【作者】 李海；

【导师】 崔南方；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 随着电子商务和物流行业的迅猛发展，网上购物成为了一种主流的消费方式。而网络渠道的出现也给制造商提供了直销的便利性。直销渠道不仅给制造商提供了一个自有的销售平台，使得制造商能够直接面对消费者需求，更重要的是让制造商在一定程度上摆脱了受制于零售商的困境，并重新掌握渠道话语权。直销渠道和零售渠道并存的双营销渠道分销模式已经渗透到各行各业之中。与此相对应的是，双营销渠道模式下的供应链问题引起了企业界和学术界的广泛关注。而相比传统供应链，双渠道供应链中既有渠道之间的水平冲突问题，又有制造商和零售商的垂直冲突问题，研究任务更为复杂艰巨，存在一系列亟待解决的问题。基于此，本文综合应用消费者效用分析方法、博弈论、最优化理论与方法、讨价还价理论和仿真算例分析等方法，在直销渠道与零售渠道并存的双营销渠道背景下建立供应链模型研究了不同情境下的供应链决策问题。其中主要的研究工作如下：研究了存在退货风险的双渠道供应链中的定价和服务水平决策问题。对比分析不同环境下退货率对双渠道供应链决策的影响，进行了双渠道供应链参数对于需求分配的敏感性分析，并对退货率与渠道需求分配同时变化时不同定价模式下的利润进行了比较研究。研究表明，在双渠道供应链下，退货率对供应链的影响与定价模式、服务成本等密切相关。在两种定价模式中，制造商偏好于价格不一致模式，零售商偏好于渠道等价模式。但对于退货率较高的产品，价格不一致模式更容易成为双渠道供应链各方接受的一致选择。首次在双渠道供应链的背景下研究了批发价谈判模式问题。基于批发价协商过程中谈判方的讨价还价能力，得出了供应链成员的价格均衡决策。研究表明，批发价谈判模式的选择对制造商的利润影响并不显著，但对零售商利润和供应链利润的影响较大。在多数情况下，制造商弱偏好于以零售商的零售价为谈判基准，零售商则偏好于以制造商的直销价为谈判基准。而从供应链总利润角度出发，以制造商的直销价为谈判基准的批发价谈判更为有利。以制造商的直销价为谈判基准有可能成为双方均可接受的最优均衡谈判模式。基于制造商和零售商之间的谈判能力对比，通过博弈建模分析了三种零售价定价模式下供应链成员的价格决策和物流服务水平决策。研究表明，在制造商的谈判能力较弱的情况下，制造商统一定价模式是最优模式。在制造商的谈判能力较强的情况下，以直销价格为协商基础的分别定价模式是最优模式。在最优模式下，制造商和供应链的利润都显著占优，电子零售商提供的物流服务水平也相应最高，但电子零售商的利润受定价模式的影响不显著，最优模式也是双方接受的均衡策略。研究了两个竞争性制造商在同一传统销售渠道进行分销，领先制造商引入直销渠道形成双渠道供应链对原有供应链决策的影响问题。研究表明，领先制造商在引入网络直销渠道的决策过程中除了考虑网络直销渠道的运营成本和网络直销渠道的接受度之外，还应该充分考虑竞争对手的情况。竞争性制造商却有可能因为领先制造商的直销渠道的引入而利润得到改善，这主要来自于直销渠道的去双重边际化带来的好处，对于竞争性制造商而言，其实质是一种“搭便车”效应。更多还原

【Abstract】 With rapid development of E-commerce and logistics, shopping online becomespopular consumption style. Manufacturer’s direct sale gets much easier by the emergenceof internet channel. Direct channel provides manufacturer with a platform for sale andmakes manufacturer confront with market demand directly. What’s more, manufacturercan regain the channel power and get out of the control by retailer in the channelrelationship. The dual marketing channel mode (i.e., direct channel and retail channel) isadopted widely in many industries. Correspondingly, the problems of dual-channel supplychain are paid much attention by scholars and practitioners.Compared to traditional supplychain, there are horizontal conflict between channels and vertical conflict betweenmanufacturer and retailer. The research on dual-channel supply chain is much morecomplicated and difficult and there are still a series of problems unsolved. Based on thesynthetical application of consumer utility analysis, game theory, optimization theory andmethod, bargaining theory and simulation, this dissertation makes a systematic and deepstudy of decision problems in dual-channel supply chain in different scenarios. The mainresearch works are as follows:Decision problems of pricing and serving level in dual-channel supply chain withconsumer returns risk were studied. By numerical analysis, product return rate’s impact onsupply chain decision under different conditions were compared.Then sensitivity analysisof dual-channel supply chain’s parameters to demand allocation between channels wasmade.Finally the profits under different pricing shcemes were compared when productreturn rate and demand allocation between channels were changed simultaneously.Itshows that in the dual-channel supply chain, product return rate’s impact on supply chainrelates to pricing scheme, the cost of service and etc. The manufacturer prefers unequalpricing scheme while the retailer prefers equal pricing scheme. But for high return rateproduct, the unequal pricing scheme is more likely to be accepted by chain members.Based on the bargaining power of retailer in the wholesale price negotiation, wederived the equilibrium pricing decision made by supply chain members. The studyreveals that the choice of wholesale price bargaining strategy rarely influences manufacturer profit while having great impact on the retailer’s profit and supply chainprofit. In most cases, the manufacturer weakly prefers wholesale price negotiationadopting retail price as benchmark, but the retailer prefers wholesale price negotiationadopting direct sale price as benchmark. Wholesale price negotiation adopting direct priceas benchmark is more benefitial to supply chain profit. And wholesale price negotiationadopting direct sale price as benchmark could probably be the equilibrium optimalbargaining mode accepted by chain members.Under different bargaining power owned by manufacturer or e-tailer, the pricingdecision and logistic service level decision of supply chain member were analyzed byusing game theory under three pricing schemes. It’s found that uniform pricing decided bymanufacturer is optimal when the manufacturer’s bargaining power is weak, and unequalpricing scheme with wholesale price negotiated based on direct sale price is optimal whenthe manufacturer’s bargaining power is strong. Under these optimal pricing schemes, theprofit of supply chain and manufacturer is dominant and the logistic service level ishighest. The profit of e-tailer is slightly influenced by pricing scheme, so the optimalpricing scheme may be the equilibrium strategies accepted by chain members.Two competing manufacturers distribute their product through the same traditionalretail channel. How the introduction of online direct channel by leading manufacturerinfluences the decisions of chain members was investigated. It shows that the leadingmanufacturer not only needs to consider the operational cost in direct channel andconsumer acceptance of online channel, but also needs to consider the situation ofcompeting manufacturer. The competing manufacturer’s profit may be enhanced due tothe introduction of online direct channel by leading manufacturer, which is mainly becauseof the alleviation of the double marginalization problem by online direct channel. And inessence, it’s so-called free-riding effect for competing manufacturer.更多还原