【作者】 李晓郛；

【导师】 贺小勇；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 国际法学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 2002年,美国国内多个组织,比如健全美元联盟(Coalition for a Sound Dollar)、公平货币联盟(Fair Currency Alliance)先后宣称,由于中国政府的操纵行为,人民币汇率较经过购买力平价(purchasing power parity)计算出的“真实汇率”(real exchange rate)严重低估,阻碍了美国产品的对华出口,进而形成美中之间上千亿美元的贸易逆差,属于违反国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Found,以下简称“IMF”)、世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization,以下简称“WTO”)等规则的行为,要求美国政府积极交涉乃至通过国际法、国内法解决。部分经济学者则用数据推动或者支持国内舆论,比如经济政策研究所(Economic Policy Institute)的斯考特(Robert E. Scott)于2010年撰文,“从2001年到2008年,美国失去或者被替代240万个岗位,包括2008年的91,400个岗位。”到了2012年,斯考特继续发布报告“从2001年到2011年,超过270万个岗位因为美中之间的贸易赤字而减少或者被替代,大约76.9%的岗位是制造业,超过同期美国制造业失业人口的一半”。美国国会议员也不“淡定”了,针对人民币汇率机制提出各种法案,从法律层面施压中国政府。第一章“美国国会汇率法案对人民币汇率机制的法律指控与折射出的国际法问题”。本章是全文的基础性章节,首先对2002年至今美国国会汇率法案进行总体概述和介绍。以国会历年法案的内容和国会的态度为区分点,美国议员在人民币汇率问题L的表现可以分为4个阶段。纵观美国国会法案的内容,国会议员针对人民币汇率争端的(拟)处理途径可以分为国内途径和国际途径。国内途径(直接方法)则主要是通过征收反倾销、反补贴税等措施,以制裁手段要求中国政府改革人民币汇率形成机制；国际途径(间接方法)主要是通过IMF、WTO等国际机构,以多边的方式强迫人民币大幅度升值。值得关注的一点是,比起行政机关,美国国会处理人民币汇率争端的手段更加单边化。由于汇率问题具有天然的国际法属性,因此包括《IMF协定》、WTO及其涵盖协议在内的一系列国际法就成为衡量美国国会汇率法案合法性的主要依据。总的来说,美国国会汇：率法案主要涉及以下几个问题：第一,货币(汇率)主权。当前的国际社会,-国政府的汇率主权是否受到限制以及受到何种限制,这是美国能否干预人民币汇率机制的核心问题。第二,国际汇率争端的管辖权。第三,将金融问题贸易化的举措以及国际(汇率)问题国内化的做法是否得到法律支持?第二章“美国在IMF规则下指控人民币汇率机制的合法性分析”。考察当前中国的汇率主权,IMF规则是最重要的法律依据。在国际法框架下,国家汇率主权经历了“自由—强约束—再次自由—软约束”的演绎。牙买加体系是随着1978年4月1日《IMF协定(第2次修正案)》的生效而诞生的一种新的并且沿用至今的国际货币制度。从会员国权利进行考察,中国享有汇率制度选择的自由；从会员国义务进行考察,中国的行为符合《IMF协定》下的“软约束”义务,包括实体性义务和程序性义务。2007年IMF执行董事会发布了《对成员国政策双边监督的决定》,试图以市场力量作为判断均衡(真实)汇率的依据,但是其法律性质属于指导性文件,不具有国际法的约束力。更何况《对成员国政策双边监督的决定》增加了主观目的要素,为中国政府在汇率问题上的抗辩增加了新依据。虽然美国国会汇率法案得到部分经济学家的支持,但是本文不认为美国政府能够自行设立均衡汇率标准,进而指责和施压中国人民币汇率机制。本章特别指出,纵观美国历年国会的法案,对人民币汇率的金融法指控核心要点都是中国政府导致汇率失衡,但是1MF在判断和监督会员国是否履行义务过程中存在的一大难题就是对汇率机制缺乏强有力的衡量标准或者计算均衡汇率的公式。这也是中国政府坚持现今人民币汇率机制的一大依据。第三章“美国在WTO规则下指控人民币汇率机制的合法性分析”。本章第1节首先讨论了WTO/DSB管辖人民币汇率争端的可能性。WTO/DSB受理争端的基础是成员方之间的贸易纠纷或者和贸易相关的纠纷,加上DSU相关条文的内容以及DSB处理争端案件的实践,WTO/DSB很有可能受理美国政府提交的汇率争端。在人民币汇率机制与GATT1994第15.4条义务的协调问题上,一方面,即便贸易自由化是GATT条款意图中的一个,也不可能得出人民币汇率机制阻碍GATT条款意图的结论。事实上,人民币汇率机制作为阻碍GATT条款意图的措施是存在争议的。因为人民币汇率机制帮助中国实现机构改革,从而促进了中国的贸易自由化。另一方面，假定人民币汇率机制属于贸易措施,它也没有阻碍IMF条款意图的实现。在人民币汇率机制和反倾销、反补贴的界限问题上,即使在执行上有自己的做法,美国国内采取反倾销措施、反补贴措施的核心法律要素与WTO规则相同,因此这两个部分主要以WTO规则进行探讨。人民币汇率不属于影响价格的可比性差异,加上《反倾销协议》是以具体产品作为反倾销对象的,因此,美国政府若要以人民币币值低估为由对中国输美产品实施反倾销,那么,就需要一项一项开展针对不同产品的反倾销调查,这种情况更多的是理论上的估算。况目,中国输美产品不可能都对美国国内产业造成损害。将人民币汇率与反补贴措施挂钩是美国国会长期倚重的措施。虽然《中国入世议定书》第15条、美国国内法判例给予美国政府对中国输美产品征收反补贴税表面上的法律依据,但是在判断补贴的要件上：首先,人民币汇率形成机制受到政府的干预,可能会被认定为“公共资金向私人的流动”,进而被当做财政资助；其次,由十全球各地人民币汇率基本一致,难以另行确定“自由市场”的人民币汇率,因此不能强行将人民币汇率认定为“被授予的一项利益”；最后,由于所有企业使用相同的汇率,并且单纯以增加出口为由不足以充分证明人民币汇率与出口实绩相连,因此不符合专向性的要求。即便美国国内一些人士曲解DSB相关案例,也无法认定人民币汇率属于事实上的补贴占。最后,部分美国国会议员希冀十在WTO/DSB提出“非违法之诉”压迫中国政府大幅度升值人民币汇率，通过对WTO规则和GNTT/DSB(?)决报告的分析，由于启动“非违法之诉”的要求是“利益的减损”,小考虑是否属于符合WTO涵盖协议的措施，人民币汇率机制符合“非违法之诉”成立的第1个要件——“措施”。但是美国国会的指控不符合“非违法之诉”成立的第2个要件，因为申诉方应当是产品出口国而非美国这个产品进口国，加上美国政府在WTO/DSB难以证明美国遭受“不可预见”的利益损失这个令“非违法之诉”成立的第3个要件。因此，本章认为在WTO框架下针对人民币汇率机制提出的4种指控，尽管能得到部分经济学家的支持，但是在国际法层面上并无充分依据。第四章“美国国会将人民币汇率问题复杂化的法律分析”。美国国会近期的汇率法案内容不仅涵盖了之前汇率问题贸易化的举措，而且在其他内容上有新变化，比如把汇率问题作为不授予“市场经济地位”的制裁手段：把汇率问题作为反对中国加入《政府采购协议》的制裁手段：把汇率问题作为禁止国际投资的制裁手段：把汇率问题作为压制中国参与全球金融治理的制裁手段。通过本章第1节的分析，美国国会拟采取的几中制裁手段，由于汇率问题都不是决定因素，因此中美双方存在谈判的空间。本章第2节从提案人的影响力、国内利益集团物不同态度，总统奥巴马连任后的方针、群众示威运动以及主流媒体的态度5个方面预测了法案通过的可能性。美国国会将人民币汇率问题复杂化的表现反映出议员实际上对于通过单边解决人民币汇率争端并无信心和把握，力图通过“组合拳”的方式，进一步压制中国政府、强迫人民币大幅度升值本文预测今后美国国会肯定还将出现针对人民币汇率的法案、法案的内容将类似《2011年贷币汇率监督改革法案》这样包含国际金融、国际贸易、国际投资等内容，但是法案成为法律的概率很小。第五章“中美人民币汇率争端的应对之策”。尽管人民向汇率机制在国际法框架下其有合法性，中国拥有确定人民币均衡汇率的主权：但是研究人民币汇率问题不能仅仅局限于法律层面，还要联系国际关系层面的博弈，尤其是美国对人民币汇率压力度问题。中美人民向汇率争端来自于经济全球化、金融全球化，争端的解决不但要依靠法律手段，从长远来看，还要依靠国际经济、金融形势的发展和改革的成果。如果从表面看，中美人民币汇率争端与当年美日汇率争端同出一辙，都是因为两国存在长期贸易顺差所致：但深入分析后发现：由于中关贸易具有很强的互补性；屮国入阯承诺为缓解中美贸鉍不平衡提供了相应的法律保障；中国维护汇率i权的独立性等因素的存在，美国对中p丨汇率压力要远远小于当年其对FI本的压力。对丁-芙W要求人民币升值的丨上：力，除在国际法层面提出抗辩外，还要从关国国会内部、中国自身经济结构、发展模式、软实力等方面进行适当的调整，以减缓相应正力。更多还原

【Abstract】 Chapter One is "International law issues and legal allegation from the U.S. Congress currency exchange rate bills." As a basic part, this chapter makes a general overview and introduction of the U.S. Congress currency exchange rate bills from2002. According to the contents of the bills and the attitude of the U.S. Congress, these currency exchanges rate bills can be divided into four stages. Throughout the contents of the currency exchange rate bills, the pathways from the congress members to settlement of Sino-US disputes over currency exchange rate can be divided into domestic channels and international channels. Domestic routes (direct method), are mainly by imposing anti-dumping, countervailing duties and other measures or sanctions in order to force Chinese government to reform of the RMB exchange rate formation mechanism, while international routes (indirect method) are mainly through the IMF rules, the WTO rules and other international laws, multilateral ly forcing a significant appreciation of RMB. Noteworthy point is that, compared to the executive authorities, the pathways of the U.S. Congress for settlement of Sino-US disputes over currency exchange rate are more unilaterally. As a natural property of international law, people need IMF agreements, WTO agreements and other international laws when considering the legitimacy of the U.S. Congress currency exchange rate bills. Generally, the Sino-US disputes over currency exchange rate are mainly related to the following issues:firstly, the currency (exchange rate) sovereignty. In the international community, a government’s currency sovereignty is limited and subject to what limits, this is the core issue of whether the United States can intervene in the RMB exchange rate mechanism and even China’s internal affairs. Secondly, the jurisdiction of the international exchange rate disputes. Thirdly, is it legal that a government uses the trade measures to settle the financial issues or the domestic measures to settle the international issues?Chapter Two is "Legal analysis of U.S. challenging the RMB exchange rate mechanism under the IMF articles". When it comes to Chinese currency sovereignty, the IMF articles are the most important elements of international monetary laws. This chapter first examines the legal history of the international monetary system. In the framework of international monetary laws, the sovereignty of a national exchange rate experiences a "free-strongly constrained-free again-softly constrained" life. In1978. the Second Amendment which marked the end of the par value system--incorporated the current version of Article IV into the IMF articles. The amended version of Article IV reflects a shift in objective from achieving a stable exchange rate to achieving a stable exchange rate system. Under the IMF articles. China enjoys the freedom of choosing any currency exchange rate regime if Chinese actions are consistent with the "soft" obligations, including the substantive obligations and procedural obligations. In2007. the IMF Hxecutive Board issued Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members’Policies, using market forces to determine the equilibrium (real) exchange rate, but the document is a guidance-type file, which does not have the binding force. This chapter specifically points out that different estimation methods are subject to different assumptions and measurement uncertainties. Exchange arrangement refers to the method a member adopts to determine the value of its currency. Thus, as presently drafted, China is in compliance with the IMF articles. Chapter Three is "Legal analysis of U.S. challenging the RMB exchange rate mechanism under the WTO rules". This chapter first discusses the jurisdiction of Sino-US disputes over currency exchange rate under the WTO/DSB rules. WTO/DSB accepts trade disputes or trade-related disputes. According to the relevant provisions of DSU and the practice of the DSB cases, WTO/DSB may accept Sino-US disputes over currency exchange rate. Coordination on the issue of the RMB exchange rate mechanism with Article15.4of GATT1994obligations, the paper argues that, even if people accept trade liberalization is one of the GAIT intentions, it is impossible to reach the conclusion of the RMB exchange rate mechanism hindering the GATT Terms intent. The RMB exchange rate mechanism is to help achieve institutional reform, so as to promote China’s trade liberalization. But even assuming the RMB exchange rate mechanism belongs to the trade measures, it does not hinder the realization of the IMF Terms of intent. RMB exchange rate does not belong to "differences which affect price comparability" coupled with the Anti-dumping Agreement on specific products as anti-dumping object, therefore, so if the U.S. government want to impose anti-dumping duties on every Chinese export, it is more like a theoretical estimate. It is a fact that Chinese exports to U.S. are unlikely to cause damage to all domestic industry in U.S., even if the U.S. government operates all products surveys. For a long term, the U.S. Congress would like to link RMB exchange rate to countervailing measures. Article15of the Chinese Accession Protocol, the jurisprudence of the United States domestic law give the U.S. government the "legal basis" to impose countervailing duties on Chinese exports. However, to determine the elements of a subsidy, the WTO rules and the United States domestic laws are basically the same. Firstly, the fact that the RMB exchange rate formation mechanism interrupted by Chinese government, may be identified as "the flow of public funds to private", and then as financial contribution; Second, since RMB exchange rate is basically the same all over the world, it is difficult to be determined "a new RMB exchange rate under free market", and therefore people can not consider RMB exchange rate identified as "a benefit"; Finally, since all companies use the same currency exchange rate, and in order to increase exports does not adequately prove that RMB exchange rate has a strong relationship with export performance. Thus. RMB exchange rate mechanism does not meet the special orientation requirements. Even if some Americans misinterpret the DSB cases, it could not identity RMB exchange rate belongs to the de facto subsidies. Last but not the least, some U.S. lawmakers hope that "non-violation Complaints" in WTO/DSB oppresses significant appreciation of the RMB exchange rate. After analyzing relevant reports by the GATT/DSB ruling, the paper argues that the RMB exchange rate mechanism docs not violate WTO agreements or not in line with WTO/DSB jurisdiction constitute "measures" under the meaning of "non-violation Complaints". But as an exporting country rather than an importing country, coupled with the U.S. government difficult to prove that Americans suffers the loss of interest, issues with RMB exchange rate are not in the meaning of "non-violation Complaints". Therefore, although some economists support, this paper considers four kinds of allegations against the RMB exchange rate mechanism under the WTO rules could not hold strong international laws.Chapter F;our is "Legal analysis of the U.S. Congress complicating Sino-US disputes over currency exchange rate". The U.S. Congress would like to link RMB exchange rate issue as a reason for granting "market economy status" sanctions, opposing to China’s accession to "Government Procurement Agreement", imposing international investments sanctions and the suppression of China’s participation in the global financial governance. However. RMB exchange rate is not the core factor in these sanctions and there would be space for two countries to negotiate. The paper considers the passage of congress bills from five fields:the power of act’s drafters, different attitudes of the interest groups, the impact of presidential elections. the potential impact of "the Occupation of Wall Street" movement and the performance of the U.S. mainstream media. This paper argues that the U.S. Congress will complicate the performance of the RMB exchange rate issues reflects the U.S. Congress actually does not have the confidence to solve the RMB exchange rate disputes through unilateral grasp, trying to further suppress the Chinese government through the ""combination punches" to force RMB appreciation. This paper also predicts the future of the U.S. Congress exchange rate bills and that the contents of such bills would be similar to "Currency Exchange Oversight Reform Act of2011", including countermeasures of international finance, international trade and international investment, however, this kind of bills would hardly become law.Chapter Five is "Countermeasures for Sino-US disputes over currency exchange rate". This paper concludes that while some economists support that China clearly manipulates its currency, Chinese measures are not inconsistent with the IMF Articles or the applicable WTO agreements. Chinese government should contempt the issue of currency exchange rate in strategy and insists on its own rights while the first resolution lies on bilaterally negotiation. Examining the cases of Sino-US in DSB with data from the complainant, the respondent and third party, US is incline to use DSM to create frictions. When confronting the DSB cases. China should take advantage of "rule-oriented" mechanism with a more positive attitude. In future, the paper advises China be in a practical point of view to implement DSB reports and build a coordination mechanism, as well as do more preparation for evidence. And it is time to revalue the studies of Chinese International Economic Law in the new era. China has positioned itself as an emerging developing country, which is consistent with national condition. But Western countries, especially the United States, do not agree with Chinese national orientation since China is week in construction of soft power. The Chinese government should focus on the construction of cultural identity when strengthening the soft power.更多还原