【作者】 孙蕾；

【导师】 于莹；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 民商法学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 “机构投资者”（Institutional investors）是一个较为笼统和宽泛的范畴，不同的学者根据自己的理解都可能给机构投资者下一个不同的定义。在机构投资者参与公司治理语境下，机构投资者一般代表小投资者的利益，将小投资者的储蓄集中在一起管理，为了特定目标，在可接受的风险范围和规定的时间内，追求投资收益的最大化。在我国，“机构投资者”这一概念并没有在法律上得到明确的界定，只是以“合格境外机构投资者”和“合格境内机构投资者”的名义出现在相关的法律文件中。并且，我国学者对机构投资者的认识也不一致。笔者认为，尽管现实中存在对机构投资者的不同认识，但至少在以下两个方面的认识应当具有一致性，即机构投资者具有组织性和金融性。机构投资者应当是一定的组织，而不是作为自然人的个人。虽然这种组织在绝大多数情况下都具有法人资格，但也不能否认在某些情况下非法人组织作为机构投资者的可能性。这些组织和个人一样从事证券等金融产品的买卖，但他比个人投资者的规模更大、管理更专业、规避风险的能力更强。故此，机构投资者就是由专业投资人员管理，以其所能利用的自有资金或通过证券等金融工具所筹集的资金在金融市场上进行各类证券投资的非个人化的金融机构。由机构投资者的定义我们可以得知，在通常情况下，机构投资者就是替小的个人投资者进行投资理财的专业机构，发挥着“信息中介、风险中介、监督中介、期限中介、规模中介及交易中介”的作用，从而具有以下法律特征：第一，机构投资者属于非个人化的金融机构。机构投资者首先是一种机构组织，并非个人。第二，机构投资者具有双重委托代理关系。第三，机构投资者投资的规模化和投资管理的专业化。第四，机构投资者主要投资股权性或债券性金融产品，且股权投资方向上具有收益性和非控股性。第五，机构投资者具有投资结构组合化和投资行为规范化的特征。上述机构投资者的法律特征从某种意义上也可以说是机构投资者相对于个人投资者而言所存在的优势，但是机构投资者这种优势的发挥并不是绝对无条件的，而是受以下条件的影响和制约：首先，上市公司有关信息披露的情况。其次，机构投资者自身存在认知偏差和行为偏差。最后，机构投资者存在委托代理问题。正是由于机构投资者优势的发挥受到上述诸多条件的制约，所以才应主张机构投资者要参与上市公司的治理，与此同时，机构投资者自身也要负担一定的义务，只有这样，才能使机构投资者的优势得到有效的发挥，使股市得到健康稳定的发展，使小投资者的利益得到有效的保护。尽管机构投资者具有上述共同的法律特征，但不同种类的机构投资者在内部结构、投资动力、投资目标等方面存在一定的差别。基于上文对机构投资者法律特征的分析并联系现实中的机构投资者种类，本文所研究的机构投资者主要包括以下几类：证券投资基金；证券公司；社会保障基金；保险公司；商业银行；其他金融机构或资产管理机构。公司治理理论是我们研究机构投资者参与公司治理的另一个理论基础。公司治理无论是在理论上还是在实务中都没有形成一个统一一致的定义，但这并不意味着我们对公司治理的基本含义无从把握。其实，从上面的论述中我们可以看出，公司治理所关心和解决的问题就是“为了谁的利益进行治理”和“怎样治理”。公司治理就是解决这两个问题的一套复杂的机制。其中，对第一个问题的解决涉及的是公司治理的目的问题，对第二个问题的解决涉及的是公司治理的结构和模式问题。公司治理不仅要谋求股东利益的最大化，而且也要保护和照顾公司的其他利益相关者。公司治理的这种多元化目的决定了公司治理也应当是一个多元化的治理，其表现就是公司的各种资本的投入者在公司治理过程中所形成的权利义务关系，其实质就是投资者之间以及公司的决策者、监督者、执行者之间的利益分配关系，包括公司各资本投入者在生产经营过程中的控制、参与、选择、激励和约束等行为。为了实现公司治理的目的，公司治理也采取一定的结构模式。对于公司治理的模式，不同的学者从不同的角度作出了不同的分类，如基于董事会的模式将公司治理模式分为英美的单层制模式和德日的双层制模式，基于公司的目的分为股东导向型模式、经理人导向型模式、劳工导向型模式、国家导向型模式和利益相关者导向型模式，基于公司监控模式分为外部控制型模式和内部控制型模式，基于融资角度分股东主导型模式和银行主导型模式，等等。但这些公司治理模式的划分并非彼此互不关联，而是存在一定的交叉，如英美的单层制模式在很大程度上又是股东导向型模式、股东主导型模式和外部控制型模式，而德日的双层制模式在很大程度上又是劳工导向型模式、银行主导型模式和内部控制型模式。机构投资者积极主义在经济全球化背景下促进了全球性公司治理的进一步发展，推动了两种主导型的传统公司治理模式分别朝着不同的方向发展，即英美公司治理模式由股权的市场控制方式逐步向股权通过市场控制和股东直接控制相结合的方式发展，而德日公司治理模式则由债权的直接控制方式逐步向债权直接控制和股权直接控制相结合的方式发展。在这种发展的过程中，前者的机构投资者是由市场型向紧密型发展的，而后者的机构投资者则是由紧密型向市场型发展的。由于各国在政治、经济、历史、文化、法律制度等方面存在差异，在发展的过程中又受到制度的“路径依赖”以及制度互补性等因素的影响，不可能形成全世界统一一致的公司治理模式。但是，尽管如此，各种治理模式在取长补短互相融合的基础上的趋同性发展趋势较为明显，而机构投资者在这一发展过程中无疑是最主要的推动者。从国内外的机构投资者参与公司治理的实践看，机构投资者自身的发展壮大及其积极主义的兴起，为机构投资者参与公司治理奠定了现实基础。机构投资者在国外的发展并积极参与公司治理给我国也带来了一定的影响。从上世纪九十年代开始，我国的机构投资者也逐步发展起来并表现出积极参与公司治理的态势。机构投资者积极参与公司治理不仅具有理论基础和现实基础，而且具有法律制度方面的基础。法律制度对机构投资者发展的支持和放松管制为机构投资者的发展壮大提供了必不可少的条件，进而促进机构投资者对公司治理的积极参与。我国机构投资者大发展壮大及其对公司治理的参与也离不开我国相关法律制度的支持和保护。从国内外相关的立法和实践经验看，机构投资者参与公司治理的法律途径主要有征集代理投票权、提出议案、董事提名、股东诉讼、归入权的行使、知情权及临时股东大会召集权的行使等，非法律途径主要有私下协商、公开发表意见、发表公司治理准则、联合行动等。在借鉴国外相关经验的基础上，需要对我国的相关法律制度加以完善。在现代公司法律制度中，机构投资者通过一系列法律途径和非法律途径积极参与公司的治理并不意味着机构投资者可以为所欲为，机构投资者参与公司治理要受到一定的法律限制，这种限制除了体现在机构投资者参与公司治理的途径不能违反法律的规定以外，还进一步体现在世界各国法律所普遍规定的机构投资者应当负有的信义义务（fiduciary duty）。我国相关的规范性法律文件已经要求机构投资者承担相应的信义义务，但由于较为概括而不完善，应当加以完善。更多还原

【Abstract】 "Institutional investor"(Institutional investors) is one of the moregeneral and broad category, according to own understanding may bedifferent to Institutional investors under a different definition. In thecontext of institutional investors participating in corporate governance, theinstitutional investors generally represent the interests of small investors,the small investor’s savings together management, to a specific goal, in therange of acceptable risk and within the stipulated time, the pursuit of themaximization of investment returns. In our country, the concept of"institutional investors" is not in law had a clear definition, just to"qualified foreign institutional investors" and "qualified domesticinstitutional investor" in the name of the relevant legal documents. Also,Chinese scholars are not uniform understanding of institutional investors.The author thinks that, although there are different understandings ofinstitutional investors in reality, but at least in the following two ways ofunderstanding should be consistent, organizational and financialinstitutional investors. Institutional investors should be a certainorganization, individuals rather than as a natural person. Although theorganization in the vast majority of cases have the legal person status, butalso can’t deny that, in some cases, the possibility of unincorporatedorganizations as the institutional investors. These organizations andindividuals engaged in securities and other financial products business, but he is bigger than the size of the individual investor, management moreprofessional and stronger ability to avoid risk. Therefore, institutionalinvestors is by a professional investment management, with its can use itsown funds or funds raised through securities and other financialinstruments in financial markets on the non personal financial institutionsof all kinds of securities investment.We can learn by the definition of institutional investors, under normalcircumstances, the institutional investors is for small individual investorsto invest in financial management of the professional institutions, plays a"information intermediary, risk mediation supervision mediation, timelimit mediation, scale and trading intermediary mediation," role, whichhas the following legal characteristics: first, institutional investors are notpersonal financial institutions. Institutional investor in the first place, is akind of organization is not personal. Second, institutional investors withdual principal-agent relationship. Third, institutional investors, investmentscale and specialized investment management. Fourth, institutionalinvestors invest primarily equity or debt financial products, and profitableand non holding equity investment direction. Fifth, institutional investorshave investment structure combination and investment behaviorcharacteristics of standardization.The legal characteristics of the institutional investors or institutionalinvestors in a certain sense of advantages relative to individual investors,but the play of the institutional investors, this advantage is not absolutelyunconditional, but is affected and restricted by the following conditions:first, about the information disclosure of listed companies. Secondly,institutional investors own existence cognitive biases and behavioral biases. At last, the institutional investors principal-agent problems.Advantage because institutional investors play a restricted by the manyconditions, so we should advocate institutional investors to participate inthe governance of listed companies, at the same time, institutionalinvestors themselves also should burden certain obligations, only in thisway, can we make to effectively play the advantage of the institutionalinvestors, the stock market to get healthy and stable development, makethe interests of small investors get effective protection.Although institutional investors has the characteristics of thecommon law, but in the internal structure of different types of institutionalinvestors, investment motivation, investment objectives, as well as certaindifference. Based on the above analysis of the institutional investors, legalcharacteristics and types of institutional investors in the actuality, thispaper studies the institutional investors mainly includes the followingcategories: securities investment funds; Securities company; The socialsecurity funds; The insurance company; Commercial Banks; Otherfinancial institutions or assets management institutions.Corporate governance theory is our study of institutional investorsparticipating in corporate governance of another theoretical basis.Corporate governance both in theory and in practice has not form a unifiedand consistent definition, but it doesn’t mean that we grasp the basicmeaning of corporate governance. Actually, we can see from the abovediscussion, the corporate governance concerns and solve the problem isthat "for the benefit of the who governed" and "governance". Corporategovernance is to solve the two problems of a complex mechanism. Amongthem, the first problem is the purpose of corporate governance issues, to the second problem relates to the issues of corporate governance structureand mode.Corporate governance is not only to pursue the maximization ofshareholders’ interests, but also to protect and care for the otherstakeholders of the company. Corporate governance of the diversifiedpurpose determines the corporate governance should also is a diversifiedmanagement, its performance is the company’s various capital of devoteesin the rights and duties in the relationship produced in the process ofcorporate governance, the essence of which is between the investors andthe company’s decision makers, the interests of the distributionrelationship between supervisors and executives, including all thedevotees of capital in the process of production and operation, control,participation, selection, incentive and constraint, etc.In order to achieve the purpose of corporate governance, corporategovernance is to take certain structural patterns. For corporate governancemodel, different scholars from different Angle to the differentclassification, such as corporate governance mode based on the model ofthe board of directors divided into Anglo-American system of single modeand the German-Japanese mode of double deck system, based on thepurpose of the company is divided into shareholder oriented mode,managers-oriented mode, labor oriented mode, national oriented modeand stakeholders-oriented mode, based on the monitoring model isdivided into external control model and the model of internal control,based on the perspective of financing shareholder leading mode and bankleading mode, and so on. But the division of the corporate governancemodes are not unrelated to each other, but there is a cross, such as Britain and the United States of the system of single mode to a great extent andshareholder oriented mode, shareholders and the model of external control,and the pattern of double layer system, in the very great degree and labororiented mode, Banks, and the model of internal control.Institutional investor activism in the context of economicglobalization to promote the further development of the global corporategovernance, promote the traditional corporate governance modeldominated by the two respectively in a different direction, namelyAnglo-American corporate governance model of equity market controlmode gradually to the equity market through shareholder control anddirect control of a combination of development, while the German andJapanese corporate governance model by the creditor’s rights and thedirect control of the way gradually to the direct control of creditor’s rightsand equity directly control the combination of development. In the processof this development, the institutional investors of the former is by thedevelopment of market-oriented to close, while the latter is theinstitutional investors are from the close to the market-orienteddevelopment. As countries in politics, economy, history, culture and legalsystem, as well as differences, in the process of development is under the"path dependence" of system and institutional complementarity, theinfluence of such factors as the world can’t be formed unified consistentcorporate governance modes. But, in spite of this, all kinds of governancemodel on the basis of complement each other mutual fusion convergencetrend is more obvious, and institutional investors in the process of thisdevelopment is the main driver.From the practice of institutional investors participating in corporate governance at home and abroad, the development of institutional investorsthemselves and the rise of activism, laid a basis for institutional investorsparticipating in corporate governance. The development of institutionalinvestors in foreign countries and actively participating in corporategovernance also brought certain influence to our country. Since the1990s,China’s institutional investors have gradually developed and shows atendency of actively participating in corporate governance.Institutional investor actively participating in corporate governance isnot only a theoretical foundation and realistic foundation, but also thebasis of the legal system. Legal system support for the development ofinstitutional investors and deregulation of the development of institutionalinvestors has provided the essential condition, thus promoting institutionalinvestors to actively participate in corporate governance. Largeinstitutional investors in China to grow and their participation in corporategovernance is inseparable from the support and protection of our country’srelevant legal system.From the overseas related legislation and practice experience, theformal way of institutional investors participating in corporate governancemainly solicitation agent for the right to vote, introduced legislation anddirector nominations, informal ways are privately negotiated, publicopinion and published corporate governance standards. The way thesepathways are worth our using for reference. On this basis, the need of ourcountry related legal system improved.In modern company law system, institutional investors way through aseries of formal and informal way to actively participating in corporategovernance does not mean that institutional investors can do whatever you want, to institutional investors participating in corporate governance islimited by a certain law, the restrictions in addition to reflect the path ofinstitutional investors participating in corporate governance can not inviolation of the provisions of the law, further embodied in the laws of thecountries around the world generally institutional investors should havethe faith of his obligations under the (fiduciary duty). Our country therequirement of normative legal documents has institutional investorsundertake corresponding faith obligation, but because of general and notperfect, should be perfected.更多还原