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基于区域性垄断下互联网互联互通双向接入定价的规制研究

Regulation Research in Two-way Access Pricing of Internet Interconnection in the View of Regional Monopoly

【作者】 唐睿

【导师】 郭元晞;

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 , 产业经济学, 2013, 博士

【摘要】 对于具有自然垄断特征的网络型产业而言,引入市场竞争机制、对区域性垄断实行规制已经成为了全国通讯产业改革的重要内容。基于固有的技术和经济特点,通讯网络有效竞争的前提条件是平等接入、实现互联互通。而通讯网络产业全程全网、连通作业、服务全社会的基本特性,又决定了运营商只有互联互通才能实现网络效率、社会福利的最大化。但实践中,由于行业的自然垄断特性,往往某个主导运营商凭借技术优势、历史机遇、政策许可等因素控制着瓶颈资源,阻碍着产业有效竞争的发挥。因此,从资源配置效率、社会福利最大化的角度,如何建立-套兼顾通讯网络型产业互联互通接入运营商之间的利益的接入定价规制机制、方法与措施,已成为了一个具有重要理论意义和现实指导价值的问题。目前对通讯网络型产业互联互通接入定价以及规制的研究,国内外的研究对象集中在电信网络、广播网络等,鲜有文献对互联网互联互通双向接入定价的区域性垄断的规制进行研究,缺乏对互联网互联互通接入定价方法、规制工具选择的系统研究。尽管和电信网络、广播网络产业同具自然垄断等特征,但互联网产业又具有自身固有的经济、技术特点。特别对于我国而言,互联网产业的互联互通双向接入实践与改革正迫在眉睫,这亟待理论与实践经验的指导。结合我国互联网接入市场发展的历史演变,本文在对发达国家互联网或电信产业互联互通接入定价规制的成功经验进行归纳与梳理的基础上,对我国的互联网互联互通双向接入定价的区域性垄断规制进行了研究。具体来讲,本文基本框架如下:本文首先对区域性垄断、互联网互联互通接入、价格规制等概念进行了界定,并对经济规制的基础理论和模型进行了综述。在此基础上,本文在第三章对现阶段互联网互联互通接入定价的主要方式(互不结算方式、基于资费结算方式以及基于成本结算方式)进行了比较分析,并对互联互通的成本与收益、接入定价影响因素进行了研究。本文的第四章是一个动态博弈模型,考察互联网互联互通接入价格规制工具选择,研究了放松管制、基于成本的价格管制以及零售减成(retail-minus)规制三种政策工具的区别。接下来,本文对规制互联网互联互通双向接入定价的区域性垄断依据进行了探析,从现实依据和理论依据这两个方面进行了展开,并探讨发达国家例如美国、英国和德国的进行互联网互联互通垄断定价规制的经验,以期“他山之石可以攻玉”。结合中国互联网互联互通接入市场的现实情况,本文在第六章分析了规制互联网互联互通双向接入定价的区域性垄断的途径与障碍,分析了管制机构在互联网双向接入定价区域性垄断中的作用。最后是本文的政策与措施部分,将从建立识别管制需求的有效方式、善定期回顾制度和管制制度评价机制、重构网间结算标准、加快互联网互联互通立法、建立第三方技术监督平台等提出了相应的政策建议与措施。从研究方法来看,本文采用定性与定量研究相结合、理论联系实践的研究方法、归纳演绎分析方法、比较分析法、理论模型研究法,对我国互联网互联互通双向接入定价区域性垄断的规制进行了研究。本文的研究属于一个探索性研究,目前此方面的相关资料、文献等都较少,因此这既是本文研究的难点也是可能的创新点之一。此外,本文建立了一个互联网互联互通接入定价的动态博弈模型,考察提供互联网互联互通接入的运营商、接入的运营商之间的博弈行为,并比较分析了三种互联网互联互通接入价格规制工具的差异,将为规制机构选择最有效的价格规制工具提供重要的理论支撑。本文可能的创新之处体现在以下几点:首先,本文建立了一个互联网互联互通接入定价的动态博弈模型,考察提供互联网互联互通接入的运营商、接入的运营商之间的博弈行为,并比较分析了不同互联网互联互通接入价格规制工具(基于成本的价格规制、零售减成价格规制、放松规制)的差异,为规制机构选择最有效的价格规制工具提供了重要的理论支撑;其次,在借鉴欧美等发达国家互联管制经验的基础之上,本文提出了建立识别管制需求的有效方式、构建定期回顾制度等针对性的政策建议,为我国互联网互联互通规制政策的完善提供了一定的方法论;最后,本文对区域性垄断规制理论与模型、我国互联网互联互通接入区域性垄断历史演变与现状、发达国家互联网互联互通区域性垄断成功经验等进行了系统、全面的梳理。特别的,对互联网互联互通双向接入定价的区域性垄断的规制研究,目前在国内仍然属于空白,本文的试探性研究将为此后的相关研究起到抛砖引玉的作用,可以提供一定的借鉴意义。受制于研究时间、调查数据、本文作者研究水平,本文存在较多不足:缺乏足够的数据来测算互联互通双向接入定价以及价格规制,包括互联网接入运营商的成本、收入、利润等信息;缺乏足够的数据对模型结论进行实证检验,这些都有待后续深入研究。当然,对具有区域性自然垄断的基础性行业的双向接入定价理论进行一定的拓展,并对中国现阶段互联网行业互联互通双向接入的价格制定提供某些借鉴意义,这将正是本文的研究目的和意义。

【Abstract】 For network industry with natural monopoly characteristics, the introduction of market competition mechanism and the implementation of regional monopoly regulation has become an important part of the national communications industry reform. Based on the inherent technical and economic characteristics of the communication network, the prerequisite of effective competition is equal access and achieving interconnection and interworking. The character of communications network industry, like "the whole process, the whole net","connection operation""service of society", determines the only way for the operators to achieve to maximization of network efficiency and social welfare is interconnection. In practice, due to the natural monopoly character of the industry, the leading operator often controlls bottleneck resources by virtue of the technical advantage, the historic opportunity or the policy permission, and hampers the efficiency of industry competiton. Therefore, from the perspective of resource allocation efficiency and social welfare maximization, how to establish the regulation mechanism, methods and measuresof access pricing that balance the interests of interconnection operators in communication network industry, has become a problem with important theoretical and practical value.Currently, the study at home and abroad in access pricing and regulation of interconnection in communication network industry is concentrated in telecommunications network and broadcast network. There is little literature research on regional monopoly regulation of two-way access pricing in Internet interconnection and interworking, and there is lack of systematic study in the choice of pricing methods and regulatory tools of Internet interconnection. Although with the same characteristics of natural monopolies like telecommunications networks and broadcast network industry, the Internet industry has inherent economic and technical characteristics. Especially in China, the practice and reform of two-way access pricing in Internet interconnection is so urgent, asking for guidance of theory and practical experience.Combined the historical evolution of Internet access market and based on the successful experience of pricing regulation on Internet or telecommunications industry interconnection of developed countries, this article researches in China’s two-way access pricing regulation of Internet interconnection regional monopoly. The basic framework of this paper is as follows:This article first defines the concept of regional monopoly, Internet interconnection access, price regulation, and reviewed the basic theory and models of economic regulation. In Chapter3, it makes comparative analysis in the main methods of access pricing in internet interconnection (non-settlement method, Tariff-based method of settlement, as well as cost-based method of settlement), and researches in the cost-benefit analysis, the impact factors of access pricing of internet interconnection. In chapter4, firstly there describes a dynamic game model to examine the choice of Internet interconnection access price regulation tools. Secongly studies the distinction of the three policy tools for deregulation, cost-based price regulation, as well as retail-minus regulation. In chapter5, it explores and analyses the realistic and theoretical basis of two-way access pricing regional monopoly in internet interconnection, and then explores the experience of internet interconnection monopoly pricing regulation in developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. Combined with the reality of China’s Internet interconnection access market, in chapter6the paper analyses the analyses the regulation approaches and obstacles of regional monopoly in the Internet interconnection access pricing, then analyses the function of the regulatory agencies in the regional monopoly regulation of internet interconnection two-way access pricing. Finally, this paper concludes the policies and measures, including "clearing the purpose of interconnection regulation","establishing effective methods of identifying regulatory needs","establishing a periodic review regime","improving the evaluation mechanism of regulatory regime","reconstructing the settlement standards of networks interconnection","Speeding up the legislation of internet interconnection","establishing a third-party technical supervision platform" and as well as "make the Internet overall regional planning".For the research approaches, this paper uses the qualitative and quantitative research method, theory with practice research method, induction and deduction analysis method, comparative analysis method, and also theoretical model reseach method, to study the regional monopoly regulation of internet interconnection two-way access pricing in China. This study is an exploratory study. For less relevant information and literature in this regard, this is not only the difficulty of this study, but also the innovations. In addition, the establishment of an Internet interconnection access pricing dynamic game model, considered about the within and among game behavior of the operators which providing the Internet interconnection access,,and comparative analysis of the three types of regulatory tools in Internet interconnection access pricing, it provides an important theoretical support to regulatory agencies to choose the most effective price regulation tool.The innovations that may embodied in this article could be in the following: First, we established a dynamic game model of Internet interconnection access pricing to study the game behavior between operators, and to give a comparative analysis of different Internet interconnection interoperability access price regulation tools (based on the cost price regulation system, retail minus price regulation, relax regulatory system) which may be the most effective price regulation tool to provide the important theoretical support; Secondly, combined with our Internet industry practice, this article proposed the path of access pricing regulation, countermeasures and implementation measures, including to ensure interconnection regulatory purposes, to establish effective recognition control and to build regular review system, which may provide some Methodology or approaches for the perfection of the regulatory policies of China’s Interconnection of Internet Backbone; Finally, we gave an systematic and comprehensive review about Internet interconnection access regional historical evolution and current situation of China, and also the successful experience of developed countries on Internet interconnection of regional monopoly. Specially, the study on two-way access pricing regulation of interconnection between Internet Backbone under regional monopoly is still a blank currently aboard, and we wish that this article could provide some reference.Due to the study period, the survey data and the author’s academic ability, this article has some shortcomings:lack of sufficient data to measure the interconnection two-way access pricing and the pricing regulation, including the access costs, revenue, profits, and other information of the operators; lack of data to empirical test the theoretical model. But the shortcomings will be the follow-up in-depth study. Certainly, the development of two-way access pricing theory in the industries with regional natural monopoly character, and the formulation of relevant policies and methods in internet interconnection two-way access pricing in today’s China, is the purpose and meaning of this paper.

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