【作者】 沈向光；

【导师】 宋效中；

【作者基本信息】 燕山大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 现代公司治理理论认为，股权结构是公司治理问题的逻辑起点。不同的所有权结构安排，会产生不同的代理问题。从国际范围来看，主要存在两类不同的股权结构及相应的公司治理问题：一类是分散的股权结构，其公司治理的核心是解决股东与经营者之间的代理问题。另一类是较为集中的股权结构，其公司治理的核心是解决控股大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题，此问题又被称为“第二类代理问题”。公司治理问题的早期研究，主要注重由于股权高度分散而导致的股东与管理者之间的代理问题。近年来，随着高度集中股权结构的最新证据出现以后，控股大股东的代理问题成为公司治理研究的重点。我国上市公司大部分是由原国有企业通过改制设立而来，控股大股东对上市公司既具有“父爱主义”支持的一面，也有掏空上市公司资源、侵占中小股东利益的剥夺一面。但目前对该领域的研究，主要关注于控股大股东的掏空行为，而将控股大股东“掏空”与“支持”结合起来进行研究的文献并不多见，特别是相关理论模型的发展并不迅速。有鉴于此，本文通过构建控股大股东“掏空”与“支持”的统一分析模型，并进行相关的实证分析，有助于对控股大股东代理问题进行合理解释，并提供相关理论指导。首先，对我国控股大股东代理问题的制度背景进行了分析。在文献研究和相关理论的基础上，从制度变迁的角度对我国上市公司的所有权结构进行了考察。由于我国大部分上市公司，都是由原国有企业经过股份制改造设立而来，因此，国有股“一股独大”具有天然的制度背景。并且，这一现象在股权分置改革基本完成以后，也依然没有改变。国有股不仅一股独大，而且股权高度集中、且采用金字塔结构绝对控制。其次，对我国控股大股东代理问题进行了模型构建。按照控股大股东数目的多寡，将我国上市公司划分为单个大股东绝对控制的公司和多个大股东共同控制的公司，并将后者进一步划分为非控股大股东对控股大股东进行制衡的情况、以及控股大股东和非控股大股东进行合谋的情况。在上述分类的基础上，本文建立了单个大股东绝对控制情形下的代理问题模型，以及多个大股东共同控制情形下的代理问题模型。并分别对投资者法律保护机制、控股大股东持股比例、股权集中度等变量对控股大股东的掏空、以及对公司价值的影响进行了分析，由此得到相关命题。再次，本文对我国上市公司控股大股东代理问题的监管进行了博弈分析。独立董事作为一种内部监管机制，在和控股大股东的博弈过程中，一直处于不利的地位，独立董事的作用没有得到有效发挥。要提高独立董事的效率，就必须提高独立董事的收入水平，特别是提高独立董事的声誉收入水平，实现独立董事市场的分离均衡。而在外部监管部门和控股大股东的博弈中，监管部门监管“力度”的大小，要受到监管收入和监管成本的双重影响。提高证券监管部门监管的有效性，就必须提高证券监管部门的声誉收入，从而提高监管效率。最后，本文对我国上市公司控股大股东代理问题进行了实证检验。本文以2009--2011年度我国沪深两市上市公司为研究样本，运用SPSS统计分析工具，采用多元线性回归分析方法，对前述理论分析部分的命题和博弈分析的结论进行实证检验，验证了有关结论。同时基于上述有关结论，提出了解决中国上市公司控股大股东代理问题的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 According to the modern corporate governance theory, ownership structure is thelogical starting point of corporate governance issues. Different ownership structurearrangement can produce different agency problems. On the international scale, there aretwo different types of ownership structure and corporate governance issues: one isdecentralized equity structure. The core of corporate governance is to solve the agencyproblem between shareholders and managers.Another is relatively concentrated ownershipstructure. The core of corporate governance is to solve the controlling agency problemsbetween large shareholders and minority shareholders, which is also known as "the secondagency problem". Early research of corporate governance issues mainly focus on agencyproblem between shareholders and managers due to high dispersion equity. In recent years,with the coming of the latest evidence of the highly concentrated ownership structure, thecontrolling shareholders’ agency problems become the focus of corporate governancestudy.Most of the listed companies in China is established by the original state-ownedenterprises through restructuring. Therefore, holding big shareholders of listed companieshave the side of “paternalism ", also have the deprived side of empting the resources andencroaching on the interests of minority shareholders of listed companies. But at present,the study mainly focuses on controlling the hollowed behavior of major shareholders, andthe literature study of combining "empty" and "support" of the big holding shareholder arerare, especially the relatively slow development of the related theoretical model. Therefore,through building the unity of analysis model of "empty" and "support" of holding bigshareholder, and carrying on the empirical analysis, this paper helps to explain thecontrolling shareholder agency problem in a reasonable manner, and provide the relatedtheoretical guidance.First of all, the institutional context of China’s controlling shareholder agencyproblems were analyzed in this thesis.On the basis of literature research and theory, theownership structure of listed companies in China were studied from the perspective of institutional change. Since most of our listed companies are state-owned enterprisesthrough the establishment of joint-stock reform, dominance of state-owned shares has anatural system background. And this phenomenon still has not changed even after thebasic completion of share segregation reform. State-owned shares not only dominated,highly concentrated, and have the absolute control with pyramid structure.Secondly, the thesis have a theoretical analysis of our controlling shareholder agencyproblem. In accordance with the number of controlling shareholders, listed companies inChina are divided into absolute control of the company by single largest shareholder andcompanies jointly controlled by several large shareholders, and the latter is furtherclassified as checks and balances of non-controlling shareholders over controllingshareholders, as well as conspiracy between controlling shareholders and non-controllingshareholders. On the basis of the classification, the thesis establishes the agent modelunder the cases of absolute control by single largest shareholder as well as joint control byseveral large shareholders. And the thesis also analyzed investors legal protectionmechanisms, the controlling shareholder equity ratio, hollowed out of the controllingshareholders by equity concentration variables as well as the impact on the value ofcompanies, and at last conclude propositions.The thesis has game analysis of controlling shareholder agency problem in China’slisted companies. In China’s special system context, the controlling shareholder agencyproblem will exist for a long time. Independent directors, as an internal regulatorymechanisms, has been at a disadvantage in the process of having a game with controllingshareholders, and has not play an effective role. Income levels, especially the reputationof the independent directors, must be raised in order to improve the efficiency and realizeseparating equilibrium of independent directors market. The monitor intensity of theregulatory authorities is subjected to the double impact of the regulatory revenue andregulatory costs in the game between external regulatory authorities and the controllingshareholder. We must improve the income reputation of the securities regulatoryauthorities in order to improve the regulation effectiveness of the securities regulatoryauthorities, thereby increasing the probability of regulatory.Finally, the thesis has an empirical test on the controlling shareholder agency problems of listed companies in China.It takes China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen listedcompanies in2009-2011as samples, using the SPSS statistical analysis tools,and has anempirical test on the proposition in the theoretical analysis and the conclusion of gameanalysis with analysis method of Multiple Linear Regression.At the same time, based onthe above conclusions, this paper puts forward suggestions and policies to solve theproblem of holding large shareholders in China’s listed companies.更多还原