【作者】 孙煜华；

【导师】 童之伟；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 宪法学与行政法学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 侦查权的局部扩张已经成为一种世界性趋势。技术侦查、秘密拘留、指定居所监视居住、如实供述的义务都是侦查权介入公民基本权利的突出表现，侦查权扩张的背后体现了权力扩张的固有规律和历史惯性、立法民主的匮乏和公共安全的威胁。宪法的基本原则和基本权利都给侦查权的扩张设定了边界，从法治、人权的观念和宪法的整体结构出发解释法检公互相制约原则，应是法院居于首要地位、检察机关次之，而公安机关位于最后。公安机关和检察机关行使的侦查权均应受法院审判权的制约。新刑诉法在侦查领域面临的困境是：一方面，人权保障水平还远远没有达到国际上的通行标准，需要控制过于强大的侦查权；另一方面，在当今这个全球化时代，各种传统和非传统的威胁却又迫使国家在一定程度上强化侦查权或者保持其灵活性。控制强大的侦查权仍是我国当前主要的立法任务，因为唯有此才能实现侦查权和基本权利的总体平衡；不过，我们也不能让这种立法平衡机制过于僵化以致无法应对各种安全危机，为此还要引入司法令状制度和宪法监督制度这样相对灵活的平衡机制，只有这样，才能实现静态平衡机制和动态平衡机制的统一，进而实现健全的宪法秩序。全文共分七章：第一章、新刑诉法中侦查权的消长。我国刑诉法中的侦查权是一种侦查机关相对独立行使的、调查取证和采取强制措施的权力。侦查权在权力外观上兼具行政性和司法性，在权力来源上则具有多元性，这决定了其本质属性的多元性。侦查权的历史变迁过程反映了这样一个事实，即侦查权的权力配置模式和国家宪法秩序有着密切的关联。新刑诉法在侦查权控制方面有很大进步，但侦查权也有不少局部扩张的情形，如让指定居所监视居住成为羁押性措施，新增了批准手续疲弱的技术侦查措施。导致侦查权局部扩张的原因包括：权力扩张的固有规律和历史惯性，立法民主的匮乏、公共安全面临客观威胁。第二章、宪法对侦查权的制约。侦查权的扩张必然会影响到公民的基本权利，基本权利反过来也给侦查权的扩张设定了边界。同时，宪法基本原则也从宏观上给侦查权设定了界线，弥补了具体控权规范的不足。此外，面对侦查权与公民基本权利的关系失衡的总体法权格局，我们在加强基本权利保障的同时，应当利用其他权力对侦查权进行限制，最终使得侦查权与公民基本权利之间达到平衡。第三章、技术侦查批准手续的合宪性困境与化解。技术侦查是本次刑事诉讼法专章规定的侦查措施。批准手续是控制技术侦查权、保障公民权利的关键所在。新刑事诉讼法尽管要求技术侦查经过严格的批准手续，但是对批准手续的内容、主体、程序、监督机制均没有明确。历史上，技术侦查批准手续完全呈封闭状态，从批准权的设置、运行到批准文件的备案都由侦查部门自我授权，不受其他任何机关的监督和审查。这既不利于落实宪法中的法检公互相制约原则，又可能侵犯公民宪法上的多项基本权利。在宪法的框架下，批准手续应是中立、细化的并受到内外监督。同时，这个机制还应以公开的、明确化的法律形式出现，并且受到宪法和法律监督制度的保障。第四章、秘密拘留条款的合宪性困境与化解。秘密拘留是指，对于涉嫌危害国家安全犯罪、恐怖活动犯罪的嫌疑人，在出现有碍侦查的情形时，不及时通知嫌疑人家属的拘留措施。当前这种在公安机关主导下的秘密拘留体制不利于保障公民的宪法权利，缺少有力的事前和事后制约，而事后制约的价值大为降低并可能遭到反制。同时，由于在秘密拘留下嫌疑人无法与家属取得联系，在现有的制度条件下，是难以聘请律师给自己提供法律帮助的，即使人身自由受到侵犯，也无法有效行使辩护权、申诉权和控告权。为了化解秘密拘留遭遇的合宪性危机，我们可以借鉴域外的人身保护令制度和司法复审制度，在中国宪法框架下构建司法主导的羁押程序机制；同时将嫌疑人移交中立的拘禁场所，实行侦押分离；即时通知嫌疑人的家属，并让其聘请律师协助嫌疑人行使辩护权、申诉权和控告权；逐步建立非裁量性、即时性和奉行当事人主义的人身保护救济模式。第五章、指定居所监视居住的合宪性困境与化解。指定居所监视居住是一种适用于一些特殊且严重的罪行的、为了防范有碍侦查的情况而采取的、在侦查部门批准的居所内执行的监视居住，可折抵刑期的羁押性强制措施。刑事诉讼法的修改迁就了原法律执行中监视居住羁押化的现实，让名监实押的“潜规则”成为法定的“明规则”。指定居所监视居住背后潜藏着基本权利危机，其比拘留和逮捕更容易失控，不能体现法检公互相制约的程序控制精神。为了化解指定居所监视居住背后的基本权利危机，必须首先将指定居所监视居住定位于一种羁押措施，并比照拘留和逮捕这类羁押措施的人权保障要求，建立互相制约的决定、审查和救济程序，提高指定居所的保障程度，压缩指定居所监视居住的时间，让辩护权、申诉权和控告权的行使更加充分，并且与其他羁押措施实行同等的抵扣和赔偿制度。第六章、如实供述义务的合宪性困境及化解。如实供述义务是与侦查机关讯问权相对应的被追诉人的法律义务。如实供述义务所面临的矛盾不仅存在于刑事诉讼法中，还进入到宪法层面。如实供述的义务侵犯公民的言论自由、人格尊严等多项宪法基本权利和自由，并且与依法治国的宪法基本原则相悖。为了化解如实供述义务背后的合宪性困境，应当不再将如实供述作为一项法律义务，而应当按照免于自证其罪的要求，赋予嫌疑人完全的供述自由。同时，充分运用受宪法保障的沉默权，制约侦查机关的讯问权，避免刑讯逼供或变相逼供措施侵犯公民的各项基本权利。此外，为了保障沉默权的实效，还应运用律师在场权、坦白从宽制度等各种辅助措施完善既有的沉默权制度。第七章、如何实现侦查权与基本权利之间的平衡。首先要构建法权平衡的规范体系。为此，一方面，在人权保障的具体制度设计上，应该立足于保障被追诉人的各项基本权利；另一方面，权力配置由公安独大向审判优位转变。其次要让司法令状制度成为法权平衡的能动性支点。为了兼顾社会安全的需要和人权保障的要求，我应当在本国宪法框架下借鉴法治发达国家的司法令状制度，让其成为实现法权平衡的能动性支点。最后，使宪法监督体制成为法权平衡的最终保障。宪法监督难以激活让刑诉法修改中的合宪性问题无法纠正，为此必须转变党的执政方式，改变权力过分集中的局面，适时成立专门性的宪法监督机构，对各种作为式违宪和不作为式违宪采取有针对性的纠正措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 The expansion of the power of investigation has become a world tendency. Thetechnical investigation, the custody in secret, the surveillance in designated residenceand the surveillance of the obligation of truthfully statement are all the examples ofthe intervening of the power of investigation. There are many reasons for theexpansion of the power of investigation just like the fixed rules and the historicalinertia of expansion of the power, lack of legislative democracy, public security facingobjective threats. The constitutional pricinples and the basic rights have set limits onthe expansion of the power of investigation. If we interpret the principle of thebalance of the internal justice system according the idea of the rule of law, theprotection of human rights and the overall structure of the constitution；we may findthat the court is in the first place, the procuratorate is in the second, and the police isin the last. The power of investigation carried out by the procuratorate and the policeshould be controlled by the judicial authority of the court. The new code of criminalprocedure faces such a system predicament in the field of investigation: on the onehand, the level of guaranteeing human rights has not reached the general internationallevel, and we need to control the too strong power of investigation; on the other hand,in this increasingly global era, the traditional and non-traditional threats to security forces every country to enhance the power of investigation or keep it’s flexibility tosome extent. Controlling the strong power of investigation is still the main task of ourlegislation, because only by this can we accomplish the balance of the power ofinvestigation and the basic right. But in mean time, we can not make this balancemechanism to be too rigid in order to avoid the crisis. Therefore, we should introducethe criminal warrant system and the constitutional supervision. Only by this can weunify the static balance and the dynamic balance into together and build a perfectconstitutional order. This article can be divided into seven charts.Chart1.The reduction and the enhancement of the power of investigation in thenew Law of Criminal Procedure. The power of investigation is a relativelyindependent power for collecting evidence and taking compulsory measures. Thepower of investigation has both judicial and administrative appearance, but it hasmultivariate sources and natures. The history variance of the power of investigationreflects such a fact that there is a close relationship between the power structure of theinvestigative power and the constitutional order. The new Law of Criminal Proceduretakes many measures to control the power of investigation, but the expansion of thepower of investigation is very serous in some area, for example, making surveillancein designated residence to be a pending custody measure, adding technicalinvestigation with less-stringent approval formalities. There are a couple of factorsthat give rise to these problems: the fixed rules and the historical inertia of expansionof the power, lack of legislative democracy, public security facing objective threats.Chart2.The restriction Mechanism of Criminal Investigation in the constitution.The expansion of the power of the investigation will inevitably affect the citizens’basic rights, and the basic rights in turn will set a boundary for the power of theinvestigation. And in the meantime, the constitution principles control the power ofthe investigation in general ways, which make up for concrete standard. Furthermore,in the face of the imbalance of the power of the investigation and the basic rights, weshould limit the power of the investigation to protect the basic rights, so that we canrestore balance between the power and rights.Chart3.The unconstitutional problems of the technical investigation and the solutions for the problems. Ratification is the key link of controlling the state powerof technical investigation and protecting civil liberties. The new code of criminalprocedure requests a strict ratification, but it does not stipulate precisely the content,the subject, the procedure and the monitor of the ratification. In the past time, theratification of technical investigation was developing in closed circles, and theinvestigation section authorized the design of the internal agency systems, theoperation and the filing procedure by itself. This not only broke the balance of theinternal justice system, but also infringed a number of basic civil liberties in theconstitution. The ratification should be neutral, detailing and supervised. In themeaning time, it should present itself by the form of laws, and be safeguarded by theconstitutional and law supervision system.Chart4.The unconstitutional problems of the custody in secret and the solutionsfor the problems. The custody in secret is one kind of custody which aims at thesuspects who are alleged the crimes of endangering national security and terrorismand interfering with investigation. Nowadays, the police-dominated custody system isadverse to the protection of basic rights and without effective control measures. In themeantime, the suspects detained in secret can not contact with their close relatives, sothat they can not hire a lawyer freely under the present legal conditions in China.Even if their personal liberties are violated, they can not exercise their rights todefense, rights of petition, right of complaint. In order to resolve the unconstitutionalproblems of the custody in secret, we can learn from the habeas corpus and judicialreview system. First, we should establish the judge dominated custody system inframe of Chinese constitution, transfer the suspects to the neutral detention location,and discriminate the location for investigation from the location for detention. Second,we should also inform the relatives of the suspects and let them help suspects to hirelawyers. Last but not least, we should gradually establish an adversarial personalliberty protection model with high-efficiency and without discretion.Chart5.The unconstitutional problems of surveillance in designated residenceand the solutions for the problems. The surveillance in designated residence is onekind of surveillance which aims at some suspects who are alleged some special and serious crimes and interfering with investigation. This kind of compulsory measure iscarried out in residence designated by the investigative organization and can subtractof term of penalty. The new criminal procedure law yields the reality that thesurveillance becomes a custody measure in the performance of law. There are basicrights crisis behind the surveillance in designated residence which is more likely thancustody or arrest to spin out of control, and can not reflect the principle of mutualrestriction among the court, the procuratorate and the police in the constitution. Inorder to deal with this crisis, first, we should posit the surveillance in designatedresidence at a custody measure and establish a process with mutual restriction fordecision making, checking and relief just like the custody or arrest process. Second,we should improve the guarantee degree of the designed residence and compress thetime of the surveillance. Last but not least, we should protect the right to defense, theright of petition and the right of complain.Chart6.The unconstitutional problems of surveillance of the obligation oftruthfully statement and the solutions for the problems. The obligation of truthfullystatement corresponds with the power of interrogation. The obligation of truthfullystatement infringes the citizens’ many basic rights like the freedom of speech, thepersonal dignity, and abandons the basic principles of the rule of law. In order toresolve these unconstitutional problems, we should no longer posit the truthfullystatement at a legal obligation, and give the freedom of confession to suspectsaccording to the right from incriminating oneself. In the meantime, we should fullyexercise the right to silence in the constitution, control the power of interrogation andavoid offending the basic rights with extorting confessions by torture. Furthermore,we should also improve the level of protection of the right to silence by the presenceright of lawyer, the system about confessing leniently and the other support measures.Chart7.How to achieve the balance between the power of investigation and thebasic rights. First of all, we should establish a system in which the power and thebasic rights are in balance. In order to achieve this, on the one hand, we should designthe human right protection system based on the protection of the accused. On theother hand, the power structure should transfer from the police dominated model to the judge dominated model. Second, based on the consideration of both publicsecurity and the human rights, we should make the system of judicial writ to be thefulcrum of the balance between the power of investigation and the basic rights. Lastbut not least, we should make the constitutional supervision system to be the ultimateprotection mechanism for the balance of power and rights. The constitution is notfunctioning effectively in the process of revising criminal procedure law. In order todeal with this problem, we should on the one hand transit the ruling party’s reignmanner and solve such questions as some leading cadres hold over centralized power；on the other hand, we should establish special constitution supervision institutions inthe right time and handle all kinds of unconstitutional problems.更多还原