【作者】 吕罡；

【导师】 周宗放；

【作者基本信息】 电子科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 我国拥有广阔的农耕面积和巨大的农产品市场，“三农”问题一直以来都受到社会各界的广泛关注。解决“三农”问题的关键在于进一步解放农业生产力，促使农村经济又快又好的发展。长期以来，由于涉农经济组织内部结构松散、农户信用状况具有较大的不稳定性和易突变的特征，农村融资难问题成为困扰我国农业经济发展的重大瓶颈问题。本文通过厘清以农户为基础的涉农经济组织的内在信用行为动因，进而构建针对涉农信贷主体的信用风险评估方法，最终达到缓解我国农村“融资难”的目的。本文的研究不但有助于金融机构提高涉农信贷的质量和管理水平，也能在一定的程度上优化我国农业经济的产业结构，对解决“三农”问题起到积极的推动作用。本文首先以涉农经济组织和农户作为典型的涉农信贷主体，从政治经济学的视角，统计性地探讨了“涉农信贷主体”和“涉农金融机构”之间的历史演变过程和相互关系的发展现状。通过实地调研，在农户层面分析了目前我国涉农贷款的主要用途和来源途径。在厘清我国农村“融资难”问题的历史成因和现实状况以后，本文分别从“涉农信贷主体”和“涉农金融机构”两个层面探讨了我国“涉农信贷主体”的信用行为以及涉农信贷风险的评估问题。在涉农金融机构层面，本文着重分析了涉农金融机构在涉农信贷时所面临的市场状况，在信贷配给的外生条件下分析了涉农信贷的市场特征，并寻找到基于信用风险突变的涉农信贷市场特征因素。在“涉农信贷主体”层面，本文以涉农经济组织和农户为主要研究对象。根据涉农经济组织的组织特征，本文将涉农经济组织划分为“协作型涉农经济组织”和“企业型涉农经济组织”。由于“协作型涉农经济组织”主要由农户自发组成，结构较为松散，该类涉农经济组织的信用风险根源直接依赖于组织内部农户之间的松散结构和相互行为。因此，本文利用博弈论的相关理论刻画了该类涉农经济组织内部农户之间的信用行为，并在一类典型的结构“联保机制”下，探讨了该类涉农经济组织的信用风险如何依赖于组织内部农户之间信用行为的相互作用。进一步，对该类涉农经济组织内部农户的信用行为对组织规模的影响进行了系统仿真。对“企业类涉农经济组织”而言，无论该类涉农经济组织内部结构和行为如何，该类涉农经济组织总会通过某一系列指标反映其信用风险，在这种意义上，这类涉农经济组织的信用风险评估方法与一般企业的信用风险评估方法有相似之处。本文结合该类涉农经济组织的特征，创新性地引入集对理论对传统的信用风险评估方法进行有机整合和“取长补短”，使之在评价该类涉农经济组织信用风险时更具适应性，并由此构建了一类涉农经济组织的信用风险评估方法。进一步，为了刻画作为涉农经济组织基本单元的个体农户的信用风险变化特征，本文采用突变评价法对个体农户的信用风险进行了实证评估。最后，基于上述分析结果，本文从涉农信贷市场建设、农村信用体系建设、政策支持等三个方面，就农户需求和市场实现提出了相关建议，相信这些建议不但能对破解我国农村“融资难”问题起到积极的作用，而且有助于促进我国农村经济的健康、快速发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 China has broad farming area and huge agricultural products markets. Rural issueshave been extensively concerned by the public. The key to solve rural issues lies incontinuing to liberate the productive forces, realizing the faster and better developmentof rural economy. For a long time, owing to the looseness of agricultural organizationstructure, and the unstableness and mutableness of peasant credit, the difficulty ofagriculture financing has became a major bottleneck troubling the Chinese agricultureeconomic development. By clarifying the inner motive for the credit behavior ofagriculture organization based on the peasants, further constructing the credit riskevaluation method for the agriculture credit unit, this dissertation finally achieved thepurpose of easing the difficulty for agriculture financing. The research of thisdissertation not only benefits the finance institution in improving the quality andmanagement ability for the agriculture credit, but also can optimize the agricultureeconomic industry structure to some extent, and make positive contribution to thesolution of the rural issues.This dissertation took agricultural economic organization and peasant as typicalagriculture credit participants, from the perspective of political economic, statisticallydiscussed the historical evolution process and the correlations development status of“agriculture credit participants” and “agriculture finance institution”. Through fieldresearch, this dissertation analyzed the main uses and resources of agriculture loan inChina. After clarify the historical causes and current status of the difficulty of theagriculture financing in China, this dissertation separately discussed the credit behaviorand the agricultural related credit risk evaluation problem of the agricultural creditorganization of China from two aspects which includes “agricultural economicorganization” and “agriculture finance institution”.On agriculture institution level, this dissertation focused on the analysis of themarket status that the agriculture financial institution facing in agriculture credit, andanalyzed the features of the agriculture credit market under the exogenous condition ofcredit quota, and searched the characteristic factor of the credit market based on credit risk mutate.On agriculture credit participants level, this dissertation took agricultural economicorganization as main research object, divided the agricultural economic organizationinto “cooperative agricultural economic organization” and “enterprise agriculturaleconomic organization”, according to their organizational characteristic. Because that“cooperative agricultural economic organization” are mainly spontaneously found bythe peasants, with loose structure, the credit risk of this kind agricultural economicorganization is directly rooted from the interbehavior among the peasants in theagricultural economic organization and its loose structure. Thus, this dissertation usedgame theory to describe the credit behavior between the peasants, and discussed howthe credit risk of this kind of agricultural economic organization depend on the creditbehavior between the peasants, under a typical structure “joint guarantee mechanism”,and made a system stimulation on the effect of this type of agricultural economicorganization to the scale of the organization. For “enterprise agricultural economicorganization”, no matter what the inner structure and behavior the agricultural economicorganization has, this kind of agricultural economic organization will always show theircredit risk through a series of indexes, in this sense, the credit risk evaluation method ofthis kind of agricultural economic organization is similar to that of the generalenterprises. This dissertation according to the characteristic of this kind of agriculturaleconomic organization, creatively introduced the set pair theory to organically integratethe traditional credit risk evaluation methods, and make is more suitable for the creditrisk evaluation of the agricultural economic organization, and built a type of credit riskevaluation method for the agricultural economic organization. Then, in order to describethe credit risk change feature of the individual peasant, this dissertation applied themutation evaluation empirically evaluated the credit risk of the individual peasant.Finally, based on the analysis results, this dissertation provides some suggestionsfrom three aspects: agriculture credit market construction, rural credit systemconstruction and policy support, hoping that these suggestions can not only contribute tothe solution of “financing difficulty” for peasants in China, but also help to promote thedevelopment of the agriculture economy.更多还原