【作者】 李铁林；

【导师】 任爱胜；

【作者基本信息】 中国农业科学院 ， 农业经济管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 农产品质量安全问题，已成为一个重大社会问题。本文运用经济学相关理论深入剖析了生产者的质量选择行为，阐述了实施农产品质量安全生产补偿的必要性，并对农户的质量安全生产意愿进行了实证分析，在借鉴国外先进经验的基础上设计了我国农产品质量安全生产补偿机制。主要研究内容与结论如下：（1）分析了我国农产品质量安全生产管理现状和国外经验。指出了我国农产品质量安全生产存在的隐患和管理存在的不足：农业生态环境形势严峻；生产者质量安全意识淡薄，生产组织程度不高；制度体系仍需完善；政府管理缺乏顶层设计，投入不足且分散。概括了发达国家的先进经验和对我国实施农产品质量安全生产补偿的启示。（2）运用博弈理论，系统分析了信息不对称下生产者质量选择行为。基于对农产品生产成本的分解，构建了不同生产者之间、生产者与监管者之间、不同区域监管者之间的博弈模型，结果表明：生产者往往希望其他生产者生产优质品，提高市场价格，自己则选择生产劣质品获得超额利润；生产者选择“优质品”的概率受到政府监管成本高和惩罚力度小的双重影响，选择“优质品”的概率较小；地方政府受着政绩考核和财政约束，希望其他区域做好农产品质量安全监管，而自己“搭便车”。（3）运用决策树模型分析了实施农产品质量安全生产补偿对生产者质量选择行为的激励作用。得出结论，通过实施农产品质量安全生产补偿，可使生产“劣质品”的收益小于生产质量安全农产品的收益，提高生产者进行质量安全生产的积极性。同时，通过对农业组织化生产提供质量生产补偿，可以引导农户参与组织化生产。（4）采用Logit模型，研究农户的质量选择意愿以及农产品质量安全生产的影响因素。结果表明，农民受教育程度、收入水平、生产成本及农民认知水平，显著影响农户生产安全农产品的意愿。通过不断提高教育水平；增加高效低毒低残留农（兽）药补贴；加强对农民培训和指导，可有效地提高农户的质量安全生产意愿。（5）系统构建了我国农产品质量安全生产补偿机制。设计了补偿目标与原则、对象与范围、方式与标准等补偿机制的基本框架。较为深入地分析了“政府补偿”、“市场补偿”和“交叉补偿”三种补偿方式的内涵与特点，并对补偿机制运转流程进行设计。最后，在组织、制度、技术、资金等方面提出了相关保障措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 The quality safety (QS) of agricultural products has been a significant social issue, which hasaroused widely concern. This article analyzed producers’ quality selection behavior in depth witheconomics correlation theory, elaborated the necessity of compensation mechanism on QS ofagricultural products. Finally, this article designed compensation system for China’s QS production ofagricultural products based on the analysis of foreign management experience. Major research contentsand conclusions are as follows:(1)Analyze the current situation of China’s agri-food QS production and management, as long asthe experience from other countries. This article pointed out the pitfalls of QS production and thedeficiencies of management of China’s agri-food: serious situation of agricultural ecologicalenvironment; weak QS consciousness of producers, low level of production organizing; incompletesystem; lack of high level design of government management, insufficient and decentralized investment.This article also summarized the advanced experience and inspirations of developed countries.(2) Using the game theory and other relevant theories, this article systematically explained qualityselection behavior of producers under information asymmetry environment. Based on different divisionsof production goals, this article constructs the game models among producers and producers, producersand regulators, regulators in different areas, which showed: producers generally expect their peers toproduce products with good quality so as to increase market price, however, they themselves prefer toproduce products with poor quality in order to obtain super profit. The probability for producers toselect products with good quality is influenced by high cost of government regulation and smallpunishment, therefore, the probability for them to choose products with good quality is small. Localgovernment is restrained by government performance examination and finance, and expects to take afree rider from excellent performance of QS production of agricultural products in other areas.(3)Employ the Decision Tree model to analyze the encouragement effect of implementingagri-food QS production compensation on quality selection behavior of producers. This articleconcluded that via applying agri-food QS production quality, the income of producing ’inferior goods’would be less than the income of producing QS agri-food, which would raise the enthusiasm ofproducers’ QS production. Meanwhile, QS production compensation on agricultural organizedproduction could lead the farmers to participate in the organized production.(4) Using the method of the Logit model to analyze the quality selection willingness of farmers andaffecting factors of QS production of agricultural products. The result of model shows, it is the farmers’level of education, level of income, the production cost of the QS production and cognitive level offarmers. It is sure to effectively improve the willingness among farmers to produce safe agriculturalproducts with the constantly improved farmers’ education level, increased subsidy for pesticide andveterinary medicine with high efficient and low poison residuals, strengthened relevant training onfarmers and guidance in markets.(5) Construct the agricultural products’ QS compensation system in China systematically. Thearticle designed the basic framework of compensation system, including target, principle, object, extent, method and standard. This article analyzed the implications and features of government compensation,market compensation and cross compensation and designed the compensation process and theorganization and management of compensation. Finally, this article put forward relevant safeguards inorganization, institution, technology, capital and so on.更多还原