【作者】 何春艳；

【导师】 雷涯邻；

【作者基本信息】 中国地质大学（北京） ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 我国具有稀土比较优势。但由于我国稀土行业发展尚不成熟，产业政策尚不完善，导致稀土出口过度，资源加速耗竭，我国稀土资源大国地位岌岌可危。本研究以国际贸易理论、产业安全理论、可持续发展理论和博弈论为理论基础构建我国稀土出口贸易政策理论框架，并运用完全信息动态博弈模型展开我国稀土出口贸易各方利益博弈分析，探讨我国稀土出口到美、日、欧盟三方的分配方案，并据此设计我国稀土出口贸易政策，为促进我国稀土产业安全和资源的可持续发展提供理论指导和决策参考。具体创新性研究成果如下：第一，构建了我国稀土出口贸易政策理论框架。本文探讨了国际贸易理论、产业安全理论、可持续发展理论和博弈论与我国稀土出口贸易政策之间的内在关系，构建了我国稀土出口贸易政策理论框架，为我国稀土出口贸易博弈分析和政策制定提供理论依据。第二，构建了我国稀土出口贸易博弈模型。在深入剖析我国和全球稀土供需现状、梳理我国稀土产业政策的基础上，以我国稀土出口贸易政策理论框架为指导，综合考虑稀土供需关系、我国与各国的国际关系、各国国际地位和WTO规则四个影响因素，设定我国出口到美、欧盟、日的稀土份额为4:5:1或3:6:1，构建了我国与美、日和欧盟之间的贸易博弈矩阵。在此基础上，运用博弈论中的讨价还价模型和轮流出价的讨价还价模型，就稀土贸易中的经济利益，展开动态博弈分析。根据博弈结果，设计了我国稀土出口量分配方案，为我国稀土出口政策方案的设计提供了参考。第三，设计了我国稀土出口贸易政策。根据博弈分析，得出我国稀土出口量分配方案为①我国出口稀土到美、欧盟、日本的份额依次是40.2%，38.9%和6%；出口到世界其他国家的稀土份额占15%。②我国每年稀土出口量和国内消费量的配比为4:6。由此设计了我国稀土出口贸易政策方案，有助于进一步完善现行稀土出口政策。更多还原

【Abstract】 China’s rare earths (REs) have the comparative advantage of mineral resources.However, China’s RE industry and its policies have been still immature and deficientuntil now, which accelerates the exhaustion of RE resources and even threatens thedominant position of China’s RE resources.This paper plays the benefits game between China and its RE export tradepartners using a dynamic game model of incomplete information, based on thetheoretical frame of China’s RE export trade policies including international tradetheory, industry security theory, sustainable development theory as well as gametheory. After a series of gaming activities between Sino-US, China and Japan as wellas China and EU, an allocation scheme for China to export REs to those countries isdesigned. The study results of this paper provide the theoretical guidance anddecision-making reference for promoting China’s RE industry security and REsustainable development. Then the innovative study achievements are acquired asfollows.(1) Building the theoretical frame of China’s RE export trade policies. Thetheoretical frame of China’s RE export trade policies is built in this paper afteranalyzing the relationships between the theories (i.e. international trade theory,industry security theory, sustainable development theory as well as game theory) andChina’s RE export trade policies, which provides a theoretical basis for China’s REexport game study and policy-making.(2) Building China’s RE export trade game model. Based on the analysis of thecurrent RE supply-demand situations in China and the world and China’s RE industrypolicies, in view of the influences from supply-demand relationship, internationalrelationship between China and trade partners, partners’ international status and WTOrules, three game matrixes of RE trade between Sino-US, China and EU as well asChina and Japan are built with the set RE export shares which successive are4:5:1or3:6:1. Furthermore, using Bargain Model and Alternating Offers Model of gametheory, a game-playing is conducted to analyze the economic benefits of each country in China’s RE trade. According to the results of game-playing, an allocation schemefor China to export REs to to those partners (US, Japan and EU) is designed, whichprovides the reference for designing China’s RE export policies.(3) Designing China’s RE export trade policies. With the game-playing, anallocation scheme for China to export REs to those countries (US, Japan and EU) isgotten that the radio for China to export RE to US, EU and Japan successively are40.2%,38.9%and6%. The radio to export RE to other countries is15%. And everyyear, China’s exports to internal consumptions ratio is4to6. Based on this scheme,China’s RE export trade policies are designed, which promotes the current exportpolicies’ improvement.更多还原