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地方国有资本运营法制探索

Legal Explore on Local State-owned Capital Operation

【作者】 丁传斌

【导师】 顾功耘;

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 , 经济法学, 2013, 博士

【摘要】 在我国社会主义制度下,国有资产发挥着举足轻重的作用,它是社会主义制度建设的物质基础,对我国经济发展乃至政治生活都有巨大影响。新中国建立以来,对国有资产的管理始终是我国经济发展中的重要任务。在计划经济条件下,国有企业的发展始终受制于体制而存在很多不可克服的弊端,虽然经过多次中央与地方的行政分权,但国有企业一直都没有摆脱政府附庸的地位。随着改革开放进程的推进,产权改革、建立现代企业制度等有关国有企业改革的举措有力促进了国有资产的发展。近年来,对国有资产的管理逐渐从对具体企业的管理、对企业经营的干预向国有资本的运营转变,国有资产的载体从具体企业向资本运营转变。因应这种趋势,在管理部门不断加强对国资运营规范的同时,学界对国有资本运营给予了高度关注。作为整个国资系统的组成部分,地方国有资产的管理和国有资本的运营对于国资的整体发展和地方政府行为规范发挥着不可替代的作用。如何合理、合法运营地方国有资本是一个值得研究的课题。目前,受制于“分税制”财政体制,地方政府面临着财权与事权不平衡的境地。如何扩大财源、如何获取政绩是地方政府尤为关注的问题,而在地方不能发行政府公债、土地财政又遭受宏观调控而无法持续的情况下,通过所掌握的国有资产创造财政来源、获取政绩,成为地方政府关注的重点,大量地方融资平台的涌现即是明证。由于运营目标设定不当,地方国有资本运营存在很多问题亟待规范。从中央与地方关系看,如何充分调动地方积极性和避免地方政府的过度竞争,在集权与分权之间需要做好平衡,这也说明了研究地方国有资本运营制度的重要性。目前的地方国有资本运营体制,是在“统一所有,分级代表”的前提下建立的。地方政府在运营国有资本时只能根据中央授予的权限进行制度设计和调整。随着国有企业产权制度改革向纵深推进,传统的地方国有资产管理体制与运营体制客观上急需进行改革,以适应建立现代企业制度的需要。十八大报告中再次提出充分发挥中央与地方积极性的要求,在地方国有资产管理和运营中,如何进行资本的运营以带来财政收入是目前地方政府更为关心的问题。而“分级代表”制度下,地方政府在运营国有资本时较受限制,希望能有较大的自主权。理论界对此认为,“分级所有”是较为可取的方式。如何在“分级所有”体制下进行地方国有资本运营的制度设计也就成为需要研究的问题。本文围绕构建地方国有资本运营系统这一中心问题,在对现行地方国资运营状况作出分析评价的基础上,以坚持社会主义制度和发展、完善市场经济为指导,吸收、借鉴其他国家国有资本运营制度的有益经验,以国有资本运营理论构建、运营机构设置、运营模式设计、运营监管、运营收益分配为主线,设计出以产权关系为纽带、运营主体明确、目标层次分明的地方国有资本运营模式。在行文时,为能详细解构地方国有资本运营的历史、现状及国有资本运营制度包含的内容,从而针对性地对地方国有资本运营进行制度设计,本文没有采用理论基础—历史和现状—国外借鉴—制度改革的常见论文写作模式,而是首先在界定相关概念和概述地方国有资本运营状况的基础上,分析地方国有资本运营的主要影响因素,按照国有资本运营模式、主体、监督、分配的内容分章论述。应当承认,这种写作方式能够较为完整地论述地方国有资本运营的制度设计,但也减弱了文章结构的紧凑性。按照这个思路,全文可分为三个部分。第一部分,即第一章,首先从基础概念入手对国有资产、国有资本、地方国有资本等作出界定,分析地方国有资本的属性及其功能定位,对地方国有资本运营和地方国有资本运营法制的概念作出界定;在系统分析地方国资分布和运营状况之后,阐释现行体制下地方国有资本运营的效果及存在的弊端和暴露出的问题,说明地方国资运营还需要进一步改革。第二部分为第二章和第三章,本部分探讨地方国有资本运营的主要制约因素,即中央与地方产权关系、地方政府职能定位对地方国有资本运营的影响。第二章从中央与地方产权关系入手,通过回顾传统“统一所有,分级管理”及现行“统一所有,分级代表”制度,分析其中隐藏的弊端。对于目前的中央与地方产权关系,从中央与地方关系的宪法视角、委托代理理论、地方国有资产的实践需求方面论证了实行“分级所有”的合理性和优势。第三章论述地方政府职能转变与地方国有资本运营的关系。在目前“分税制”财政体制下,中央与地方财权与事权呈现不平衡状态,地方在财政减缩的同时还需要承担过重的公共服务职能。面对这种状况,作为公法主体的地方政府在行使国有资产所有者职能时兼具了私法主体身份,地方政府也就具有了“经济人”的属性。也就是说,地方政府在运营国有资本时会利用控制的现有资源最大化自身的利益,造成国有资本的全民属性减损或丧失。为此,地方政府职能急需转变。在有限性政府的目标模式下,地方政府在国有资本运营中需做好公权、调控、管制、监督等角色。第三部分包括第四章到第八章,是对地方国有资本独立运营体系的构建,分别从地方国有资本运营的主体、模式、监督及国有资本经营预算制度展开。第四章从国有资产管理体制与地方国有资本运营关系的角度架构地方国有资本独立运营体系。从整体上说,国有资本运营是国有资产管理体制的一部分,是管理、运营、监督中的一个环节。在现行以国资委为出资人代表的国有资产管理体制下,由于国资委的定位和职能承担没有能够完全实现政企分开、为全民创造福利的目标,因此必须根据国有资产的全民属性重新设计国有资产管理体制和国有资本运营体系。在新的国有资本运营体系下,宜将国有资产出资人职能分解为投资的决策、执行和监督三个部分:将投资的预算决策权赋予人大以体现终极所有者的权利,由财政部门具体执行投资的预决算;明确定位国有资产监管机构的职能,将其作为政府机构和统一执法主体行使对国有资产的政府监督权;设立独立运营的国有资本运营公司,并根据国有资本存在领域分类设立,实现与政府的分离,真正作为私法主体参与市场,按照市场化方式运营国有资本。第五章从现行国有资产授权经营模式出发,研究“两层次”与“三层次”运营以及分类运营的制度设计。在地方国有资本主要存在于非竞争性领域的情况下,宜以授权经营为主,实施分类、分层运营。本章对目前实践中热议的地方国资委直接持股形成“两层次”运营和地方金融类国有资产本运营作了分析。第六章分别从宏观构建和微观治理方面对地方国有资本运营的主体,即国有资本运营公司,作出探讨。本部分首先分析了目前地方政府构建国有资本经营公司时存在的问题,对引人注目的地方政府投融资平台作了探讨,建议分类、分层次设立独立运营的地方国有资本运营公司。在微观上,构建以董事会为中心的公司治理结构,合理处理董事会、党委会、经理层之间的关系。第七章为对地方国有资本运营监督的探讨。目前,地方国有资本运营监督形成了以国资委为主导的监督格局,但国资委出资人监督和政府行政监督职能不分,其定位依然不清。在其他监督方式中,行政监督面临立法真空和实践中的交叉情形,而人大监督、司法监督和社会监督一直处于薄弱地位。建构合理而强势的监督体系对地方国有资本运营大有裨益,为此需强化人大的监督,弥补政府监督立法空白、回归国资委的监督角色,加强国有企业的信息披露维护社会公众的知情权,确保司法监督独立地位、建立国有资产公益诉讼制度。第八章是对国有资本经营预算制度的探讨。国有资本经营预算对于国有资本运营起到投资决策、收益分配的作用。国有资本经营预算目前还很不完善,地方政府对国有资本经营预算做了较多的探索,在取得较多成绩的同时也有许多值得再讨论的空间,如国有资本经营预算与公共财政的衔接、国有资本经营预算编制主体的选择、国有资本经营预算的收支范围、国有资本经营预算的监督等。

【Abstract】 The State-owned capital, the foundation of economic base of socialism whichplays a central role under the current political construction of China, has tremendousinfluence over economic development as well as political life. The state-owned capitaloperation has become the central task of developing state-owned economy ever sincethe establishment of the People’s Republic of China. The state-owned enterprise hasalways been subject to the system and there are many insurmountable drawbacks inthe period of planning economy. Although after a number of central and localadministrative decentralization, the state-owned enterprises have not been able to getrid of being the governmental appendages. As the process of reform and opening up,the reform of property rights, as well as establishing a modern enterprise system andother initiatives has effectively promote the state-owned assets. In recent years, themanagement of state-owned assets gradually transits from the management of single,discrete enterprise, as well as the intervention of the enterprise business to theoperations of state-owned enterprises. The carrier of state-owned assets has changedfrom specific enterprise to capital operation. In response to this trend, academia hasgiven great attention to the operations of state-owned capital while the managedepartment has continuously strengthen the regulation of state-owned capitaloperation.As a part of the state-owned system, the management of local state-owned assetsand operations of state-owned capital plays an irreplaceable role for the overalldevelopment of the State-owned capital and regulation of local government behavior.It’s a worthy subject to research on how to reasonable and legitimate operate localstate-owned capital. Currently, the local government is facing unbalanced situation oflegal division of the responsibilities and the authority of finance between the central and the local government, in subject to the existing tax federalism system. Localgovernment is particularly concerned about the way to expand the financial revenue,as well as obtain political achievements. Since the local government cannot issue thegovernment bonds, and land financial has been suffering from financialmacro-economic control and thus becomes unsustainable, it becomes the focus oflocal government to create financial revenue and obtain political achievementsthrough the grasp of state-owned assets, and this is evidenced by the emergence of alarge number of local financing platforms. There are a lot of problems for the localstate-owned capital operation and should be standardized, due to the improper settingof operational goal.From the relationship between central and local government, how to fullymobilize local enthusiasm and avoid excessive competition among local governments,as well as making the balance between centralization and decentralization, shows theimportance of research over the local state-owned capital operation system. Thepresent local state-owned capital operation system is established over the premise ofthe “grading representatives”. The operations of state-owned capital system designand adjustment by the local government can only in accordance with the permissiongranted by the central government. In order to accommodate the need for theestablishment of a modern enterprise system as the deepened reformation of propertyrights of state-owned enterprises, the conventional local state-owned assetsmanagement and operating system is objectively needed to reform. The report of18thCentral Committee of Communist Party of China again brought the requirement ofgiving full play to the initiative of the central and local government. Among the localstate-owned assets management and operations, it is more concerned for the currentlocal government to bring fiscal revenue via the capital operations. Operation of localgovernment for the state-owned capital is quite restricted under the system of "grading representatives”, and is desired to have greater autonomy. For this reason,theorists believe that the “hierarchical ownership of state-owned capital”is a moredesirable way. Thus, how to design the local state-owned capital operation under“hierarchical ownership” system has becomes a necessary topic to study.This paper, focused on the central issue of building the local state-owned capitaloperational system, has designed a local state-owned capital operation mode, which islinked to the relationship between ownership and operator, with a definite targetsubject and explicit target structure. It is based on the analysis and evaluation of the current local situation of state-owned capital operation, with the guidance ofadherence of socialist system, development and improvement of market economy.Also, it absorbs and learns the beneficial state-owned capital operation system designfrom other countries, with the main line to build a theory of state-owned capitaloperation, operator’s institutional settings, operating model design, operationsupervision, and operating earnings distribution. The paper can be divided into threeparts:The first part, namely the first chapter, starts from the basic concepts to definethe state-owned assets, the state capital, the local state-owned assets, and analyzes theproperties of the local state-owned assets, dynamical identification of localstate-owned assets, as well as their functional orientation, definition of concepts andprinciples of state-owned capital operation. After the systematic analyze oflocalization of local state-owned assets, as well as their operational status,it interpretthe effects and drawbacks of the current system of local state-owned capital operationand the problems exposed to illustrate the necessity for the further reform of localstate-owned operators.The second part is from Chapter II to Chapter III, this section discusses theconstraints of the local state-owned capital operation, which is the relationshipbetween central and local property, functional position of the local government.Chapter II starts with the relationship between central and local property, byreviewing the traditional "unified, hierarchical management” and the current “unified,hierarchical representative” system, and analyze its hidden drawbacks. For the currentrelationship of central and local property, it demonstrates the rationality andadvantages of implement the “the hierarchical ownership of state-owned capital”based on the constitutional perspective of the relationship between the central andlocal government, principal-agent theory, and practical needs of the local state-ownedassets.Chapter III is the relationship between the local government functionalconversions to the local state-owned capital operation. Under the current “taxfederalism system”, the central and local financial/administrative authority presents anunbalanced state that the local governments need to bear a disproportionate share ofpublic service with fiscal reduction. Faced with this situation, the local government, apublic law subjective has in parallel the identity of subjects to the private law in theexercise of the functions of the owner of the state-owned assets, in this way; the local governments will have the attributes of “economic man”. In other words, in theoperations of state-owned capital, the local government will use the control ofexisting resources to maximize their own interests, which would cause thenullification or impairment of the universal property of the state-owned capital. Forthis reason, the function of the local government is in an urgent need to be changed.Under the target mode of limited government, local governments need to play anadequate role of the public service functions, regulation, control, and supervision inthe state-owned capital operation.The third part consists Chapter IV to Chapter VIII, which systematicallydesigned the main body, mode, supervision, and budget system of the localstate-owned capital operation respectively.The chapter IV explores the relationship between the state-owned assetsmanagement system and the local state-owned capital operation. Generally speaking,the state-owned capital operation is a part of the state-owned assets managementsystem, as a link of management, operation, and supervision. Under the currentstate-owned assets management system during which the SASAC is on behalf ofpromoter representative, it has to re-design the state-owned assets managementsystem and state-owned capital operation system based on the universal property ofthe state-owned assets, since the SASAC could not be able to separate governmentfrom enterprises, due to the orientation of its positioning and functions undertaken.Under the new system of state-owned capital operation, it’s more advantaged todecompose the functions of the state-owned assets investment to decision-making,execution and supervision of investment. The National People’s Congress should begiven the right to decide the investment budget in order to materialize the rights forultimate owner, the budget and final accounts of investment should be specificallyimplemented by the financial department. As the government agencies and uniformedenforcement body, the state-owned assets supervision institutions should have a clearposition of the functions to exercise the rights of governmental supervision ofstate-owned assets; Establish the independent state-owned capital operating company,classified according to the existing field of state-owned capital, with the separation ofthe government, and act as a real subject from private law to participate in the market,operate according to market-oriented manner.Chapter V studies the “two-level” and “three-tier” operators as well as thesystem design of classified operating based on the current authorized operation model by state-owned assets. In case that the local state-owned capital is mainly presented inthe non-competitive field, it should be mainly in the way of authorized operation, withappropriate classification and stratification. This chapter also analyzes the “two-level”operator formed by the direct share holding of local SASAC and the local financialState-owned Assets Operation.Chapter VI discusses the subjective of local state-owned assets, the state-ownedcapital operating company from the macro construction and micro governance. Thissection first analyzes the problems existing in the construction of the state-ownedasset management companies by the local government, discussed the compelling localgovernment financing platform, and recommends the establishment of independentoperating company of local state-owned capital according to different hierarch andclassification. In micro-scale, establish the corporate governance structure in thecenter of the Board of Directors, and to fairly deal with the relationship among boardof Directors, the party committee and the management.Chapter VII explores the supervision of the local state-owned capital operation.At present, the local state-owned capital operation supervision relies mainly on thesupervision led by the SASAC. However, the functions of SASAC investorsupervision and Government administrative supervision are still indistinct, with itsunclear definition. Over other methods of supervision, administrative supervision isfacing the legislative vacuum and cross-case in practice, while the National People’sCongress, judicial supervision and social supervision, has continuously been in aweak position. To construct the reasonable and strong supervision system greatlybenefits the local state-owned capital operation. Thus it’s needed to strengthen thesupervision of the National People’s Congress, make up for the deficiency ofgovernmental supervision, regress the supervisory role of SASAC, strengthen thedisclosure of information of state-owned enterprises to safeguard the public’sknow-rights, ensure the independence of the judicial supervision, and establish thelitigation system of state-owned assets of public interest.Chapter VIII discusses the system of state-owned capital operation budget. Thestate-owned capital operation budget plays the role as investment decision-making,revenue distribution in the operation of state-owned capital. It is far beyondsatisfactory for the state-owned capital operation budget, the local governments hasmade many exploration to the state-owned capital operation budget. There are manydiscussible spaces as long as great achievement has been made, such as the convergence of state-owned capital operation budget to the public finance, selectionof the main budget management of state-owned capital operation, revenue andexpenditure range of the state-owned capital operation budget, the direction ofinvestment and expenditure of the state-owned capital operation budget, and thesupervision of state-owned capital operation budget, etc. The problems of whether thelocal governments can issue bonds associated with the state-owned capital operationbudget. In case that it’s not able to fully liberalize the local bond issuance, theinvestment and financing platforms of local governments, in behave of the debt ofstate-owned assets, need to be constrained by the state-owned capital operationbudget.

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