【作者】 汪丽丽；

【导师】 罗培新；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 30余年改革开放，中国经济增长速度创造了世界经济史奇迹，其中民营经济对其做出了不可磨灭的贡献。然则，民营经济对社会经济发展做出的贡献并不足以说明其在正规金融体系中的地位，其中企业数量占比为99%的中小企业，占GDP比重为55.16%，占全国新增产值比重为74.17%，占社会销售额比重为58.19%，占税收比重为46.12%，占出口总额比重为62.13%，占城镇就业岗位比重为75%左右。1但只有极小数的中小企业可以从正规银行类金融机构获取所需资金，如同Kellee S. Tsai所言，中国经济中最有活力的部分却缺失正规信贷，民营企业并没有直接受益于国有银行的信贷配置。2同时，证券市场的门槛又将绝大多数中小企业拒之门外，在无法从正规金融系统融入资金的情况下，多数中小企业在创业初期、产能扩张期或者经济不景气的情况下，选择了非正式金融。与此同时，中国广大农村出现了资金逆向流出现象，农村信用社及邮政储蓄银行等金融机构从农村吸收的存款，不断地输入到城市，如果农村信用社全部改制成商业银行，成为与大型商业银行类似的运营模式，可能会随着大型商业银行在农村的萎缩而逐渐缩容。面对此格局，在农村长期的金融体系中，非正式金融发挥了重要的不可替代的作用。对民营经济和农村经济发展起到推动作用的非正式金融，又如何陷入风波之中？非正式金融是否比正规金融体系更加脆弱，更易引发系统性风险，否则政府何以将绝大多数非正式金融视为非法，予以取缔而快之？基于一系列疑惑以及近年来民间借贷风波的发生，本文试图对非正式金融的法律规制问题进行深入分析，对中国现有非正式金融法律规范进行疏理，并采取历史、经济、比较以及实证的分析方式探究我国非正式金融法律规制的现状，及我国民间借贷纠纷大规模发生、非法集资手段不断推陈出新、非金融企业间借贷不断地变相发展的制度动因，同时通过对境外有关非正式金融法律规制的实践经验进行疏理与比较，最终对我国非正式金融的法律规制路径进行思考。基于这一思路，全文的研究分为五章层层展开。第一章是全文的理论根基，从非正式金融内涵与外延的界定着手，通过非正式金融生成逻辑的多维分析以及非正式金融法律规制的理论基础分析，为后文的法律规制确定理论基石。有关非正式金融内涵的界定是仁者见仁，但关键在于其是否受到监管、是否纳入政府金融监管体系，处于金融监管体系之外的各种金融组织及各种资金融通活动统称为非正式金融。换言之，非正式金融是指不受政府对于资本金、储备金和流动性、存贷利率限制、强制性信贷目标以及审计报告等要求约束的金融组织和金融活动的总和。基于这一内涵的界定，非正式金融区别于民营金融、非法金融等，同时具体的非正式金融活动包括民间借贷、企业内部集资、非金融企业间借贷（文章并不赞成将其排除在民间借贷范围之外）、通过私人钱庄与合会进行的金融活动、钱中与银背等中介组织进行的金融活动、P2P网络信贷以及各类非法集资行为、影子银行的行为等等，只要满足其内涵均可以确定为非正式金融范畴。对于非正式金融的生成逻辑，文章从二元金融结构与政府的“父爱主义”入手提出非正式金融在当代中国生成的特殊环境，并且对于我国长期存在的金融抑制政策加以分析，同时对非正式金融生成的制度动因进行深入阐述，非正式金融的变迁作为一种诱致性制度变迁的结果，更是地方政府、中央金融权威机构与非正式金融参与者三方之间博弈的一种金融制度创新，最后通过经济学上交易成本理论的分析为非正式金融的存在与发展提供进一步的经济学基础。文章一方面强调非正式金融生成的逻辑机理，另一方面对非正式金融长期隐蔽运营所造成的社会问题以及金融本身的脆弱性进行论证，从而为非正式金融的法律规制提供基石。依照明斯基的金融脆弱性理论，一旦不具备偿还债务能力的组织或者个人，只是通过不断举借新债偿还旧债时，随着这种非正式金融主体的增加，非正式金融将处于不稳定状态，即极易发生危机，而温州民间借贷风波的发生即有此等因素的作用。与此同时，金融市场所存在的信息不对称性、外部性及垄断问题，通过政府公权力的介入，初步是可以解决的，但其不可避免地会产生一些监管被俘获的问题，故而如何将这种公权力的介入控制在一定边界内，即对非正式金融的监管控制在必要的范围内，进行适度地监管成为各界所关注的问题。作为外在制度的金融法律制度，是否具有普适性、是否与内生演化而来的规则互补、金融法律制度的供给是否满足社会需求，这一系列问题亦成为非正式金融法律规制的必要前提。第二章就非正式金融法律规制现状加以阐释。通过温州民间借贷风波的简要论述，引出中国非正式金融法律规制的发展历程，此后对非正式金融法律规制的现状进行深入分析，从而寻找出如此管制强度之下，民间借贷纠纷泛滥、非法集资行为范围不断扩张的制度原因，进而为变非正式金融“管制”为“法律规制”提供法律制度上的现实原因，也为后文“契约治理”与适度监管的规制路径的提出提供法律制度基础。一国的金融法律制度一般都会基于金融稳定、安全的考量，从当时的社会经济背景出发，确定具体的金融法律制度。为此，从1949年至今，我国对于非正式金融的法律态度前后有所变化，从建国初期的提倡私人借贷到此后一段时间的绝对禁止，形成了非正式金融一度基本消失的状态。对于当时的政治经济环境而言，通过市场机制来实现经济赶超目标基本是不可能的，计划经济也就成为当时恢复经济的首要选择，这种强制性积累机制适应了社会经济发展的现实需求。然而在改革开放之后，民营经济迅速发展起来，政府对非正式金融的管制也有所松动，故而得到前所未有的发展。然而，20世纪90年代初的投资过热现象，以及诸如沈太福、邓斌事件的发生，和1993年-1995年期间大量金融法律法规相继出台，又适逢1997年亚洲金融危机的发生，促成了新一轮金融严管政策。故而，在20世纪90年逐步形成了行政取缔与刑事制裁非法集资行为的规制模式，各种非正式金融组织亦成为非法金融组织。2005年，相关法律制度开始松动，中央对于非公有制经济发展提出36条，同时促进了民间资本向金融领域的发展，而2010年有关民间资本36条的出台，更是为民间资本进入金融领域提供了决定性的法律基础，从而对非正式金融的管制有所松动。现有规制非正式金融的法律规范多集中于金融行政法规、规章，以及最高人民法院的司法性文件，效力位阶比较低，甚至与其他基本法律相抵触。这种将民间借贷限制于自然人间、自然人与企业组织之间的借贷，排除非金融企业间借贷行为的规定，以及民间借贷利率四倍以上不受法律保护，同时又通过中国人民银行的金融规章将其确定为“高利贷”行为，却无相关法律责任的规定，等等一系列法律制度上的不完善，憱就了非正式金融管制的低绩效。文章通过规范分析方法阐述了非正式金融现有法律规制的低绩效与严管制的现状，为第四章论述私人契约治理与适度监管路径提供逻辑基础。第三章围绕发达国家与发展中国家有关非正式金融法律规制实践与经验，为后文的论证提供比较分析的基础。本章分为两部分，即发达国家，诸如美国、德国、日本等国有关非正式金融发展的经验，尤其是法律规制的经验，并且将对中国非正式金融发展的启示融合于其中；发展中国家则以非洲撒哈拉以南国家小额信贷机构的发展经验、南非《国家信贷法》的规制实践以及亚洲孟加拉格莱珉银行的成功发展为例，为我国小型金融组织的发展提供参考。而南非《国家信贷法》的简要阐述为我国民间职业放贷人的规范提供了可资借鉴之处。无论是发达国家的美国、日本，抑或是发展中国家的非洲诸国，以及中国台湾地区，对于非正式金融的法律规制，既重视非正式金融固有的契约治理模式，同时考虑差异化监管，并且非正式金融的进一步发展离不开法制的先行。第四章围绕非正式金融法律规制理念的重新树立、契约治理与适度监管的论证展开。金融监管强调安全、稳健、有效等理念，然而在非正式金融法律规制过程中，过分强调“管制”，造成自由与效率价值的忽视，甚至是公平的丧失，并不符合非正式金融规制现实需求，更不利于非正式金融的规范化健康运作，必须重新树立理念价值，客观地认识非正式金融与正规金融法律规制的区别。强调效率理念：非正式金融的私人契约治理机制的有效利用；自由理念：赋予公民、企业一定的融资自由权，即民间自治权的发挥；公平价值：公平信贷权理念的树立；保障安全价值：需要适度监管；最终实现正式规范与非正式规范的弥合、非正式金融与正规金融的联结。非正式金融之所以能够长期存在并得以发展，除了具有多维度的生存空间，在缺乏有效的法律机制保护情况下，其特有的私人治理机制发挥了重要作用。然而，无论是非正式金融的隐性担保机制（缘约文化）、基于长期合作与重复博弈形成的声誉执行机制，抑或是团体贷款中的连带责任（同行压力），都是以社会资本和声誉价值为基础，其运作机理的关键在于交易者声誉信息的传递，以及对不良声誉惩罚的可置信性。但其受限于特定的社区范围内，无法应对规模化运营，对于超出血缘、地缘、亲缘关系的非正式金融，这种私人治理机制的效用不断弱化。同时，经济环境的复杂多变，信息不对称问题、交易不确定性问题依然会困扰非正式金融的正常发展，再加上长期在法律体系之外运营，无法得到法律的保护，对于组织化程度较低的非正式金融而言，缺乏有效的风控机制，这些都对非正式金融的可持续发展、投资者的利益保护不利，为此，需要来自于第三方的法律治理机制来弥补这些治理空隙，并矫正这些私人治理机制失效的领域。法律治理机制对于私人治理机制的弥合，需要控制在一定范围内，即政府公权力的介入，需要有一定的边界，换言之，需要设定非正式金融监管供给与需求边界，为非正式金融的私人治理与政府监管提供一个可行的平衡点。对于监管模式的选择上，文中并不赞成在目前的中国实行自律性监管为主、政府监管为辅的监管模式，而是仍以政府监管为主，充分重视自律性监管及非正式金融领域存在的非正式制度。通过立法上一定程度地赋予非正式金融法律身份，从而为监管制度的具体构建提供法律基础，否则市场准入、退出及交易活动等监管制度的设计皆为惘然。第五章探讨司法对非正式金融的保障。尤其是在现有法律规定不加以改变的前提下，对于体制外运营的非正式金融而言，在自身私人治理机制无法解决契约纠纷时，或者已经获取一定的法律身份的前提下，发生纠纷，司法机制也是其最后的保障，同时，司法能动性是回应非正式金融创新的最可行路径。司法介入非正式金融不仅有助于金融监管目标的实现、解决非正式金融纠纷持续走高问题，同时也可以弥合现有法律制度的粗疏与滞后性以及监管不足的现象。然则，完全依赖于司法规制并不是法律规制的应然之路，非正式金融阳光化的发展，不仅需要尊重其自身固有的特性，更需要立法上予以承认其法律身份，并且需要行政监管部门的适时护航、司法部门的最后保障，即形成全方位的规制体系。更多还原

【Abstract】 More than30years of reform and opening up, China’s economic growth rate hascreated a miracle in the history of the world economy, which the private economy hasmade an indelible contribution. Whereas, the contribution made by the privateeconomy of the socio-economic development has not illustrated enough their positionin the formal financial system, in which SMEs accounted for99%of the number ofenterprises,55.16percent of GDP,74.17percent of the share of national new outputvalue,58.19percent of social sales,46.12percent of the tax,62.13percent of totalexports, and accounting for the proportion of jobs in urban areas is about75%. Butonly a very small number of SMEs can obtain the necessary funds from the formalbanking financial institutions. As Kellee S. Tsai said, the most dynamic part ofChinese economy is missing formal credit, private enterprise does not directly benefitfrom state-owned banks credit allocation. Meanwhile, the threshold of the securitiesmarket shut out the vast majority of SMEs into the capital market, in the case of notfinance from the formal financial system, the majority of SMEs in the early days, thecapacity expansion period or economic recession, select the informal finance.At the same time, the vast rural areas of China appear phenomenon of reverseoutflow of funds, which rural credit cooperatives, postal savings banks and otherfinancial institutions in rural areas absorb deposits from the rural areas, then, thesecapital enter into the city. If all rural credit cooperatives convert into commercial bank,and their mode of operation are similar to large commercial banks, they may begradually volume reduction as large commercial banks’ atrophy in the rural. Faced ofthis pattern, the informal finance played an important and irreplaceable role in rurallong-term financial system.Informal finance has played the important role in promoting the development of the private economy and the rural economy, but how to plunge into turmoil? Isinformal finance is more vulnerable than the formal financial system, and more likelyto lead to systemic risk？Otherwise, why the informal finance has been deemed to beillegal and banned by the government for a long time? Based on a series of doubts anda storm triggered by private lending in recent years, this thesis attempts to analyzein-depth the legal regulation of the informal financial problems, comb the existinglegal norms of informal finance and take the history, economy, comparative, andempirical analysis methods to explore the status quo of informal financial legalregulation. And this thesis would analyze institutional motivation of private lendingdisputes large-scale increasing, illegal fund-raising means constantly innovating, andnon-financial enterprises lending in disguise constantly developing. Meanwhile, theauthor probes into legal regulation path of informal finance in China, throughanalyzing comparatively the practice of the foreign informal financial legal regulation.Based on the above idea, this research consists of five chapters.The first chapter is the theoretical foundation of this research, starting from theinformal financial connotation and denotation defined, through multidimensionalanalysis of the generation logic of informal finance and analysis of theoretical basis ofinformal financial legal regulation, to determine the theoretical foundation for thelater discussion of the legal regulation.The definition of the informal financial connotation is different, but the key ison whether or not subject to regulation, whether be included in the governmentfinancial regulatory system, in additional, a variety of financial organizations in thefinancial regulatory system and various informal financing activities are collectivelyreferred as informal finance. In other words, the informal finance means the generalterm for financial activities and financial organizations free from government’sfinancial constraints for capital, reserves and liquidity, deposit and lending interestrate restrictions, mandatory credit target, as well as audit reports. Based on thedefinition of the connotation, the informal finance distinguishes from privatefinancing and illegal finance. The specific informal financial activities include privatelending, corporate internal funds, non-financial enterprises lending (this article not infavor of their exclusion in the private lending beyond), financial activities carried outby the private banking house, RCAs and another intermediary organizations, and theP2P credit, as well as all kinds of illegal fund-raising behavior, the shadow banking act, and so on, as long as financial activities to meet the connotation of the informalfinance would be identified as informal financial areas.As for the generation of informal finance, the article proposes the generatedspecial environment of informal financial starting from the dual financial structureand government "paternalism" in contemporary China, and analyzes ourlong-standing policy of financial repression, while elaborating system motivation ofinformal financial generation. As the result of an induced institutional change, theinformal finance is a tripartite game between the local governments, the centralfinancial authorities and informal financial participants and financial systeminnovation. Finally, this part further analyzes the existence and development of theinformal finance through the transaction cost economics theory. The thesisemphasizes the generated logic mechanism of informal financial, while, the otherhand, demonstrating the social problems caused by the informal financial long-termcovert operations and financial vulnerability, which provide cornerstone for the legalregulation of the informal finance.According to Minsky’s theory of financial fragility, organizations or individualsthat couldn’t repay the debt, just continue to raise new debt to repay old debts, withthe increase of such informal financial body, informal finance will be in an unstablestate, prone to crisis, and there are the role of these factors in the occurrence ofWenzhou private lending storm. At the same time, asymmetric information,externalities and monopoly issues exist in the financial market, can be resolvedpreliminary through the intervention of the government authority, but it will inevitablyproduce some regulatory capture. Therefore how to control the intervention of thepublic authority within a certain boundary, that is, the informal financial regulatory becontrolled in the necessary range, moderate supervision.Financial legal system as an external system, whether it has a universal, whetherbe complementary with endogenous evolved rules, and whether supply of financiallegal system meets the needs of the community, the series of issues have also becomenecessary premise of the legal regulation of informal finance.The second chapter elaborates the status quo of informal financial legalregulation. After demonstrating the course of development of the informal financiallegal regulation by a brief discussion of the storm of Wenzhou private lending, thischapter in-depth analyses the status of informal financial legal regulation in order tofind the institutional reasons of the proliferation of private lending disputes and the continuous expansion of the scope of illegal fund-raising under the strength of such acontrol, to provide a legal system reasons for changing the informal financial "control" to " legal regulation" and also provide the basis of the legal system for theregulatory path of contract governance with moderate supervision.The financial legal system of a country is usually based on financial stability,safety considerations, starting from the prevailing socio-economic background, todetermine the specific financial legal system. So, since1949, legal attitude forinformal finance has changed, from the early days of advocate of private lending tothe absolute prohibition of private borrowing, and this change created the disappearedstate of the informal finance. It is impossible to achieve the goal of economic catch-upin terms of market mechanisms under the political and economic environment. So, theplanned economy system become the first choice of economic recovery, themandatory accumulation mechanism adapted to the social and economic developmentof the reality demand. However, after reform and opening up, the private sectordeveloped rapidly, the government’s control for informal finance loosed, so theinformal finance get unprecedented development. However, in the early1990sinvestment overheating phenomenon, and such as Shen Taifu, DengBin incident, alarge number of financial laws and regulations have issued in1993-1995period, uponthe happening of the Asian financial crisis in1997, contributed to a new round offinancial control policy. Therefore, during1990s, it has gradually formed theregulation mode of a administrative and criminal sanctions on illegal financing, allkinds of informal financial organizations also become illegal financial organizations.In2005, the relevant legal system began to loose, the Central government putsforward “36” clauses to develop the non-public sector, and at the same time, promotethe folk capital into the financial sector. And in2010, the new “36” clauses about thefolk capital were issued, it provided decisive legal basis for private capital into thefinancial sector, and informal financial control began to loose.The existing regulation informal financial legal norm is centered in the financialadministrative regulations, rules and the judicial documents of the supreme people’scourt, its effect of low rates, even conflicting with other basic law. These provisionswhich restriction private lending within lending of the natural person, lendingbetween natural person and enterprise organization, eliminate lending betweennon-financial enterprise, and the interest rates of private lending be not protected bylaw more than four times, and at the same time, this lending be identified as the "usury" behavior through the people’s bank of China financial rules, while not theprovisions of the relevant legal liability, are not perfect, and promote the lowperformance of the informal financial control. This article reveals the present situationof the low performance of the existing legal regulations on informal finance and thestrict control through the normative analysis method, to provide logical basis fordiscussing private contract governance and appropriate regulatory path at the fourthchapter.The third chapter provides the comparative analysis base for the later argumentaround the informal financial legal regulation practice and experience on thedeveloped countries and the developing countries. This chapter is divided into twoparts, namely, the developed countries, such as the United States, Germany, Japan andother countries’ the informal financial development experience, especially discussingthe legal regulatory experience, with integration the implications for the informalfinancial development of China into the argument. Developing countries areSub-Saharan Africa countries’ microfinance institutions development experience,South Africa’ National Credit Law regulation practice and Asia Bangladesh GrameenBank’s successful development as an example, for the development of small financialinstitutions of China to provide the reference. Meanwhile, this part briefly describesthe South Africa the National Credit Law, to provide reference for the regulation ofprivate lender in China.Whether the United States, Japan as the developed countries, or the Africancountries of developing country, as well as China’s Taiwan, for informal financiallegal regulations, not only pay attention to the informal financial inherent contractgovernance model, considering the differentiated regulation, and aware furtherdevelopment of informal finance be inseparable from the rule of law.The fourth chapter focuses on reshaping the concept of informal financialregulation, argumentation of contract management and appropriate regulatory.Financial supervision has stressed safety, steady and effective ideas, however, inthe process of the informal financial legal regulation, too much emphasis on "control",creating neglect freedom and efficiency value, and even the loss of a fair. Thissituation does not conform to the real demand of informal financial regulation, and isunfavorable to the healthy standardization operation of informal finance. Therefore,it must reshape value, and objectively recognize the difference between informalfinance and formal financial regulation. Emphasizing efficiency concept: effective utilization of informal financial private contract governance mechanism; Free idea:giving citizens, enterprises for financing liberty, namely folk autonomy into full play;Fair value: setting up fair credit right idea; Safety value: need to moderate supervision;Finally realizing formal regulations and informal norm to bridge, the linkage betweeninformal finance and formal finance.Informal finance can exist for a long time and constantly develop, in additionthe multidimensional space of living, in the absence of effective legal protectionmechanism, its unique private governance mechanism plays an important role.However, whether the informal financial recessive guarantee mechanism, thereputation mechanism based on long-term cooperation and repeated game, or group ofloan joint and several liability (peer pressure), are based on social capital andreputation value as the foundation, its operation mechanism lies in traders reputationinformation transfer, and the bad reputation of punishment can be confidence. But themechanism be limited to a specific community range, could not cope with the scale ofoperation, for informal finance beyond blood, geopolitical, genetic relationship, thiskind of private governance mechanism utility weakening. At the same time, thecomplication of economic environment, the problem of the information asymmetry,transaction uncertainty problem will still beset the normal development of informalfinance, plus operating outside the legal system for a long time, being unable to getlegal protection, as well as the lack of effective control-risk mechanism. All of theseare unfavorable for the informal financial sustainable development and the interests ofinvestors, therefore, need third party legal governance mechanism to make up forthese management gap, and correct these failure fields of private governancemechanism.Legal governance mechanism makes up for private governance mechanism,which been control in a certain range, that is, the government public power’sintervention, must be have certain boundary. In other words, it needs to set the supplyand demand boundaries of informal financial regulation, to find a feasible equilibriumpoint between private governance and government regulation of informal financial.As for the selection of regulatory model, this thesis does not agree withimplementing the mode centering by self-discipline supervision association withgovernment supervision in the present China, but the mode centering by thegovernment supervision, emphasizing self-discipline supervision and informal normin the informal financial field. Through giving informal financial legal status on a certain degree, so as to provide legal basis for construction supervision system,otherwise market access, exit and trading activities supervision system would befrustrated.The fifth chapter discusses the judicial safeguarding roles of the judicialregulation for the development of informal finance. Especially in the current, if notchange the existing laws and regulations, for informal finance outside system isconcerned, and their own private governance mechanism be ineffective, or have beenobtained certain legal identity, when there are disputes, the judicial system is its finalsecurity. Meanwhile, the initiative of justice is the most feasible path in response tothe informal financial innovation. Informal financial judicial regulation not only helpsto realize the goal of the financial supervision, solve the informal financial dispute,also can make up for the existing law system of careless and hysteresis quality and thephenomenon of supervision-lack. But, completely dependent on judicial regulation isnot the necessary road of legal regulation. Informal financial sunshine development,not only need to respect its inherent characteristics, need more legislation give itslegal identity, and need to administrative supervision department timely convoy, thelast safeguarding of judicial departments, namely the all-round regulation system.更多还原