【作者】 张健；

【导师】 刘斌；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 会计学， 2014， 博士

【摘要】 从全球范围来看，家族企业的发展得到社会广泛关注。越来越多的研究认为家族企业存在巨大的生命力。目前，不仅大多数发展中国家，家族企业在社会经济中占据了重要地位，在一些发达国家和地区，家族企业也占不小的比例。中国的家族企业发展历程并不长，但其发展势头以及社会贡献力却不容小觑。在家族企业强劲发展的势头下，同时也暴露出大量问题。例如：家族内讧、代际传承问题引发的企业“地震”，波及到企业正常运营，给企业带来不可弥补的损失。同时家族大股东通过违规担保、非法占用资金等方式掏空上市公司，侵占社会股东利益的事件频发，屡被媒体曝光。以上问题引起理论界对家族企业治理模式的诸多质疑和批评，相关研究也出现较大分歧。依据传统代理理论，大股东参与管理能够减轻第一重代理冲突，提高资源配置效率，增厚企业价值。但有学者提出，在家族管理模式下，家族内部亲情关系可能会加重代理冲突，带来效率低下问题。此外，家族企业普遍采用了金字塔控股结构，这既可能是家族缓解集团企业资金压力的一种做法，也可能是家族股东掏空上市公司的重要途径。研究我国企业问题离不开外部特定的制度环境，其中政府强干预是我国重要的制度背景特征之一。产业政策是一项具有弹性的重要政策，也是常用的政府干预手段，对经济生活发挥了重大作用，深刻地影响着企业的融资与投资环境。那么长期受到融资歧视的家族企业，能否从产业政策鼓励中受益？融资约束改善对家族企业投资效率又产生何种影响？面对以上研究分歧和问题，本文从家族企业代理问题分析入手，深入研究家族涉入影响公司财务行为的内在机理，主要从投资、融资视角上探讨家族涉入企业的经济后果。并进一步结合外部产业政策研究异质家族企业的投融资效率。论文研究内容及结论如下：第一章绪论。提出研究问题，阐述研究目的，介绍本研究的理论价值与现实意义，以及论文的主要研究内容、研究思路，本论文的研究特色与贡献。第二章文献综述。主要分为两个部分。其一是围绕国内外关于家族涉入企业的治理特征、家族企业投资和家族企业融资这几个方面进行文献阐述；其二是围绕政府干预、产业政策的微观效应进行文献阐述。第三章理论基础与制度背景分析。首先介绍了与本研究密切相关的委托代理理论和管家理论以及桥接两者的利他主义理论。文章深入分析了家族企业的委托代理关系层级，并具体阐述管家理论的具体内容，进而分析了利他主义理论如何实现管家理论和代理理论的桥接。其次，论文基于公司治理视角，详细阐述了企业投资理论与融资理论。第三，在中国转轨经济制度背景下，分析我国家族企业的发展演进过程、资本配置状况和我国产业政策制定实施历程。最后，构建了产业政策对家族企业代理冲突与资源配置效率关系影响的理论分析框架第四章研究了产业政策、代理冲突与家族企业的投资效率。本章首先根据家族涉入企业的程度，将家族企业划分为高涉入与低涉入两类家族企业。研究发现虽然创始人任职CEO削弱了第一重代理冲突，继而提高投资效率，但家族利他主义却增加了第一重代理冲突，显著降低了投资效率；总之，我国制度背景下，家族高涉入企业主要面对第一重代理冲突。另一方面，家族低涉入企业主要存在第二重代理冲突，而家族股东控制权和现金流权分离度加重了代理冲突，降低了投资效率。在我国当前制度背景下，相对于家族低涉入企业，家族高涉入企业总体上代理问题比较严重，投资效率较低。文章进一步研究了产业政策对高低涉入两类家族企业投资效率的影响。结果表明，产业政策鼓励显著改善了家族企业的融资环境，提高了低涉入家族公司投资效率，但却明显降低了高涉入家族公司的投资效率。第五章研究了产业政策、代理冲突与家族企业研发投资效率。本章在深入细致地研究高低涉入两类家族公司不同代理问题基础上，从影响家族企业研发投资的两个基本因素：风险规避和长期投资视域出发展开研究。首先分别研究了利他主义、创始人效应以及控制权与现金流权分离对高低涉入两类家族企业研发投资强度影响。其次比较了两类家族企业研发投资强度差异。更进一步研究了企业外部国家产业政策与家族企业涉入程度如何对上市公司研发投资价值创造产生交互影响。研究认为，相对家族低涉入公司，家族高涉入公司的研发投资强度较小；国家产业政策鼓励放松了家族企业融资环境，却降低了家族企业研发投资的价值创造效应，并且对家族高涉入企业的影响更为显著。第六章研究了产业政策、代理冲突与家族企业债务融资效率。在将家族企业划分为高涉入与低涉入两类家族企业基础上，本章研究了不同的代理问题特征下，家族涉入对企业负债融资效率的影响。本章进一步研究了企业外部国家产业政策与家族企业涉入程度如何对上市公司负债融资效率产生交互影响。结果发现家族高涉入公司负债融资效率较低；国家产业政策鼓励放松了家族企业融资环境，给家族企业带来更多资金，但降低了高涉入公司负债融资效率，提高家族低涉入公司负债融资效率。第七章结论与启示。概括本文研究结论，提出启示建议，指出未来研究方向。更多还原

【Abstract】 From a global perspective, the development of family firms has been widelyconcerned. More and more studies suggest that the family firm has great vitality. Atpresent, not only in the majority of developing countries, family firms occupy animportant position in the social economy；in some developed countries and regions,family firms also accounted for not a small proportion. Although the developmentprocess of family firms didn’t last long in China, its development trend and socialcontribution cannot be ignored.However, with the strong development of family firms, a lot of problems are alsoexposed, such as: internal contradictions and succession issues in enterprises likeearthquakes affect its normal operation, this may cause irreparable harm to the company.At the same time it is reported frequently that family shareholders encroach on socialshareholder interests through illegal guarantee and the illegal occupation of funds whichTunnel the listed company. The above problems caused many questions and criticismsfor corporation’s governance, related research also have big differences. On the basis ofthe traditional agency theory, it is the big shareholders who participate in themanagement could reduce the conflict of first kind of agency, improve the efficiency ofallocation of resources of enterprise, and enhance the enterprise value.But somescholars proposed that in the mode of family management, the internal relationship offamily may further aggravate the agency conflict and cause the problem of lowefficiency. In addition, the family business generally used the pyramidal ownershipstructure, which could relieve the financial pressure of family group enterprise, and alsomay be an important way of family shareholders to tunnel listed company.In our country the research on enterprise problem cannot do without consideringexternal specific institutional environment. Strong government intervention is one of theimportant characteristics of China’s institutional background. Industrial policy is animportant flexible policy, is also a commonly used means of government intervention,which played a significant role in the economic life and has a profound impact oninvestment and financing environment of enterprises. Can the industrial policies benefitthe family firm which has long been in the financial crimination? What kind of impacton investment efficiency of family firm can the improvement of investment financingconstraints have? In the face of the above differences and problems, this paper starts from analyzingthe problem of the family firm’s agency, deeply studies the internal mechanism offamily involvement which affect the behavior of financial companies, mainly from theinvestment, financing perspective discuss the enterprise economic consequences offamily involvement. Further, the thesis discusses investment and financing efficiency ofthe heterogeneity of family enterprise based on external industrial policy. The contentand conclusion of this paper includes the following sections:The first chapter is introduction. In this chapter, it explains the research purpose,introduces the theoretical value and significance of this study, and the main researchcontents, research ideas, research characteristics and contributions of the dissertation.The second chapter is the Literature review. It is divided into two parts，one isabout the literature on the governance characteristics, investment and financing of thefamily involvement business, the other is the literature about the microeffect ongovernment intervention, industrial policy.The third chapter is the analysis of theoretical basis and the institutionalbackground. Firstly, it introduces the principal-agent theory, the stewardship theory andthe altruism theory which bridges two theories high closely related to our study. Thispaper analyzes each level of the principal-agent relationship of the family firms, andexpounds the contents of stewardship theory, then interprets how the altruism theoryimplements the connection between principal-agent theory and the stewardship theory.Secondly, based on the perspective of corporate governance, the paper details theinvestment and financing theory of the enterprise. Thirdly, under the Chinesetransitional economy background, the thesis analyses evolution of family business, theallocation of capital and reviews implementation process of industrial policy inChina.At last the chapter Constructs a theoretical framework of the influence ofindustrial policy on the family business agency conflict and resource allocationefficiency.The fourth chapter studies the industrial policy, the agency conflict and investmentefficiency of the family firm. Firstly, according to the extent of the involvement offamily firm, this chapter divides the family firms into two types:family-high-involvement firm and family-low-involvement firm. The chapter finds thatalthough the founder of enterprises as CEO has weakened the conflict of first kindagency, then improved the efficiency of investment, the family altruism has increasedthe conflict of first kind agency, reduced the efficiency of investment significantly. Overall under the institutional background in China, the family-high-involvement firmmainly faces the first agency conflict. On the other hand, family-low-involvement firmmainly faces the second kind of agency problem, and the separation between controlrights and cash flow rights increases the agency conflicts and reduces the efficiency ofinvestment. This paper believes that, under the current institutional background, theagency problem of family-high-involvement firm is more serious thanfamily-low-involvement firms，and the efficiency of investment is lower. Further, theinfluence of industrial policy to investment efficiency on the level of involvementbetween two kinds of family firms has been studied. The results show that the industrialpolicy has improved the financing environment of the family firm significantly,increased the investment efficiency of low involvement family firm, but reduced theinvestment efficiency of high involvement family firm dramatically.The fifth chapter studies the industrial policy, agency conflict and efficiency ofR&D investment in family firm. This chapter studies the different kinds of agencyproblems thoroughly between the high and low involvement of two family firms, fromthe perspective of two basic factors of family firm’s R&D Investment: risk aversion andlong-term investment. Firstly the chapter investigates the influence from the altruism,founder effect and separation effect between control rights and cash flow rights to R&Dinvestment intensity on the level of involvement of two kinds of family companies.Secondly, the chapter compares the difference of R&D investment intensity betweentwo types of family firms. Furthermore, the chapter studies the interact effect of externalnational industrial policy and family involvement on the value of R&D investment inlisted companies. we can infer that the R&D investment intensity of the highinvolvement family firm is smaller than the low involvement family firm; It is thenational industrial policy that encourages the relaxation of the financing environment offamily business, but lowers the value of the family firm’s R&D investment effect, andthe impact on the high involvement family firm is more significant.The sixth chapter studies the industrial policy, the agency conflict and debtfinancing efficiency of the family firm. Based on dividing the family firms into twotypes: high involvement family firm and low involvement family firm, and from the twobasic motives of family capital structure choice: keep the right of control and riskaversion, the chapter analyses the impact of family involvement on the efficiency ofdebt financing under the influence of different agency problem. Further, this chapterstudies interaction effect of listed Company’s debt financing efficiency under the influence of the external industrial policies of the state and extent of family involvement.The findings indicate that in family firm of high involvement its debt financingefficiency is relatively lower; the national industrial policy encouraging the relaxationof financing environment of family firm, brings more money to the family firm, butreduces the efficiency of debt financing in high involvement family firm，andimproved the efficiency of debt financing in low involvement family firmThe seventh chapter is the conclusion and prospect.This chapter includes thepaper’s research conclusion, suggestions, limitations and the prospect of future researchdirection.更多还原