【作者】 孟佳娃；

【导师】 孙烨；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 会计学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 作为连结股东与经理人利益的纽带，何种制度安排是中国上市公司薪酬委员会与股东利益趋同的有益表征，何种制度安排又是阻碍其作用发挥的“绊脚石”，尚待人们探究。本文尝试以组织形式存在的薪酬委员会作为监督者，在委托代理理论的最优契约模型中嵌入“委托人-监督者-代理人”三层结构来分析中国上市公司薪酬委员会对经理人薪酬契约制定及设计有效性的影响。通过以监督者的角色分析薪酬委员会特征是如何减轻或增加了信息不对称，缓解亦或加重与经理人薪酬相关的代理问题，以探究薪酬委员会在我国公司内部治理中的作用，并探寻适合我国上市公司薪酬委员会治理实践的有益信息。我国上市公司处于含有“一元制”治理模式若干要素的特殊“二元制”治理模式之中。与采用“一元制”的国家相比，我国资本市场对中小投资者保护尚不完善，上市公司股权相对集中，一些企业有大股东的控制，国家仍有能力以实际控制者的身份控制部分上市公司。在这种情况下，国有控股股东或大股东对董事会有实质性影响，薪酬委员会很可能代表大股东的利益，甚至可能受大股东的主导或控制与经理人合谋盘剥小股东。根据中国上市公司制度背景和三层委托代理框架的分析，本文研究了三个具体议题：一是从监督者的特征是否与股东利益融合的视角考察薪酬委员会董事资格是否符合股东的利益；二是试图从监督合谋的角度回答表征薪酬委员会成员的信息获取能力、监督强度以及监督诱因在我国上市公司经理人薪酬制定中起了何种作用；三是试图从委托人与监督者的角度解释何种薪酬委员会特征能够使其与股东利益更加融合，从而协调上市公司股东与管理者之间的利益冲突。本文考察了与之相关的六个问题：薪酬委员会董事资格特征，这些特征如何影响经理人薪酬水平、薪酬结构、薪酬-绩效敏感度和薪酬契约的设计，以及在不同股权结构的企业中上述关系的差异。通过大量的文献研究以及实证分析，本文得出的基本结论是：（1）我国上市公司薪酬委员会组成及成员资格同外部监控型公司治理模式下的薪酬委员会特征既存在相似之处，又存在较多的差异。相似之处在于：①虽然制度背景不同，但独立性均不是上市公司薪酬委员唯一的显著特征；②我国上市公司薪酬委员会董事选任不存在性别偏见；③内部活动较多的董事更可能任职于薪酬委员会。不同之处在于：①目前，有84%的上市公司薪酬委员会独立董事比例在50%以上，有27%的上市公司经理人也是薪酬委员会委员。薪酬委员会独立董事比例较高，但也存在经理人“自定薪酬”的现象；②我国仅国有控制上市公司或股权集中度较高的上市公司比较倾向于选择具有商业高管背景的内部董事任职于薪酬委员会；③我国上市公司薪酬委员会董事的董事会任期较短，均值为3.47年，任职经验不足，并且，上市公司在选任薪酬委员会成员时并没有考虑董事在公司的任期经验；④薪酬委员会中，仅外部董事具有在其他多家公司兼任董事的特征；⑤非国有控制或股权集中度高的上市公司中，持股越多的内部董事，更可能任职于薪酬委员会。而在这两类上市公司中，外部董事持股越多则越不会被选入薪酬委员会；⑥年龄越大的外部董事，及教育水平越高的外部董事，越容易进入薪酬委员会，这一现象在非国有上市公司更为显著；⑦薪酬委员会的内部董事大都较年轻，这可能会导致薪酬委员会在与经理人的薪酬谈判中不具有年龄优势。从上述特征看，我国上市公司对外部董事的选任看重的是与董事工作相关的任职经验、在董事会内部关系网络中获得信息的能力，以及与其他委员会有效地合作、胜任多元任务的能力，而不是外部董事在公司的利益。我国上市公司薪酬委员会内部董事选任的标准则着重于董事在公司的权益及其商业经验，而不是该类董事在公司的任职经验。此外，国有控制股东以及大股东在我国上市公司仍具有较大的权力，这影响了上市公司薪酬委员会董事的选任，从已有实证结果来看，这一影响是有利于维护股东，尤其是维护大股东利益的。（2）中国上市公司薪酬委员会独立董事发挥作用的途径是通过促进企业经理人持有公司股份来协调经理人与股东的利益一致性。独立董事在薪酬委员会的比例并不会显著提高经理人货币薪酬水平。薪酬委员会独立董事大都不持有公司的股份，这降低了薪酬委员会与股东利益融合的动机。非国有控制上市公司薪酬委员会中，独立董事比例越高，越能够在经理人薪酬契约设计中增加促进经理人从事有利于公司长远发展的时效性盈余信息。（3）监督者的所有权和货币激励是有效的防合谋手段。在我国上市公司中，监督者的所有权（即薪酬委员会成员的股权）在三层代理框架中会减轻潜在的经理人壕沟，增加经理人获得权益激励的机会，增强经理人薪酬与企业绩效的联系，协调经理人与股东利益。薪酬委员会成员的货币激励并没有提升经理人货币薪酬，而是提升了国有控制上市公司以及股权集中度低的上市公司经理人与股东利益的一致性。（4）在多个董事会委员会任职是薪酬委员会信息获取与监督努力的表征，在我国特殊的“二元”制治理模式下，这些表征在我国国有控制以及有大股东的上市公司中更能发挥作用。（5）女性能够给薪酬委员会带来多元化的决策。薪酬委员会的女性董事并不是上市公司的“门面装饰”，在国有控制或股权分散的上市公司中，其有效性更加显著。（6）薪酬委员会董事外部兼职是把“双刃剑”。薪酬委员会董事外部兼职较多，能够增加薪酬委员会的经理人薪酬契约设计经验，增强经理人薪酬契约中时效性会计盈余指标的权重，促进经理人从事有利于企业长远发展的经营活动，避免经理人短视。但薪酬委员会董事与外部企业经理人较多的沟通使薪酬委员会获得了经理人薪酬水平的参照点，从而助推了经理人货币薪酬水平。（7）非国有控制上市公司中经理人不在薪酬委员会任职会导致较低的薪酬-绩效敏感度。而本文并未发现经理人是否在薪酬委员会任职会影响其货币薪酬与激励。以上几个研究结论，其政策意义相当明显。最后文章总结了全文的研究，并提出了未来基于三层委托代理理论可以继续延伸的研究议题，主要包括薪酬委员会对经理人的监督与激励对经理人隐性薪酬监督控制作用的影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 As an interest’s tie between shareholders and managers, what institutionalarranagements would make the Chinese listed companies’ RemunerationCommittees(RCs) and shareholders’ interests converge, and what institutionalarranagements will hinder its role to play need people to explore. Based onprincipal-agent theory’s three-tier model，this paper investigated the impact of RCs onmanager’s compensation formulation and design. By introducing a three-tier modelinto principal-agent theory’s optimal contract, this paper attempts to regard RCs assupervisors, alough it exist in the form of organization, and to analyze the RCs’ rolein the internal corporate governance. The purpose of this paper is to investigatecurrent Chinese listed companies RCs’ role in mitigating the agency problems relatedto managers’ pay, and trying to understand how RCs’ characteristics can reduce orincrease the information asymmetry, increase or ease the agency problems relating tomanager’s compensation, so as to explore the beneficiary information to RCsgovernance practices.China’s listed companies exist in a special “dual system” which combine somefactors in the “unitary system”. Comparing with “unitary” countries, investorprotection in our country is still imperfect, equity is relatively concentrated, somecompanies are controlled by large shareholders, and the government still has theability to control part of listed companies as actual controller. In this case, thestate-owned controlling shareholders or major shareholders have substantial influenceon the board of directors. The compensation committee is likely represent the interestsof the major shareholder, or even dominated by major shareholders and conspiredwith managers to rob small shareholder. According to the system background ofChina’s listed companies and the analysis of three-tier principal-agent theories, thispaper studies the following three specific topics. One is from the the features of thesupervisors’ perspective to explore whether the features of the supervisors are consistent with shareholders’ interests, and try to investigate whether the membershipof RCs’ directors are in the interests of the shareholders. Second, from the view ofsupervisory conspiracy, this paper try to answer the question of what role do RCs’information accessing ability, supervisory intensity and supervision incentives play inthe design of listed company’s manager compensation in our country. Third, from theangle of principle and supervisor, this paper try to explain which kind ofcharacteristics of RC members can make it more consistent with shareholder’sinterests, so as to coordinate the conflicts of interest between shareholders andmanagers in listed companies effectively. This paper examines the related sixquestions: the qualifications features of RC members, how these features affectmanagers’ pay level, pay structure, pay performance sensitivity and the design of thecompensation contracts, as well as the difference of aforementioned relationshipbetween enterprises with different ownership structure. The results show as follows:①Even under different system background, independence is not the only significantcharacteristic of RCs.②The director of listed company’s compensation committee isnot significantly different with other director in gender. The main differences are:①At present, about84%listed companies have more than above50%independentdirectors, about27%companies in which the manager is also a RCs’ member. Mostcompanies has a higher percentage of independent directors, but there are alsophenomenon as to "managers’ customized compensation".②In our country, onlystate-owned listed companies or higher ownership concentration listed companies’RCs tend to choose inside directors with business background.③The directors tenureof RCs is relatively short,3.47years in average, it shows China listed companies didnot consider director’s experience when they elected RCs’ members.④Amongst thedirectors of the listed company’s RCs, only outside directors have the significantfeature of part-time directorship in other companies.⑤Non-state-owned companiesor companies with high ownership concentration, internal directors who have morestake are more likely sit on RCs. In the above two types of listed companies, the morestake hold by outside directors, the less likely they are elected to the RCs.⑥Thegreater the directors’ age and the higher the education level of outside directors, theeasier it is to be selected by RCs. This phenomenon is more significant in non-state-owned listed companies.⑦The RCs’ directors being selected by listedcompanies in China are likely younger, this may induce RCs lack the age advantagein the negotiation between the managers and RCs. From the above characteristics,China’s listed companies tend to select outside directors with more work relatedexperience, the ability to obtain information on the board and within the board’sinternal network, the ability to cooperate with other board effectively, and the abilityto fulfill multiple tasks, rather than outside directors’ interests in the company. Thecriterion of internal directors’ selection in listed company’s RCs focuses on directors’interests in the company and business experience, rather than the directors’ companyworking experience. In addition, the state-owned controlling shareholders and theblock shareholders of listed companies in our country still have great influence, whichaffected the selection of RCs’ director. From the existing empirical results, theinfluence is conducive to maintaining shareholder, especially large shareholders’interests（.2）The channel of RCs’ independent directors play their role is by promotingmanagers to hold company’s stock to coordinate the interests of managers andshareholders. The proportion of independent directors on the RCs does notsignificantly improve the level of managers’ monetary compensation. Independentdirectors of RCs mostly are not hold shares in the company, this reduces RCs’motivation to align managers’ interests with shareholders’. In non-state-controlledlisted companies RCs, the higher the proportion of independent director, the more toincrease the timely earnings information in promoting managers engaged in companylong-term development in the design of managers’ compensation contract.（3）Theownership and monetary incentives of supervisors are effective means of preventingcollusion. The ownership of the supervisor (i.e., the equity of compensationcommittee member) will reduce potential trenches of managers in the frame of thethree-tier principle and agents model. It increases the chances of managers to obtainequity incentives, and enhances the relationship between managers’ compensation andcorporate performance, so that coordinated the interests of managers and shareholders.The monetary incentives of RCs’ members did not improve managers’ monetarycompensation, but promote the consistency of managers and shareholders’ interests instate inforqqustions owned listed companies and companies with low ownership concentration.（4）irectors holding position in multiple boards is characterization ofthe RCs’ information acquisition and monitoring incentives, and in our country’sspecial "dual system" mode, these characteristics can play a role in state-owned listedcompanies and large shareholders companies（.5）Women can bring the diverse to RCs.Female directors of RCs are not listed companies’"facade decoration", the role ofwomen directors in the listed companies RCs’ mostly embodied in state-ownedlisted companies and more scattered equity companies.（6）RC members’ externalpart-time is a "double-edged sword". Director’s external part-time can enhance RC’soutside experience in design managers’ compensation contract, increase weights onaccounting surplus index in managers’ compensation contracts, promote managersengaged in the operation of the enterprise long-term development and avoid managersshortsighted. However, the communication between RCs’ directors and externalcorporate managers make RCs have more reference points in setting managers’ paylevel, thereby boosting the managers’ pay levels.（7）Finally, we found that managersnot in the non-state-owned RCs will lead to lower compensation performancesensitivity. And this article doesn’t find that whether evddedmanagers sit on the RCswill affect their monetary compensation and incentive. The policy meaning ofaforementioned research conclusion is quite obvious.Finally the article summarizes the full text of the research, and put forward thefuture extended research topic based on the three layers of principal-agent theory,mainly including the impact of RCs’ oversight and incentives for managers on theirimplicit compensation’s supervision and control.更多还原