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法治的权力网络

Power Network of the Rule of Law

【作者】 林辉煌

【导师】 贺雪峰;

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 , 社会学, 2013, 博士

【副题名】林乡派出所的警务改革与社会控制(2003-2012)

【摘要】 在中国的社会转型过程中,社会化控制体系和组织化控制体系的弱化使得以公安系统为前锋的专门化控制体系显得日益重要,然而长期存在的官僚化问题和权力自由化问题严重削弱了公安系统在社会控制中的作用。正是在这样的背景下,公安系统从2003年开启了一系列的警务改革。可以认为,整个警务改革是在自由主义的旗帜下围绕着权力规训和执法规范化展开的。然而随着警务改革的推进,基层警察日益消极,越来越多的非法治手段被采用,而多数人的权益也很难获得有效的维护,警务改革陷入“法治内卷化”的困局。通过讲解有关林乡派出所警务改革的故事,本文尝试揭示公安法治建设背后的权力网络与“法治内卷化”生成的中层机制。令人意外的是,近年来的警务改革进一步强化了基层公安机关的官僚化趋势,从而使治安调解成为一线民警不堪重负的任务。更为严重的问题是,当前的治安调解逐渐异化,出现了“治安调解不可逆”的困境:在治安处理丧失公信力的背景下,民警只能通过不断的调解来促成纠纷的表面和解,其结果是通过治安调解的社会控制越来越难以实现。另一方面,随着警务改革的推进,涉警信访出现了“无理化”的趋势,这正是“治安调解不可逆”的直接原因。在公安官僚体系中,上级单位与下级单位在信访治理的博弈过程中形成了一种“信访引诱”的机制,使得信访人可以从中牟取私利。随着无理信访的升级,通过信访的权利救济渠道逐渐被堵塞。如果说涉警信访是通过群众的力量将警察的越轨行为自下而上地暴露出来,那么警务督察则是公安部门对警察权力自上而下的控制过程。随着警务改革的推进,国家对于警察权力的监督技术日益完善,形成了一套以警务督察为核心的“全景敞视”的权力监督网络。然而,警察却发展出各种不规范的应对策略,试图最大限度地减少被当事人信访和被上级单位惩罚的风险,结果导致警察权力的进一步失控。以权力规训为核心的警务改革不仅没能推动公安法治的良性发展,反而陷入法治内卷化的困境。这种意外后果的出现,从根本上讲是因为警务改革打破了“法治的权力网络”,使其不能正常运转。改革者一味地强调权力规训,却忽视了权力决断在法治现代化进程中的重要意义。只有建立在权力决断的基础之上,权力规训才能有效发挥作用,多数人的权益才能够得到维护。然而在当前的警务改革中,由于权力决断能力的丧失和央地关系博弈的失衡,官僚权力体系无法对正义是非原则进行辨识、裁断和实践,结果导致各种投机行为的泛滥。法治内卷化的困局给我们的启发是,在自由主义思潮的蛊惑下,“未经决断的权力规训”只会使法治建设走向自己的对立面。西方国家将自由和市场作为普世性的最高法则推销给发展中国家,结果却给后者带来了巨大的伤害,而这实际上正是西方资本主义在全球确立意识形态霸权的内在需求。作为社会主义发展中国家,中国必须警惕自由主义的糖衣炮弹,在法治建设的进程中确立社会主义意识形态的主体性,从而有效维护国家安全和人民利益。

【Abstract】 In the process of social transformation in China, the weakening of the social control system and the organized control system makes the specialized control system—the public security system as a core—becoming increasingly important. Long-standing bureaucratic issues and power liberalization, however, severely weakened the public security system in the social control. In this context, the public security system started a series of police reform since2003. It is believed that the entire police reform is under the banner of liberalism and around the restriction on powers and the standardization of law enforcement. However, with the advance of police reform, grassroots policemen are increasingly negative, more and more non-rule of law means are used and the interests of the majority of people is difficult to obtain a valid maintenance. Police reform has fell into the dilemma of "involution of rule of law". Through telling the story about the police reform of Lin Town Police Station, this paper attempts to explain the power network behind the construction of rule of law in public security and the mid-level mechanism of "involution of rule of law".Police reform in recent years has further strengthened the bureaucratic trend in the grass-roots public security organs, so that the public security mediation became overwhelmed task for the front-line policemen. The more serious problem is that the current public security mediation gradually alienated to the plight of "public security mediation irreversible":under the background of non-credibility of public security processing, the policemen can only contributed to the surface of the dispute settlement through the mediation. The social control though the public security mediation is increasingly difficult to achieve.On the other hand, with the advance of police reform, the police-related petition became unreasonable, and this is the direct cause of " public security mediation irreversible". In the public security bureaucracy, a "lure to petition" mechanism is generated in the game process between the higher-level units and sub-units, so that the petitioner may appeal to reap personal gain. With the upgrade of unreasonable petition, the channel of right safeguarding through petition is gradually blocked.The police-related petition is the way to expose the deviant behavior of policemen from the bottom up, and the police inspector is the top-down control process of the police powers by the public security department. With the advance of police reform, the supervision technology on policemen has improved steadily, forming a panoptic power-monitoring network with the police inspector as the core. However, the policemen have developed a variety of non-standard coping strategies, trying to minimize the risk of petition of the parties and punishment by the parent unit, resulting in further loss of control of the police powers.The police reform with the core of the restrictions on power is not only to promote the sound development of the rule of law in public security, but to fall into the plight of " involution of rule of law". The emergence of such unintended consequences, fundamentally because the police reform break "the power network of the rule of law", so that it can not operate normally. Reformers solely emphasize the restrictions on powers, but they ignore the significance of the decision of powers in the process of modernization of the rule of law. Only built on the basis of the decision of powers, the restrictions on powers can effectively play a role and most people’s interests can be maintained. In the current police reform, however, due to the loss of the ability of the decision of powers and the imbalance of the game between the central and the local, the bureaucratic power system can not identify, judge and practice the principle of justice, resulting in the proliferation of a variety of speculation.The plight of "involution of rule of law" inspired to us, that,under the spell of liberalism,"the restrictions on powers without the decision of powers" not only unable to advance the development of the rule of law, but toward its opposite. Western countries put the freedom and the market as the highest law of the universal and sell them to the developing countries, as the result, it has brought great harm to the latter, which is the internal demand of the western capitalism to establish ideological hegemony in the whole world. As a socialist developing country, China must be wary of the sugar-coated bullets of the liberalism, and establish the subjectivity of socialist ideology in the process of the building of rule of law, in order to effectively safeguard national security and interests of the people.

  • 【分类号】D631;D632.8;D920.0
  • 【被引频次】1
  • 【下载频次】1685
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