【作者】 杜茎深；

【导师】 靳相木；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 土地资源管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 提高土地配置效率是中国转型发展实践对当代土地管理科学提出的重大课题。针对理论和实践中对引入指标市场这一改革中的新生事物以及指标市场与地价关系认识上的模糊和滞后现象,本文应用国外发展权转移思想、理论和技术,提出三个核心问题：(1)美国发展权市场结构、性质和一般运作模式是什么?如何刻画可交易发展权范式?(2)中国指标市场存在哪几种类型?其各自发展演变前景如何?中国指标市场的典型运作机制、价格决定与基本性质是什么?(3)引入指标市场对城市地价形成带来了哪些可能的影响?本文沿着“域外经验-理论提炼-中国应用”的技术路线,首先讨论了美国发展权市场的案例、特征和规律；然后总结刻画了可交易发展权范式的概念、特征与本质,并通过与中国建设用地指标之比较,确立了引入可交易发展权范式来解释、指导中国指标交易实践的理论可行性；接下来,在区分两类指标市场及其发展演变前景的基础上,以重庆地票交易为例,研究了中国指标市场的典型运作机制、价格形成与基本性质；最后,从定性描述和模型表达两个维度考察了引入指标市场对地价形成的影响。具体研究结论如下：(1)通过多案例比较分析,发现美国发展权市场是一个人为创设的市场。TDR设计要素、分区规划规则、潜在住房和土地市场共同决定了发展权的供给和需求。因此,发展权价格是政府和市场共同作用的结果。确切地说,美国发展权市场通常表现为“强政府、弱市场”的特征,本质上是一个准市场。(2)作为一种国际性思潮的“可交易发展权”已经取得了范式的资格,其特征与内容可概括为：引入市场机制；提高管制效率和质量；明确总量控制和个体份额；强调以损失补偿为中心；借助私人主体和资金实现管制目标；管理者和公众关系的改变。TDR的本质可以沿着三个视角解析：基于产权束的TDR是土地所有权人依意思自治和合同自由原则将发展权从土地权利束中分离出来,并作为一项独立财产出售给他人；基于社会公平的TDR是政府解决规划困境和管制性征收问题的应对方案,是通过创设一项新的财产权利来间接补偿经济损失的一种非经济补偿手段；基于管制效率的TDR是科斯定理在解决外部性问题上的应用,是分区规划市场取向的实施机制和辅助工具。中国农地非农化管制框架中的建设用地指标与可交易发展权的内涵和表现形式存在相似之处,引入可交易发展权范式来解释指导中国业已存在的指标交易实践具有理论可行性和实践迫切性。(3)中国指标市场可以划分为地方政府之间的交易与个人或企业参与的交易两大类型。其中,前者只是中国转型发展特定阶段的一个历史片段。为此,选取重庆地票交易作为中国指标市场的典型案例,发现机制设计核心是如何将农村已利用、物化的指标还原并分离为未利用、可交易的指标,尔后藉由政府交易平台配置给城市使用。地票价格受到政府设立交易基准价格、控制交易总量、打包零散指标、决定交易时间和方式、设定具体用途等方式调节,同时也受到市场供需规律支配。经测算,地票价格理论上应在288.9万元/hm2至459.75万元/hm2之间浮动。但地票实际成交均价接近生产价格,由此推断其定价策略侧重于复垦成本填补,为土地综合整治大规模展开后的社会资本找到退出机制。由于地票市场对信息收集、加工和处理存在明显滞后性,不具备价格发现功能,是准市场。(4)以“地票市场-土地市场”相分离为特征的土地双层市场结构形成的根源是地票落地与土地出让制度的衔接。重庆市政府设计的优先划地权是两个市场的对接点,开发商可以藉此在土地市场获得事实上的优先地位,从而创造出对地票的旺盛需求。理论上,两个市场之间存在政府统购统销、先买票后买地、先买地后买票和自由市场等四种互动模式。由于指标配置“双轨制”的存在,客观上起到了细分土地市场的作用。考虑到各细分市场指标来源渠道和土地使用权取得方式的差异,引入地票市场对各细分市场的供需及地价形成的影响各不相同。通过四象限模型的讨论,发现票价与地价之间的影响是双向的,具体存在土地需求拉动型、土地供给推动型、地票需求推动型和地票供给拉动型等四种类型。(5)通过对理想世界、存在建设用地总量管制和引入指标市场三种不同情形的均衡地价进行比较,发现地价之高低取决于开发商数量和建设用地指标价格,且引入指标市场的均衡地价与建设用地指标价格之间存在“跷跷板”效应。逐一放松假设条件,可以发现,引入指标市场可能强化了地方政府在土地市场的卖方垄断地位；极大的增加了市场结构的复杂性和土地要素的交易费用,在交易费用由买方承担情形下,均衡地租水平会存在一定程度降低；并在城乡二元土地市场结构的情形下总体上降低了城市地价水平,但对各细分市场的影响可能截然不同。还发现政府压低地票价格的基本动因是为了实现土地财政收入最大化。更多还原

【Abstract】 Improving land allocation efficiency is a major issue raised by China transformation practice to contemporary land management science. For the recognition lag to the introduction of land quotas market and the relationship between land quotas market and land price in theory and practice, this thesis applys the ideas, theories and techniques of foreign tradable development rights (TDR), raises three core questions:(1) What is the structure, operation mechanism and nature of Amercian land development rights market?(2) What types of land quotas markets can be divided in China? And what is the prospect of each type? Further more, what is the nature, price formation and operation mechanism of quotas market in China?(3) What are the influences of introduction land quotas market to land price formation?Along with the technical route of "extraterritorial experience, theoretical summary and China application", for a start, this thesis deeply discusses the cases, characteristics and rules of TDR markets in Amercia; and the next, summaries the concept, characteristics and nature of TDR paradigm. Through a comparative study between TDR and land quota in China, this thesis establishes theoretical feasibility of introduction TDR paradigm to explain land quotas trading in China; once more, based on the differentiation of land quota markets and their prospects, this thesis researches the operation mechanism, price formation and nature of Chinese land quotas market which taking land tickets trading in Chongqing for example; finally, inspects the influences of introduction land quotas market to land price formation from the angles of qualitative description and model expression. Research conclusions are as follows:(1) Though comparative case study, this thesis found that TDR market in Amercia is a man-created market. All of the design elements work together, and in the conjunction with zoning rules and potential housing and land market conditions, to determine TDR supply and demand. Thus, TDR price is determined by government and market. Accurately, TDR markets in Amercia are characterized by strong government and weak market, and quasi-markets in nature.(2)As an international trend, TDR has achieved the qualification of paradigm. Its features and content can be summaries as follows:introduction market mechanism; improving regulation efficiency and quality; clearing total control and individual share; emphasis on loss compensation; achieving regulation goals with the support from private body and funding; changing relationship between managers and the public. The essence of TDR can be understood from three perspectives:from the perspective of property rights bundle, TDR is a right separated by knd owner from land rights bundle and sold to others according to the principle of autonomy of will and freedom of contracts; From the perspective of social justice, TDR is a solutbn of government to solve zoning dilemma and regulatory taking problems, and a non-financial compensation means through creating a new property right to compensate the loss; From the perspective of regulation efficiency, TDR is the apply of Coase theorem to solve externality problem, and a market-oriented implement tool of zoning. The meaning and manifestations between Construction land quotas and TDR are similar. It is theoretical feasible and practice urgent to introduction TDR paradigm to explain and guide land quotas trading in China.(3) land quota markets in China can be divided into two types, that is, transaction between local governments and transaction participated by individuals or enterprises. Among them, the former is just a historical fragment which only existing in the period of China’s transformation and development Taking land tickets trading in Chongqing for example, this thesis found that design mechanism of quotas market is reduction and separation land quotas which were used and materialized in rural to unused and tradable land quotas, and distribution to city through trading platform provided by local government. Ticket price not only regulated by government through setting benchmark price, appointing specific purpose, controlling trading volume, packaging retail quotas, deciding trade time and ways, but also at the mercy of market law of supply and demand. By calculation, we found that ticket price should float between2889000yuan/hm2and4597500yuan/hm2in theory. From the fact that actual average deal price close to the production price, we can be inferred that ticket pricing strategy is focused on making up for reclamation cost and finding an exit mechanism for social capital when land comprehensive improvement activities carried out at a large scale. Therefore, ticket market doesn’t have the function of price discovery; and it is merely a means ofpublic policies. Thus, ticket market is also a kind of quasi-market in nature. (4) The root cause of land double market structures which characterized by separation of tickets market and land market is the cohesion between land ticket fall to the ground and land grant system. Priority planning land that designed by Chongqing government for creating strong demand is junction between the two markets. By this, developer can get priority in fact in land market. In theory, there are kinds of interactive modes between tickets market and land market, that is, unified purchase and sell by government, bought tickets before buy land, bought land before buy tickets, and free market. The double-track system of land quotas allocation has played an important role in land market segment.The impacts which bring by the introduction of tickets market on land price in each segment market are different, because the sources of quota and grant ways of land use right are different. This thesis found that there is a two-side influences between ticket price and land price, that is, the kinds of land demand pull, land supply promote, ticket demand promote and ticket supply pull.(5) This thesis found it depends on the quantity of developers and the price of land quotas, through comparation among equilibrium land prices in those land markets, that is, market in ideal world, market with total amount regulation on construction land and market with the introduction of quotas market. Also found there is a "seesaw effect" between land price and quota price in the introduction of land quotas market. Relax the assumpations one by one, we found that the introduction of land quotas market can strengthen local government’s monopoly position in land market, greatly increase complexity of land market structure and transaction costs, the equilibrium rent will be reduced to a certain extent when the transaction costs borne by the seller, and can reduce the overall urban land price under the situation of separation between urban and rural land mark et. But for the influence of each segment market may be very different. We also found the motivation for government to lower ticket price is to maximize their land revenues.更多还原