【作者】 黄志瑾；

【导师】 刘晓红；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 国际法学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 本文旨在研究中国国有投资者在境外投资中面临的法律问题，从国有投资者与东道国、国有投资者与母国、投资者母国与东道国这三组法律关系入手，从解决问题与理论探讨相结合的角度深入分析中国国有投资者在对外直接投资中的法律问题及应对措施。导言部分提出本文研究的问题及其重要意义，对现有研究作文献综述和对研究对象作界定，正文分四章对该问题展开论述。第一章对国有投资者的理论加以梳理，为整篇论文的研究对象奠定了概念性的理论基础。第一节首先从欧盟、英国、新加坡、新西兰和美国等不同国家的立法例入手，研究其他国家立法例对国有企业的定义，以比较中西方对国有企业定义的不同；第二节对中国国有企业公司制改革后从国有企业到国家出资企业概念的确立进行了梳理，厘清中国法律对国有投资者的概念界定；第三节从国际法的角度出发梳理国有企业国家属性的界定，通过对ICSID、WTO和《联合国国家及其财产管辖豁免公约》入手，探讨各国际组织对国有/国家实体与私营实体间区分的标准，以判断国有投资者在进入国际法范畴后的界定问题，国际组织对国有实体的界定受该国际组织宗旨的影响，ICSID更注重实体活动的本质，WTO偏重的则为是否行使政府职能，《联合国国家及其财产管辖豁免公约》的标准更加宽松，只要是独立法人即可。在研究完界定标准后，第三节还进一步以美国最高法院判例为基础研究了判断“国有”的“两步”方法论。第二章从国有投资者与东道国的法律关系入手，探讨了国有投资者的东道国法制，解决中国国有投资者因为其国有属性在东道国面临的法律问题及应对对策。第一节对市场准入前国民待遇的基本理论做了阐述，分析了美国、加拿大和澳大利亚等投资东道国在投资准入阶段的相关投资审查措施，对国有投资者的更为严格的审查程序和标准；第二节结合当前的投资实践，研究美国国家安全审查的可诉性分析，包括美国国内司法途径和WTO争端解决途径；第三节研究投资进入东道国后享有的投资待遇问题，重点探讨针对国有投资者的投资待遇例外。第三章从国有投资者与投资母国的法律关系入手，研究投资母国，即中国对国有投资者的投资监管。第一节梳理了中国境外投资的法律渊源，回顾了中国境外投资的立法史，并总结了境外投资现行立法的特点；第二节探讨了对国有投资者境外投资行为的监管和对境外投资国有资产的监管；第三节研究了国有投资者在境外投资过程中的公司治理问题，以解决国有投资者在跨境治理中的治理结构。分析了国有企业在跨境经营中的不公平竞争问题，在此基础上总结了国有投资者的境外治理结构，并在上述理论分析上构建了中国国有投资者在境外投资中的跨境治理。第四章从国有投资者母国和东道国的国际法律关系入手，研究国有投资者的国际法制问题，立足于中国在双多边投资协定中的立场及应对。第一节解析了“国有投资者”在国际法上的内涵；第二节着重于中美双边投资协定中的国有投资者议题，以2012年美国BIT范本为研究对象，分析了该范本对中国国有投资者“走出去”战略的影响及其产生的原因，并对中国在中美投资协定谈判中的立场和对策提出若干建议；第三节探讨了多边投资协定中的竞争中立规则，在分析了竞争中立的造法过程后，对中国政府在国际立法层面维护中国国有投资者利益提出了具体的政策性建议：我国应当保持时刻关注，参与这一国际造法过程，尽可能多地争取符合我国利益的国际规则的实现，并在双多边国际投资协定的进一步发展中明确界定国有投资者的定义，给予国有投资者与私营投资者同样的待遇。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation aims to study the legal issues about overseas investments ofChinese state-owned investors. It focuses on three legal relationships, the relationshipbetween state-owned investors and the host country, the relationship betweenstate-owned investors and the home country, the relationship between investors’ homecountry and host country, and tries to solve problems and discussed from the angle ofcombining theory analysis Chinese state-owned investors in foreign direct investmentin the legal problems and countermeasures. After briefly introducing the issues whichwill be explored on later, pointing out their significance, and defining the object ofstudy, this dissertation will discuss them in the following chapters from five aspects.Chapter one defines the concept of state-owned investors on the general theoryof disclosure requirements for patent application, establishing the foundation for thewhole dissertation. This chapter clarifies the meanings of SOE from differentlegislative cases, including EU, Britain, Singapore, New Zealand and the US. Itfurther examines the “state-invested enterprises” in the context of Chinese legalsystem. It also examines the conception of state entity from the perspective ofinternational law through the ICSID, WTO and the UN Convention on JurisdictionalImmunity of States and Their Property. The dissertation distinguishes the public entityand private entity by putting it into international law context. The ICSID pays moreattention on the entities’ physical activities while the WTO lays particular stress onthe governmental function, and the UN Convention has a looser standard which is thatit does not account as a governmental branch only if the entity is an independent legalentity. It further studies the methodology of how to judge state-owned.Chapter two proceeds to conduct studies on the state-owned investor host staterelationship. Thus to settle the legal obstacles and find the countermeasures forstate-owned investors when investing in the host countries. Section I reviews thenational treatment on the pre-establishment stage and its execptions. Section IIanalyses the national security review practice in the United States, Canada andAustralia and other countries. It shows that the state-owned investors apply morestrict vetting procedures and standards. Combining with the current investmentpractices, Section II also examines whether the national security are under the judicial review both under the U.S. and the WTO. It also concludes that it is better to solve itin the domestic judicial way than in the WTO. Section III overviews the investmenttreatment after the investment entering into host countries and discusses theexceptions for state-owned investors.Chapter three studies the state-owned investors home countries relationship,namely, SOI China. It focuses on home countries’ supervision on the investmentactivities and state-owned assets. Section I overviews China’s sources of law ofoverseas investment. There is no complete independent systematic legal system forChina’s state-owned investors. Even for the overall overseas investment system, thereis still no high level central legislation. Section II explores the state-owned investorinvestment regulatory and state-owned assets regulatory system. Section III overviewsthe corporate governance during the oversea investment. Based on the OECD seriesReports, Section III clarifies unfair competition issues of the state-owned enterprise,summarizes the overseas governance structures of the state-owned investors. Aftermaking the theoretical analysis, Section III tries to build the cross-border governanceof Chinese state-owned investors during their overseas investments.Chapter four focuses on investment home countries host countries relationship.It focuses on the international investment agreements involving state-owned investors,especially on China’s standpoint for multilateral and bilateral investment treatiesnegotiations in the coming future. The United States is treating competition neutralityas the weapon to kill Chinese state-owned enterprises’ overseas investment in theinternational legal society. The international law making process of competitionneutrality has already started in the OECD and the TPP. China should keep pay closeattention to the international law making process of competitive neutrality andparticipate in it as much as possible to conform to the interests of the our country.China shall also participate in this negotiation with a comparatively tough attitude,and strives for the realization of international rules for the best interest of China aspossible.更多还原