【作者】 张华；

【导师】 韩东平； 艾文国；

【作者基本信息】 哈尔滨工业大学 ， 企业管理， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 首次公开发行新股上市（IPO）是公司的重大战略决策之一，IPO不仅会影响公司的资本结构和规模，而且对于公司治理也会产生深远影响。随着我国多层次资本市场体系建设的不断完善，越来越多的企业通过IPO进入资本市场进行融资，然而公司选择IPO进行融资的影响因素有哪些，公司IPO相关决策的机理是什么？大股东控制在我国IPO公司中普遍存在，股权集中条件下大股东具有侵占中小股东利益获取控制权私有收益的强烈动机，而大股东或者实际控制人对公司IPO具有重要影响，因此，本文基于大股东控制权私有收益的理论，研究了大股东控制对公司IPO决策、IPO定价和IPO抑价的影响机理。从公司治理的角度揭示了影响我国资本市场公司IPO行为的内在因素。大股东通常是公司IPO的决策主体。公司IPO一方面使得原有大股东的控制权和所有权结构将会产生变化，大股东的控制权和现金流权进一步偏离，大股东攫取控制权私有收益的动机增加。另一方面，会使得大股东面临外部投资者和市场的监督产生变化，外部大股东（如机构股东）的加入和市场的监督有利于公司价值的提高，但又限制了大股东控制权私有收益的获取。因此，大股东控制下的IPO决策需要在公司价值最大化和控制权私有收益的最大化之间进行权衡。本文基于大股东控制权私有收益和外部监督角度构建了大股东控制下公司IPO决策的模型，系统分析了影响公司IPO决策的影响因素，并通过阿里巴巴集团IPO的相关案例分析验证了模型研究提出的相关结论。研究认为企业选择IPO而不进行私募融资的意愿和融资规模、私募股权融资的边际成本及大股东利益侵占效率正相关，与公司最大价值、上市成本负相关。发行定价决策是公司IPO中最核心的问题，在我国现行的IPO询价制度下，新股发行价格反映了资本市场投资者对公司投资价值的判断，如果IPO公司存在股权集中和大股东控制现象，那么外部投资者在对IPO新股定价时就会关注公司存在大股东控制的治理风险，并在新股价格中做出反应。因此，本文在理论模型分析的基础上，通过实证研究的方法发现IPO公司披露的大股东控制股权结构特征对IPO定价能够起到信号传递效应。投资者在新股估值时能够一定程度关注IPO公司大股东控制的治理风险并作出合理的判断。另外，IPO定价会直接影响IPO抑价水平，现有的研究主要基于信息不对称理论来解释IPO抑价现象，但现实中我国公司IPO一直存在“三高”现象，与传统的信息不对称理论对IPO抑价的解释并不一致。本文构建了大股东控制影响IPO抑价的理论模型，并选取我国中小板IPO的公司样本实证研究发现，控制权和现金流权偏离程度越大，IPO公司大股东通过降低IPO定价维持公司控制权的动机减弱，而是倾向于提高公司的IPO定价，一方面，可以补偿外部投资者对新股的定价折扣的成本，另一方面可以高额募集资金，为上市后控制权私有收益的攫取创造条件。研究还发现IPO公司的私募股权资本不能起到对IPO公司控股股东的监督和公司投资价值的认证作用，会减弱终极控股股东控制权和现金流权偏离程度对于公司IPO抑价水平的负向影响。本文的研究丰富和完善了IPO决策和定价的相关理论，同时结合我国证券市场的实际情况，对IPO抑价现象提出了新的观点，本文的研究结论可以为广大企业在IPO的股权结构设计、定价、治理结构的优化等方面提供决策依据，也可以帮助投资者对IPO公司股票进行合理的估值，为证券监管部门加强IPO市场监管和相关政策的制定及调整提供决策参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Initial public offerings (IPO) is one of the major corporate strategic decision-makings, IPO not only affect the corporate capital structure and scale, but also have far-reaching influence on the company’s governance. With the constant improvement of multi-level capital market system construction in our country, more and more corporations enter the capital market to finance through IPO. However, what is the mechanism of IPO related decisions, and what are the influence factors of IPO financing? These problems lack corresponding theoretical support in practice. Large shareholder control is common in the IPO firms in our country. The controlling shareholders have strong motivation to obtain private benefits of control by encroaching the interests of minority shareholders.Based on the theory of large shareholder’s private benefits of control, the dissertation discuss the the influence mechanism of of IPO decision, IPO pricing and IPO underpricing by the Large shareholder control, and from the perspective of corporate governance, reveals the factors affecting IPO behavior of capital market in China.The controlling shareholders often dominate the IPO decision. On the one hand, IPO will change the original large shareholder’s control and ownership structure, and increase the deviation of control and cash flow right,and the controlling shareholder’s expropriation motivation increases.On the other hand, the external supervision on the controlling shareholders by the investors and market will also change. Monitoring by outside large shareholders, such as institutional shareholders and stock market will improve the value of the company, but also limit the private benefits of control of the controlling shareholder. Therefore, IPO decision under the control of controlling shareholder need to trade-off between maximization of the company value and private benefits of control. Model of the IPO decision is constructed based on the private benefits of control and external monitoring and analysis the influence factors of affect IPO decision, and the model is verified by Alibaba group IPO related cases study. The research results suggest that companies will of choosing IPO instead of private financing is positively related to financing scale, the marginal cost of private equity financing and expropriation efficiency, and negatively related to the maximum firm value and the IPO cost.Pricing decision is the core problem in the IPO, under the current IPO inquiry system in China, the offer price reflects the investors’ judgment of investment value of the IPO company, if the IPO company have concentrated ownership and controlled by large shareholder, the market investors could focus on the existing large shareholder control and the governance risks in the pricing of IPO, and react in valuating the new shares.Therefore, on the basis of theoretical analysis, this dissertation find that the company’s large shareholder ownership structure characteristics has the signal transmission effect on IPO pricing by the method of empirical research. Investors pay attention to IPO firm’s large shareholder control governance risks in the IPO valuation to some degree and make a reasonable judgment.In addition, IPO pricing will directly affect the level of IPO underpricing. The existing theories mainly explain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing based on the information asymmetry theory. In reality, China’s IPO has "three highs"(high offer price, high P/E ratio, high capital placement) phenomenons, and is not consistent with the traditional information asymmetry theory about IPO underpricing. The dissertation constructs the model of effect on IPO underpricing by the controlling shareholder and empirically find that the greater the controlling shareholder’s motivation of reducing the IPO price to maintain corporate control is negative with the degree of deviation of control and cash flow right, but tend to improve the company’s IPO offer price.On the one hand, it can compensate for the cost of offer price discount by outside investors, on the other hand it can raise much more capital, preparing for the expropriating the private benefits of control after IPO. In addition, the dissertation also find that private equity capital can’t play the roll of monitoring the controlling shareholder and certificating the investment value of IPO firm, and will weaken the negative relationship between IPO underpricing level and control and cash flow right deviation of ultimate controlling shareholder.The dissertation enrich and perfect the IPO pricing decisions theory, and give out the new view of IPO underpricing phenomenon combining with the actual situation of the securities market in our country, the conclusion of the dissertation can provide decision basis for the enterprises in IPO equity structure design, pricing, governance structure optimization, can also help investors in valuating the IPO, and provide decision-making reference for the stock supervision department of strengthen the supervision of the IPO market and related policy making and adjustment.更多还原