【作者】 丁心海；

【导师】 王先甲；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 党的十六大以来,中央开始更加重视反腐败问题,将其视为和平时期最大的执政威胁,将反腐败工作上升到反腐败斗争高度,于2005年1月颁布了《建立健全教育、制度、监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系实施纲要》,确立了“标本兼治、综合治理、惩防并举、注重预防”的反腐倡廉战略方针,标志我国反腐倡廉建设开始进入科学化、法制化、系统化的创新发展阶段。2008年5月,中央又颁布了《建立健全惩治和预防腐败体系2008—2012年工作规划》,其中明确将完善工程建设项目招标投标制度,健全工程建设项目招标投标行政监督机制,深化政府采购制度改革,加强对政府采购各个环节的监管,规范国有企业采购招标投标等列为重点工作。廉洁风险防控机制建设,是惩治和预防腐败体系建设的重要组成部分。因此积极开展招投标廉洁风险防控机制研究有着重要的现实意义。论文围绕“问题提出->问题分析->重点问题机理分析->问题应对->结论”的研究思路展开,共分七章,各章主要内容如下。第一章绪论,是问题提出。主要是对论文选题的背景和意义、国内外相关研究现状、与选题有关的基本概念、研究思路和拟采用的研究方法、论文结构逻辑及主要内容、研究创新等进行总体性的概述。基于选题研究目的,将机制定义为涵盖与招投标活动监管和风险防控有关的管理体制、法律规范、程序方法、技术支持等。在简述招投标基本概念和基本流程基础上,特别指出招投标与拍卖的经济学理完全相同,只是两者的交易性质反向,完全可基于拍卖理论来分析招投标经济机理。在大量研讨文献基础上,对国内外研究现状从制度机理、技术方法、支持系统三个层面进行了归集阐述。第二章相关理论基础,是分析问题的理论指导。主要是对本文研究主题涉及的相关理论基础集中进行简要介绍。这些理论包括拍卖理论、博弈理论、机制设计和委托代理理论、腐败与反腐败理论、风险管理理论等。每一理论基础都将被用于指导后文一个或几个章节的研究。拍卖理论和博弈理论用于分析横向串标(合谋)和纵向串标(腐败)的经济机理。机制设计和委托代理理论用于纵向串标有关机制设计分析。腐败与反腐败理论用于指导全文研究框架设计和招投标监管机制设计。风险管理的基本概念和思想则是本文研究的出发点与落脚点,其贯穿于全文各章节的分析与研究。第三章我国招投标实践中的廉洁风险分析,全面分析问题的表现形式、性质分类、产生原因。对招投标实践中的种种问题,按可能引发问题和风险的招投标活动相关主体分类归集分为：招投标监管部门的不合理行政干预、招标(代理)方的不规范或暗箱操作、投标方的限制竞争行为、评标专家的失职渎职行为等四大类。同时按问题所关联的行为方互动(串谋)特征分类归集分为：横向串标行为、纵向串标行为、混合串标行为、非串谋不良行为等四类。在此基础上,对招投标廉洁风险问题表象背后的主要原因,从信息不对称、产权激励约束机制、法律法规、监管体制、评标机制、市场诚信环境等多方面进行了剖析。第四章横向串标机理分析,对重点问题之一横向串标进行详细经济机理分析。在分析横向串标的基本概念及关键特征基础上,通过建立一个典型的一维价格招标采购标准模型,应用拍卖理论详细分析横向合谋串标的均衡特性,并重点分析投标参与人数、保留价格、实施成本等外控因素对横向合谋串标均衡的影响,以及合谋的风险博弈。此外,还对横向合谋串标的认定和检测方法进行了初步分析。第五章纵向串标机理分析,对另一重点问题纵向串标进行详细经济机理分析。在分析指出纵向串标问题的本质特征在于评标自由裁量权滥用的基础上,通过建立一个关于质量和价格的二维属性标准竞标模型,应用拍卖理论详细分析其均衡特性,评标自由裁量权对竞标均衡解和最优招标机制的影响,及其与腐败决策、腐败率之间的相关关系。并应用寻租理论和博弈理论构建一个由招标委托人(监管者)、设租招标人(招标代表或代理机构)、寻租投标人参与的三方动态博弈模型,分析腐败的查处率与惩罚强度、串标收益的相互关系,招标人和投标人的腐败率之间的相互关系,以及腐败率与监管查处成本、惩罚强度、代理酬金(薪酬)、行贿受贿大小之间的静态比较关系。第六章招投标廉洁风险防控机制设计,是关于问题的应对措施分析。在对国外发达市场经济国家(美国、德国、日本)与我国的招投标监管制度进行全面比较分析基础上,针对我国招投标监管中存在的主要问题和不足,借鉴国外先进经验,结合国家反腐败战略方针,从不敢腐的惩戒机制、不能腐的防范机制、不易腐的保障机制三个方面着重论述了我国招投标廉洁风险防控机制的完善设计对策。第七章总结和展望。是对全文研究内容和相关结论进行总结回顾,提炼概括本文研究成果的创新点,并对需要进一步深入研究的相关问题进行展望。论文的主要创新工作可总结为以下四个方面：(1)基于大量文献研究对招投标全过程各环节的各种不廉洁问题进行了全面梳理和分类归集。一是从可能引发问题和风险的招投标活动相关主体角度,将各种问题归集分为：招投标监管部门的不合理行政干预、招标(代理)方的不规范或暗箱操作、投标方的限制竞争行为、评标专家的失职渎职行为等四大类,这样归集便于各相关主体所属部门通过完善制度、规范、流程等针对性地加强内部风险管控。二是从问题所关联的行为方互动(串谋)角度,将招投标实践中反映出的各类问题和风险归集分为：横向串标行为、纵向串标行为、混合串标行为、非串谋不良行为等四类,这样归集便于问题防范的机制设计。同时对招投标廉洁风险问题表象背后的主要原因,从信息不对称、产权激励约束机制、法律法规、监管体制、评标机制、市场诚信环境等方面进行了总结分析。(2)在分析横向串标的基本概念及横向串标问题的关键特征基础上,建立了一个一维价格招标采购标准模型,应用拍卖理论详细分析了横向合谋投标与非合谋投标的均衡解及均衡特征,并重点分析了投标参与人数、保留价格、实施成本等外控因素对横向合谋投标均衡的影响,以及合谋的风险博弈,通过论证分析得到关于横向投标合谋及防范的有指导意义的六点主要结论。同时初步分析了横向合谋的认定和检测方法。(3)在分析指出纵向串标问题的本质特征在于评标自由裁量权滥用的基础上,通过建立一个关于质量和价格的二维属性标准竞标模型,应用拍卖理论详细分析了评标自由裁量权对竞标均衡解和最优招标机制的影响,及其与腐败决策、腐败率之间的相关关系。此外,应用寻租理论和博弈论构建了一个由招标委托人(监管者)、设租招标人(即招标代表或代理机构)、寻租投标人参与的三方动态博弈模型,在给出博弈均衡解的基础上,分析了招标委托监管方对腐败的查处率与惩罚(罚款)强度、串标收益的相互关系,设租招标人(招标代表或代理机构)和寻租投标人的腐败率之间的相互关系,以及腐败率与监管查处成本、惩罚(罚款)强度、招标代理酬金(薪酬)、行贿受贿大小之间的静态比较关系。相关研究结论被总结成七条定理。(4)在对国内外招投标监管机制比较和借鉴基础上,结合国家反腐败战略方针,以廉洁风险防控视角,基于系统工程思想,从不敢腐的惩戒机制、不能腐的防范机制、不易腐的保障机制三个方面着重论述了我国招投标廉洁风险防控机制的完善设计措施。不敢腐的惩戒机制,主要体现在完善招投标相关法律制度、加快招投标诚信体系建设两方面。不能腐的防范机制,主要体现在改革招投标监管体制、强化招投标过程内控管理两方面。不易腐的保障机制,主要体现在合理设定评标方法、提升招投标监管信息化水平两方面。分别在以上六个方面提出了若干针对性的完善措施和建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The Party Central Committee begins to pay more attention to the anti-corruption issues since the Sixteenth CPC National Congress. Corruption is regarded as the greatest threat to the regime in peacetime, and anti-corruption work is upgraded to anti-corruption battle. In January2005,"the Implementation Outline of Establishing the Sound System of Punishing and Preventing Corruption Paying Equal Attention to Education, Institution and Supervision" has been promulgated, which indicates the foundation of strategic policy to fight corruption and to promote honesty and cleanness by "Curing both Symptoms and Root Cause, Comprehensive Treatment, Consideration both Punishment and Prevention, Focusing on Prevention". It marks that the construction of fighting corruption and promoting honesty and cleanness comes to the new stage which is scientific, legal and systematic innovation and development. In May2008,"the Work Plan of Establishing the Sound System of Punishing and Preventing Corruption in2008-2012" has been promulgated by the Party Central Committee again, in which the key works are confirmed: improving bidding and bid institution of construction projects, consummating administrative supervision mechanism of bidding and bid of construction projects, deepening the reform of government procurement system, strengthening the supervision of each link of government procurement, standardizing the bidding and bid in state-owned enterprises procurement. The establishment of risk prevention and control mechanism for honesty and cleanness is an important part of the construction of the punishing and preventing corruption system. So it is practically significant to actively carry out the research on the risk prevention and control mechanism for honesty and cleanness in bidding and bid.Around the research ideas of "Emerging of Problems-> Analysis of Problems-> Mechanism Analysis of Key Problems-> Countermeasures to Problems-> Conclusions", the thesis is divided into seven chapters, and the main content of each chapter is as follows:The first chapter is the introduction, and focus on the emerging of problems. It mainly explains the overall overview of the following contents:the background and significance of the selected topic of the thesis, the related research status quo at home and abroad, the basic concepts related to the topic, the research ideas and methods, the structure logic and main content of the full text. Based on the research purpose of the selected topic, the "mechanism" is defined as the management rules, legal norms, procedures and methods, technical support, all of which are related to the supervision and risk prevention of bidding and bid activities. Based on briefly explaining the basic concepts and process of bidding and bid, it is especially pointed out that the economic theory of bidding and auction is exactly the same, but just their directions of trading reverse. So the auction theory can be entirely used to analyze the economic mechanism of bidding and bid. Based on the study of a large number of literatures, overseas and domestic research status quo is summarized from three levels:management mechanism, technical method and information support system.The second chapter briefly introduces the related theoretical basis to guide to analyze the problems. In this chapter, the theoretical basis related to the research topic of the thesis is intensively and briefly introduced. These theories include auction theory, game theory, mechanism design and principal-agent theory, the theory of corruption and anti-corruption, and the theory of risk management. Each theoretical basis will be used to guide the research of one or several chapters. The auction theory and game theory are applied to the analysis of economic mechanism of transverse and vertical collusion bid. The mechanism design and principal-agent theory are applied to the analysis of mechanism design and analysis related to vertical collusion bid. The theory of corruption and anti-corruption are applied to guide for the designs of this thesis framework and the supervision mechanism of bidding and bid. The basic concept and thought of risk management run throughout the analysis of each chapter and it is the starting and foothold point of the full text.The third chapter analyzes the risk of honesty and cleanness in bidding and bid practice in our country, the main content of this chapter includes the comprehensive analysis of forms, qualities, classifications, causes of the dishonesty risk in bidding and bid. According to the participants in bidding and bid activities who are likely to cause problems and risks, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is approximately classified into four categories:unreasonable administrative interventions of supervision departments, non-standard or black-box operations of the tenderee or its agency, limit competition behaviours of bidders, malfeasance behaviours of bid evaluation experts. In addition, according to the interaction features of collusion participants, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is also classified into the following four categories:transverse collusion bid, vertical collusion bid, mixed collusion bid and non-collusion mal-behaviors. Based on the above problem analysis, the main deep reasons behind representations of the dishonesty risk problems are dissected separately from the viewpoints of information asymmetry, property rights incentive constraint mechanism, laws and regulations, supervision system, bid evaluation mechanism, honesty environment of market.The fourth chapter analyzes in detail the economic mechanism of transverse collusion bid which is one of the key research problems of this thesis. Based on the analysis of the basic concepts and key features of transverse collusion bid, a typical one-dimensional (price) standard bidding model is established. The equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid are analyzed in detail by auction theory. The influence of external factors, which mainly include the number of bidder, reserve price, implementation cost of collusion, on the equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid as well as the risk game of collusion, are analyzed emphatically. In addition, the recognition and detection methods of transverse collusion bid are analyzed preliminarily.The fifth chapter analyzes in detail the economic mechanism of vertical collusion bid which is another one of the key research problems of this thesis. On the basis of pointing out that the essential characteristic of vertical collusion bid problems is ascribed to the abuse of bid evaluation discretion, a two-dimensional attributes (quality and price) standard bidding model is established. By auction theory, the following contents related the model are analyzed in detail:the auction equilibrium characteristics, the influence of bid evaluation discretion on the auction equilibrium solution and the optimal bidding mechanism as well as the relationship between corruption decision-making, corruption rate and bid evaluation discretion. By rent-seeking theory and game theory, a three-party dynamic game mode is built that consists of the tenderee or supervisor which is the principle, the bidding delegate or agency which is the rent-creating middle agent, and the bidder which is the rent-seeking terminal agent. The relationships between the punishment rate of corruption and punishment intensity as well as collusion benefit are analyzed. The relationships of the corruption rate between bidding delegate and bidder is discussed. In addition, the static comparative relationships between the corruption rates of bidding delegate and bidder and supervision cost, punishment intensity (fine), bidding agency fee (emolument), and bribery magnitude, are demonstrated.The sixth chapter focus on the countermeasures of the above mentioned problems and the mechanism design of prevention and control of dishonesty risk in bidding and bid. Based on the comprehensive comparison of bidding supervision system in our country and foreign countries such as the United States, Germany and Japan, aiming at the main problems and shortages existing in the bidding supervision system in our country, drawing lessons from the advanced overseas experience, combining with the national anti-corruption policy, the improvement countermeasures to prevent and control the dishonesty risk in bidding and bid in our country are discussed from three aspects, which are the punishment mechanism of not-dare-to-corrupt, the prevention mechanism of can-not-corrupt and the guarantee mechanism of not-easy-to-corrupt.The seventh chapter is summary and outlook. The research content and related conclusions are summarized and reviewed, the innovations of the research work are refined, and the outlooks of related problems which need to be further researched are finished. The main innovation work of the thesis can be summarized as the following four aspects:(1) Based on a large number of literature research, all kinds of dishonesty problems in each link of the whole process of bidding and bid are summarized and classified comprehensively. Firstly, according to the participants in bidding and bid activities who are likely to cause problems and risks, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is approximately classified into four categories:unreasonable administrative interventions of supervision departments, non-standard or black-box operations of the tenderee or its agency, limit competition behaviors of bidders, malfeasance behaviors of bid evaluation experts. The above classification is convenient for the department of each participant belongs to strengthening the internal risk management and control by improving and perfecting the related systems, rules and processes. Secondly, according to the interaction features of collusion participants, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is also classified into the following four categories:transverse collusion bid, vertical collusion bid, mixed collusion bid and non-collusion bad behaviors. Based on the above problem analysis, the main deep reasons behind representations of the problems are dissected separately from the viewpoints of information asymmetry, property rights incentive constraint mechanism, laws and regulations, supervision system, bid evaluation mechanism, honesty environment of market. This classification is convenient for prevention mechanism design. Thirdly, the main deep reasons behind representations of the dishonesty risk problems are dissected separately from the viewpoints of information asymmetry, property rights incentive constraint mechanism, laws and regulations, supervision system, bid evaluation mechanism, honesty environment of market.(2) Based on the analysis of the basic concepts and key features of transverse collusion bid, a typical one-dimensional (price) standard bidding model is established. The equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid are analyzed in detail by auction theory. The influence of external factors, which mainly include the number of bidder, reserve price, implementation cost of collusion, on the equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid as well as the risk game of collusion, are analyzed emphatically. And so, six main conclusions with guidance significance related to transverse collusion bid are achieved. In addition, the recognition and detection methods of transverse collusion bid are analyzed preliminarily.(3) On the basis of pointing out that the essential characteristic of vertical collusion bid problems is ascribed to the abuse of bid evaluation discretion, a two-dimensional attributes (quality and price) standard bidding model is established. By auction theory, the following contents related the model are analyzed in detail:the influence of bid evaluation discretion on the auction equilibrium solution and the optimal bidding mechanism, the relationship between corruption decision-making, corruption rate and bid evaluation discretion. By rent-seeking theory and game theory, a three-party dynamic game mode is built that consists of the tenderee or supervisor which is the principle, the bidding delegate or agency which is the rent-creating middle agent, and the bidder which is the rent-seeking terminal agent. The relationships between the punishing corruption rate and punishment intensity as well as collusion income are analyzed. The relationships of the corruption rate between bidding delegate and bidder is discussed. In addition, the static comparative relationships between the corruption rates of bidding delegate and bidder and supervision cost, punishment intensity, bidding agency fee, and bribery magnitude, are demonstrated. The related research conclusions are summarized into seven theorems.(4) Based on the comprehensive comparison of bidding supervision system in our country and foreign countries, by the reference of the advanced overseas experience, from the perspective of the prevention and control of honesty and cleanness, guided by the concepts of system engineering, combining with the national anti-corruption policy, the improvement countermeasures to prevent and control the dishonesty risk in bidding and bid in our country are discussed from three aspects, which are the punishment mechanism of not-dare-to-corrupt, the prevention mechanism of can-not-corrupt and the guarantee mechanism of not-easy-to-corrupt. The punishment mechanism of not-dare-to-corrupt is embodied in two aspects:improving the legal system of bidding and bid, and speeding up the construction of honesty and credit system of bidding and bid. The prevention mechanism of can-not-corrupt is embodied in the following two aspects:reforming the supervision system of bidding and bid, and for a tenderee to strengthen the internal management and control in bidding process. The guarantee mechanism of not-easy-to-corrupt is also embodied in two aspects:reasonably selecting bid evaluation method and upgrading the information level of management and supervision in bidding and bid process. Further more, some corresponding concrete measures and suggestions are put forward respectively in the above six aspects.更多还原