【作者】 王军伟；

【导师】 周德群；

【作者基本信息】 南京航空航天大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 自从伯利和米恩斯明确提出公司治理的概念，公司治理理论研究与实务发展越来越受到人们的重视。随着股票市场的建立和上市公司的出现，我国对公司治理的研究也逐渐展开。20世纪90年代亚洲金融危机的爆发，以及2001年发生的美国安然公司（Eron）事件等一系列世界著名公司丑闻事件的出现，引发了人们对公司治理问题前所未有的关注与探讨。美国、经济合作与发展组织（OECD）等国际组织和一些国家相继发布了新的公司治理规范。我国证券市场监管部门也颁布了公司治理规范，学者们开展了相关的研究，公司治理日益得到社会各界的重视。本文首先对公司治理的起源进行了简单回顾，界定了公司治理的内涵。在此基础之上，对与本文研究密切相关的公司治理研究领域：公司治理效率与评价、大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题，以及国内外公司治理研究现状和新进展进行了回顾与述评。本文认为，当前公司治理研究主要可以归纳为四个方面：公司治理内涵研究、公司治理理论研究、公司治理机制研究与公司治理比较研究。近年来公司治理研究的新进展主要表现在：公司治理效率与公司治理评价、大股东与中小股东代理问题、行为公司治理等方面的研究。公司治理研究从“股东与经理人之间的代理问题”转向了“大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题”，这些研究在取得了丰富研究成果的同时，存在着以下几点不足：一是对于控制权的研究主要停留在大股东收益、大股东对公司绩效影响的层面；二是研究主要限于大股东或者控股股东，对“最终控制人”的研究缺乏，而且缺乏对“控股股东”、“最终控制人”行为与公司治理关系的研究；三是对公司治理效率认识不一，缺乏严谨的理论界定，对股东行为对公司治理效率的影响研究不够深入。本文针对上市公司中存在的大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题，以我国A股上市公司作为研究对象，对“控股股东、最终控制人行为”特征进行了分析，对“公司治理效率的内涵和测度指标”进行了理论研究。在此基础之上，着重研究“控股股东、最终控制人行为”与“公司治理效率”之间的关系，建立了相应的理论模型并进行实证检验，为有效治理上市公司违规行为、提高公司治理效率提出政策建议。本文认为，公司治理效率是一种制度效率，利益相关者治理成本最小化、治理收益最大化是公司治理效率的直接测度指标，公司绩效、公司价值是公司治理效率的间接测度指标。公司治理效率具有多重性特征。控股股东与最终控制人的行为是影响公司治理效率的关键因素，其行为取决于其个体特征、自身需求及其所处的环境。公司治理效率是控股股东与最终控制人个体特征、行为与其所处环境的函数。据此本文建立了“环境、结构—行为—效率”的实证分析框架，以“期间费用率、托宾Q、净资产收益率、净资产报酬率和违规次数等指标作为公司治理效率的测度指标对提出的假设进行了检验。实证结果表明，公司治理环境与结构、控股股东与最终控制人行为都对公司治理效率有着不同程度的影响，公司治理结构对控股股东与最终控制人行为也有着较为显著的影响，但是他们之间的关系并不是一成不变，这说明影响公司治理效率的因素较为复杂，特别是环境因素所包含的并非仅仅是本文所涉及到的因素。从实证分析结论来看，本文根据理论分析和相关研究文献提出的假设并不完全成立，而且公司治理效率测度指标不同，对假设的检验结果也会不同。这一研究结果一方面进一步说明了公司治理效率测度指标的多样性，而其根本原因在于公司治理效率内涵的复杂性；另一方面也说明了公司治理结构、控股股东与最终控制人行为与公司治理效率关系的复杂性，简单的线性模型不能有效说明其影响机制与机理。另外，由于难以用数量指标刻画等原因，本文实证研究没有涉及到“环境”这个影响公司治理效率的重要因素，也是导致一些研究假设不能成立的重要因素。基于理论研究和实证分析的结论，本文提出了提高我国公司治理效率的对策，主要有完善和强化相关利益主体的刚性约束、建立和完善市场经济与竞争机制、建立有效的再谈判机制和改善公司治理外部环境等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since Berle and Means put forward the concept of corporate governance explicitly, it has beenpaid more and more attention to study on corporate governance theory and practice. With theestablishment of the stock market and the emergence of the listed companies on corporate governancein China，study on corporate governance is also gradually expand. In1990s, the emergence of theoutbreak of the Asian financial crisis and the events of Enron in2001， and a series ofworld-renowned corporate scandals, has sparked unprecedented attention on corporate governanceissues. In United States, OECD and other international organizations and some countries newcorporate governance norms have been issued. China Securities Regulatory Commission also issued anumber of corporate governance norms, and scholars carry out related research, corporate governancegains the attention of the community increasingly.In this paper, there is a brief review of the origins of corporate governance and the meaning ofcorporate governance firstly. On this basis, it surveys and comments the academic literatures on thecorporate governance efficiency and evaluation, the agency problem between large shareholders andminority shareholders, which is closely related to this study, as well as the status of corporategovernance research and the new progress now. Corporate governance research can be summarized infour aspects: the connotation of corporate governance research, the study of the theory of corporategovernance, corporate governance mechanism and corporate governance comparative research. Inrecent years, the new progress of corporate governance study includes the study of the corporategovernance efficiency and corporate governance evaluation, large shareholders and minorityshareholders proxy issues (i.e. Principal-Principal Agency), and research on behavioral corporategovernance. The corporate governance research have changed from the agency problem betweenshareholders and managers to the agency problem between large shareholders and minorityshareholders, these studies have made extensive research, but there are the following deficiencies:First, the study of the control mainly stay in the largest shareholder gains and the influence of largeshareholders on corporate performance levels; Second, the research is mainly limited to majorshareholders or controlling shareholders, but lack of ultimate control, controlling shareholder andultimate control behavior; Third, it is different to define corporate governance efficiency, and lack ofstrict theoretical definition, study on the influence of large shareholders behavior on corporategovernance efficiency is not deep enough. In this paper, it analyzes the controlling shareholders and ultimate controllers behaviorcharacteristics in China’s A-share listed companies, and studies the agency problem between largeshareholders and minority shareholders of listed companies, defines the corporate governanceefficiency and suggests its measuring index. On this basis, it focuses on the relationship between thecontrolling shareholder, ultimate controllers’ behavior, and corporate governance efficiency, then itproposes a theoretical model and conducts an empirical test. Also, it gives some suggestions toimprove corporate governance efficiency and effectiveness.This paper argues that the corporate governance efficiency is an institution efficiency,minimizing the governance cost of stakeholder, or maximizing the governance return is directmeasures of the corporate governance efficiency, and corporate performance, or the value of thecompany is indirect measures. The corporate governance efficiency has multiple characteristics. Thebehavior of controlling shareholders and ultimate controllers is the key factors that affect thecorporate governance efficiency, their behavior depends on the individual characteristics, own needsand environment. The corporate governance efficiency is a function of the controlling shareholders’and the ultimate controllers’ individual characteristics, the behavior and its environment. Pursuant tothis, in this paper, it founds an empirical analysis framework of the Environment-Behavior-Efficiency.It tests the hypothesis by using the expense ratio, Tobin’s Q, ROE, ROA and the number of violationsas measure indicators of the corporate governance efficiency. The empirical results show that thecorporate governance efficiency is impacted by the corporate governance environment and structure,the controlling shareholders’ and ultimate controller’ activities differently, but the relationshipbetween them is not static. This shows that the impact factors of corporate governance efficiency aremore complex, especially environmental factors not only factors involved. From the empiricalanalysis conclusion, the hypotheses proposed according to the theoretical analysis and related researchliteratures are not completely established. If the Corporate governance efficiency measure is different,the test results of hypothesis will be different. On the one hand, the results of this study furtherillustrate the indices of corporate governance efficiency are multifarious, the fundamental reason isthe complexity of the corporate governance efficiency; On the other hand, it also illustrates that therelationship between the corporate governance structure, the behavior of controlling shareholder andthe ultimate controller of the company, and the corporate governance efficiency is complexity. Thesimple linear model could not effectively illustrate the mechanism and the mechanism between them.In addition, due to the difficult characterized by quantitative indicators and other reasons, theempirical research is not related to the “environment”, an important factor to affect the corporate governance efficiency. It also contributed to some hypotheses could not be established.On the base of theoretical and empirical analysis conclusions, this paper put forward somecountermeasures to improve the corporate governance efficiency in China, such as improving andstrengthening the relevant stakeholders’ rigid constraints, establishing and improving the economymarket and competition mechanism, establishing an effective re-negotiation mechanism andimproving the company regulation of the external environment.更多还原