【作者】 张西栓；

【导师】 赵息；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 会计学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 并购作为企业实现快速扩张和优化资源配置的重要手段，越来越成为理论界和实务界共同关注的一个永恒话题，尤其有关并购价值创造的问题。由于从并购决策的做出，并购接管的进行，到并购后的整合等并购的全过程中，高管都在其中起着决定性作用，这样为避免并购成为高管谋取私有收益的机会主义行为，就需要在企业内部建立一套高管权力的制约机制。内部控制制度具有制约高管权力、对高管进行监督和约束的功能，完善的内部控制制度能够在企业内部形成制衡机制，制约高管权力，从而有效规范高管并购决策行为，提高科学决策水平，防范并购决策风险，也能够显著改善公司治理水平。基于此，本论文研究企业高管权力与内部控制的相互作用关系及其对并购绩效的影响。本文在全面综述国内外相关研究成果的基础上，基于高管在内部控制制度设计和执行中的能动性、内部控制有效性对高管权力的制约及高管在企业并购全过程中的主导作用，综合运用委托代理理论、不完全契约理论和风险偏好理论等前沿理论中的最新研究成果，采用文献检索和理论分析研究了高管权力和内部控制及其相互作用对并购绩效的影响。在此基础上搜集中国上市公司并购数据，从内部控制信息披露和内部控制指数两个方面测度内部控制的有效性，用两职兼任、任职期限和薪酬份额测度高管权力，用并购后公司净资产收益率、总资产收益率、每股收益和托宾Q的变化测度并购绩效，构建结构方程模型，借助于结构方程模型的独特优势，对内部控制、高管权力和并购绩效三者之间的相互关系进行了实证研究。研究发现，良好的内部控制是企业并购价值实现的重要保障机制，对并购绩效具有显著的正向影响；在并购中高管往往更关心个人利益而不是股东利益，高管权力的过度膨胀对并购绩效的提高具有抑制作用，并且健全有效的内部控制能够在企业内形成相互制约、相互监督的制衡机制，制约和调节高管的并购行为，使得高管的自利行为受到一定程度的限制；高管权力的过度膨胀，往往导致高管凌驾于内部控制之上，使内部控制失灵，内部控制与高管权力之间存在反向的相互作用关系。论文最后针对研究过程中发现的问题，提出企业一方面应加强内部控制建设，切实提高内部控制水平，另一方面应加强公司治理建设，形成有效的高管监督激励机制，以规范公司并购行为，提升企业并购绩效。更多还原

【Abstract】 As an important means of optimizing resource allocation and achieving rapidexpansion, merger and acquisition (M&A) has always been an eternal topic ofmutual concern by theoretical and practical circles, in particular the M&A valuecreation. On the M&A whole process of decision making, takeover conducting, andpost-merger integration, the senior management plays a decisive role, so in order toavoid M&A being an opportunistic behavior to seek private gains for seniormanagement, a set of restraint mechanisms of managerial power should beestablished. Internal control system can restrict managerial power, supervise andconstruct managerial behavior. A sound internal control system is able to form achecks and balances mechanism within the enterprise, which can restrict managerialpower, regulate managerial M&A decision-making behavior, improve the level ofscientific decision-making, prevent the risk of M&A decision, and significantlyimprove corporate governance. Based on these, this thesis researches the interactionbetween internal control and managerial power, and their impact on the M&Aperformance.In this thesis, based on a comprehensive overview of research at home andabroad, and taking into account the dynamic role of senior management on thedesign and implementation of internal control system, the constraint of internalcontrol effectiveness on managerial power, and the leading role of seniormanagement in the whole process of M&A, this paper integrally uses frontiertheories such as principal-agent theory, incomplete contract theory and riskpreference theory, theoretically explores the impact of managerial power, internalcontrol and their interaction on M&A performance. Then the M&A data of Chineselisted companies are collected, and by means of the unique advantages of structuralequation model, structural equation model is constructed so to empirically analyzethe relationship between internal control, managerial power and the M&Aperformance. In the model, the effectiveness of internal control is measured byinformation disclosure and internal control index, the managerial power is measuredby three indexes: duality of manager and chairman, tenure and managerial pays slice,and the M&A performance is measured by the changes of three indexes: return onequity, retrun on assets, earnings per share and Tobin’s Q. The study finds that,effective internal control is an important protection mechanism for the implement of M&A value, and has a significant positive impact on the M&A performance; seniormanagement are usually more concerned about their private interests rather than theinternets of shareholders in the M&A, and the over-expansion of managerial powerwould inhibit the improvement of M&A performance, sound and effective internalcontrol can form mechanism of checks and balances of mutual restraint and mutualsupervision, restrict and regulate managerial M&A behavior, so to make managerialself-interested behavior somewhat limited; the excessive expansion of managerialpower often leads to senior management override of the internal control, and letinternal control fail, thus there exists a reverse interaction between internal controland managerial power. Finally, against the problems discovered in the course of thestudy, the paper proposes that enterprise should strengthen internal controlconstruction on the one hand, effectively improve the effectiveness of internalcontrol, on the other hand should strengthen the construction of corporategovernance, forms an effective oversight and incentive mechanism of seniormanagement, so to regulate corporate M&A behavior and enhance M&Aperformance.更多还原