【作者】 简惠云；

【导师】 王国顺；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 进入21世纪,企业与企业之间的竞争逐渐转化为供应链与供应链之间的竞争,供应链管理己成为学术界和企业界关注的热点。供应链契约是供应链管理的基础,是一种能够实现供应链协调和优化供应链绩效的有效机制。供应链契约的研究成果有很多,但是现有文献大都是基于决策者风险中性、公平中性假设下的理论研究。然而近几年行为运作管理及其实验研究表明,风险和公平偏好等行为因素导致人们并不总是追求利润最大化,这对传统供应链契约提出了新的研究课题。论文主要从风险与公平偏好这两个行为因素角度对三种常见的供应链契约进行研究,构建了随机需求下基于风险和公平偏好的供应链契约模型,设计并实施了相关实验,通过控制实验条件,分别研究了风险偏好单一因素及风险与公平偏好双因素对供应商和零售商决策行为的影响,并与风险中性、公平中性下的最优决策行为进行比较。论文采取文献分析、理论建模与实验研究相结合的研究方法,试图从理论分析与实验研究两方面对传统供应链契约研究做出有益补充。主要研究内容与结论如下：第2章在阐述传统供应链契约基本模型的基础上,研究了具有需求信息更新的两种情形下的供应链契约及其协调效果。一种是针对生产提前期长、零售商无补货机会的供应链系统,另一种是针对制造商具有快、慢两种生产模式、零售商可以两阶段订购的供应链系统。第3章首先建立了具有不同风险偏好特性的报童条件风险值模型(CVaR),分析了报童最优决策,相对于已有文献,论文中构建CVaR模型的方法更直观、易懂。在此基础上,分别对风险规避和风险偏爱的零售商,分析了基于stackelberg博弈的批发价契约中供应商的最优决策及回购契约和收益共享契约的协调条件,揭示了零售商的风险偏好对供应链协调及契约参数的影响。第4章建立了供应商的CVaR模型,根据供应商和零售商的风险偏好特性组合,分析了基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链回购契约。分别从零售商、供应商的角度,比较决策者风险态度对双方收益及供应链绩效等的影响,结合数值模拟,分析了不同风险偏好的供应商与零售商合作时是否能达到协调。第5章基于常见的批发价契约、回购契约和收益共享契约,设计了决策者一方为计算机,另一方由人扮演的零售商实验和供应商实验。以风险中性的契约理论为基础,提出了相关的研究假设,并对假设进行了统计检验。利用动态面板数据模型研究了供应商、零售商决策行为的影响因素,用最小二乘法估计了零售商的风险偏好系数,并定性分析了供应商的风险偏好特征。第6章基于批发价契约、回购契约和收益共享契约,通过实验分析了供应链参与者既考虑风险又考虑公平时的决策问题。研究了三种契约在供应链效率及决策者行为等方面的差异,并与仅考虑风险的实验结果进行比较；分析了决策双方有公平互惠考虑后,供应商和零售商决策行为的变化。通过实验研究发现,在仅考虑风险的实验中,零售商的订购量并不总是等于理论标杆；理论上可协调的回购契约和收益共享契约,订购量显著小于标杆值,供应链不能达到协调,但相对于批发价契约,这两种契约能显著提高供应链效率。数学上等价的回购契约和收益共享契约,在实践中并不完全等价。零售商具有锚定和需求追逐行为,其风险偏好系数估计结果表明,大部分个体的风险偏好特征显著,说明风险偏好是产生订购量偏差的主要影响因素。供应商回购契约实验表明,供应商主要表现为风险中性与风险规避,设置的价格组合不能协调供应链。在考虑风险和公平因素的实验中,批发价契约和收益共享契约下,公平偏好没有显著改变零售商的风险态度。而在回购契约中,公平偏好使零售商的风险规避程度减轻。与公平中性相比,考虑公平偏好后,供应商的风险偏好主要表现为风险偏爱,报价显著降低,零售商利润份额及标杆订购量增加,说明供应商愿意承担更多地市场风险,以便扩大销量。在供应商与零售商的多期博弈中,双力的决策行为显著地受到公平性因素的影响,但从长期看,零售商没有因为不公平而显著降低订购量,说明零售商与供应商达到了一种“公平均衡”。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the21st century, the competition between enterprises gradually changes into the competition between the supply chains. Supply chain management has become the focus of the academic and the business. The contract of supply chain is the basis of supply chain management, which is an effective mechanism to achieve the supply chain coordination and optimize the performance of supply chain. There are many literatures in the field of supply chain contract. But the existing literatures are mostly theoretical research based on the assumption that the decision-makers are risk neutral and fair neutral. In recent years, behavioral operations management and its experimental study tell us that the behavioral factors like risk preference and fairness preference make people do not always maximize their profits, which leads to a new research direction in the study of supply chain contract.Three kinds of supply chain contract are studied in this thesis based on the preferences of risk and fairness. Supply chain contract models are constructed based on the preferences risk and fairness under stochastic demand. Some experiments for the study of supply chain contracts are designed and implemented. By controlling the conditions of the experiments, the effect of risk preference on decision of the suppliers and retailers is studied. And then the effect of preference of risk and fairness preference on the supply chain contract is studied. The behaviors are compared with that of the suppliers and retailers with risk-neutral, fair-neutral preferences. A combination of research methods of literature analysis, theoretical modeling and experimental studies are employed in the thesis. We try to make a useful complement to the traditional study of supply chain contracts with theoretical models and experimental studies. The main contents and conclusions are as follows:Based on the description of the basic models of the traditional supply chain contract, two kinds of contract and their coordination to the supply chain with demand information updating are studied in chapter2. One contract is designed for the supply chain system with long production lead time and no replenishment opportunity for the retailers. Another is designed for the supply chain system that the manufacturer has two modes of fast and slow production, and the retailers can order in two-stage.In chapter3, a conditional value at risk model (CVaR) is established with different risk preferences for newsboy. The optimal decision of newsboy is analyzed. With respect to the existing literature, the method for the CVaR model in this thesis is more intuitive and easy to understand. Base on the wholesale price contract with stackelberg game, the suppliers’optimal decision is analyzed with risk aversion or risk taking retailers respectively. And the coordination conditions of the buy-back contract and revenue sharing contract are also studied. The effects of the retailer’s risk preference on the supply chain coordination and the contract parameters are revealed.In chapter4, A CVaR model for suppliers is established. According to the combination of the supplier and the retailer’s risk preference, a buy-back contract of the supply chain based on the Stackelberg game is analyzed. Respectively, from the view of the retailers and suppliers, we compared the impact of the decision-makers risk attitude on both revenue and supply chain performance. Numerical simulation is applied to find if the supply chain can be coordinated by the suppliers and retailers with different risk preference.In chapter5, based on wholesale price contract, buy-back contract and revenue sharing contract, experiments are designed, in which one decision-maker is the computer, and another one is the employed student. Based on the theory of risk-neutral contract, some hypotheses are given, and they are tested by statistical analysis. Dynamic panel data model is applied to study the impact factors of the suppliers’and the retailers’ decision behavior. The coefficient of the retailer’s risk preference is estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS) method. And the supplier’s risk preference is analyzed qualitatively.In chapter6, based on the wholesale price contract, buy-back contract and revenue sharing contract, the supply chain decision problems are studied with risk and fairness preference participants by experimental analysis. The difference of supply chain efficiency and decision-makers behavior among the three contracts are also analyzed, which compared with the experimental results that consider only risk preference. When both of the decision-makers consider of fairness and reciprocity, the changes of the suppliers’and retailers’behavior are discussed.Experimental study found that, in the experiments of considering the risk preference only, the order quantity of the retailers is not always equal to the theoretical benchmark. In theory, buy-back contract and revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, but in the experiments, the order quantity is significantly less than the benchmark, and the supply chain can not achieve coordination. Compared with the wholesale price contract, both the contracts can significantly improve the efficiency of the supply chain. In mathematics, the buy-back contract equals to the revenue sharing contract, but in practice, they are not completely equivalent. Retailers always anchor and chase the demand. The estimation results of the risk preference indicate that most of the individuals have significant risk preference. The results tell us that risk preference is the main factor that makes the order quantity deviate from the benchmark. The results of the buy-back contract experiment for suppliers tell us that suppliers are risk-neutral or risk-aversion. The set of the price in the contracts can not coordinate the supply chain.In the experiment of considering the factors of risk and fairness, fairness preference does not significantly change the retailer’s risk attitude under the wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. In the buy-back contract, fairness preference mitigates the risk aversion of the retailers. Compared with the fair-neutral experiment, after considering fairness preference, risk taking is the main risk preference of the suppliers. They offered significant low prices, which makes the share of profits for the retails and the order quantity increase. The results show us that the suppliers like to take on more market risk in order to expand the sales. In the multi-period game of the suppliers and retailers, both decisions are significantly affected by the fairness preference. But in the long term, the retailers did not significantly reduce the order quantity according to the unfairness, which tells us that the retailers and suppliers achieve a kind of "fairness balance".更多还原