advocating the integration of target cost and operatingcost management. Then, in the context of the asymmetric information, the incentivemanagement practices have been introduced to motivate vicarious liability cost control,reducing the game to encourage agents to integrate resources and value creation. Finally, thearticle has improved the cost management process of the current project, put forward the newmanagement process, and introduced incentive management into the feasibility study andschematic design phase to adapt to the characteristics of the cost of the earlier stage of theproject.The promotion and application of the traditional incentive mechanism has been hindered due to its limitations with too many parameters, unreasonable incentive strength, notconforming to the operating practices and so on. Therefore, a new application-oriented activeincentive model is built in this paper, changing the linear incentive of traditional model andincreasing the incentive strength, so that the reward and punishment mechanism can becomemore scientific; it solves the limitations of the traditional model and can reduce the game risksof the agent and the principal; it can effectively prevent the ratchet effect, making it common forthe agents to keep working hard, so that it can better meet the cost management in the context ofasymmetric information at the early stage of a real estate project. In addition, adopting the activeincentive model can effectively replace the Analysis Model of Spence’s Job Market SignalingModel, and reduce the deviation of information transmission, enabling the real estate business tofind about the highly capable agents who are willing to work harder for agency affairs. In thisstudy, the optimal planning models have been established and analyzed for the reverse selectionand moral risk issues respectively under the model. And the following has been found:1. Concerning the issue of reverse selection, the model makes sure that there is nodistortion in the output levels of high professional-level agents and low professional-levelagents compared with those when the information is complete. It effectively avoids thetendency of high professional-level agents following the example of low professional-levelagents, and also makes the output of the low professional-level agents maintain the optimumlevel, making it unnecessary for the real estate enterprises to raise the output criteria. Therefore,the agents will be more willing to accept the contract entered into under the active incentivemechanism, effectively encouraging the agents to increase the labor and resource allocation, sothat the agent’s productivity can be improved.2. Concerning the issue of the moral risk, the active incentive mechanism can motivate theagent to reach the same level of effort as in the context of information symmetry with smallercommission rate, and guide the agent to bravely report the real output level at the initial stage ofcontract period. The rational agents will take real actions according to their own capability andresources when handling agency matters. In the meantime, the study also points out the factorsimpacting the incentive effect and risk, including effort influence coefficient, externaluncertainty factor, absolute risk aversion measure and commission rate and etc, and analyzes theinteraction among these factors.The paper also proposes the strategy for integration and long-term cooperation, as anextension and a supplement to the incentive mechanism considering that the builders may takeall surplus value and the incentive mechanism may become uneffective to them. The modelinganalysis shows that the external agency is converted to the internal agency by the integration strategy, which can expand the incentive efforts; in particular, it can solve the problem of theincentive mechanism failing to have the optimal solution to the external builder problem. Itshows through dynamic game analysis that the agent will maintain better reputation and keepworking hard in order to earn more revenue in the future in the long-term cooperation.Finally, through the variance analysis of development cost data in23real estate projects inGuangzhou, it is found that the system errors of subdivisional projects are relatively discrete,with the minimum (preliminary project work) being14.9%, and the maximum (electrical andmechanical work) being81.8%. It indicates that there is big uncertainty in the engineering costsof different projects, which results in prevalent asymmetric information in the preliminary stageof project development and confirms that there are some drawbacks in the traditional singleliability cost management. Meanwhile, a calculation example demonstrates that the activeincentive mechanism can be well applied to the internal and external agency affairs of realestate enterprises, which is rather practical and is able to achieve good results and solve theproblems of reverse selection and moral risks to a certain extent.In summary, existing real estate enterprises have shifted the focus of cost management topreliminary stage of project development. Although the "timing" of cost control is under goodcontrol, the "space" of cost control is ignored, and inadequate consideration has been given tothe impact of asymmetric information and cost causes. This paper analyzes the features of costmanagement in the context of asymmetric information, and proposes the idea of motivatinginstead of controlling to adapt to the needs of cost management of real estate enterprises in thenew situation. Macrocosmically, it helps optimize resource allocation and reduce social andeconomic wastes. Microcosmically, it aids real estate enterprises in creating value, enhancingcompetencies.更多还原