【作者】 嘉璽瑄；

【导师】 崔彬；

【作者基本信息】 中国地质大学（北京） ， 资源产业经济， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 土地是财富之母,人类的经济社会发展几乎都建立在土地之上。在土地资源开发利用上,中央政府的目标与地方政府存在着不一致性,由于各自追求的利益差异会产生行动上的分歧,使得两者在土地政策的制定与执行方面发生着广泛的利益博弈。博弈论是研究理性的决策者之间的冲突与合作的理论,研究当决策主体的行为在发生直接的相互作用时,人们如何进行决策以及这种决策的均衡问题。如何正确地应对中央与地方政府在土地利用上的博弈是一项具有现实意义和理论价值的课题。本文应用博弈理论、非均衡理论和经济动力学理论,对中央与地方政府在土地利用方面的博弈进行分析,从六个方面开展研究。首先,对我国的土地资源及开发利用的现状进行研究,对当前土地资源的开发利用情况开展了研究,提出了开发利用存在的博弈问题。其次,对我国现行的土地政策及其改进进行分析,找到当前土地政策的缺陷,并提出这些土地政策的改进的建议。第三,对地方政府的土地管理及产权进行分析,剖析地方政府经济发展的压力,给出地方政府的发展对土地的依赖关系,对地方政府的土地管理、产权利益进行了分析。第四,对中央与地方政府之间博弈模型设计及分析,分析了中央与地方政府之间的关系,对土地政策、土地管理、土地产权的利益博弈进行了较为详细的分析。第五,对中央与地方政府之间博弈模型案例进行分析,选取典型案例开展讨论。通过系统而又深入的研究,本文得出以下结论与建议：(1)国家应建立区域差别化的土地集约利用政策；(2)建立定性与定量相结合的综合指标政绩考核机制；(3)创新多途径的土地集约利用挖潜；(4)提高土地利用信息技术,完善上下级土地信息共享机制；(5)赋予农民应有土地权利,增加地方政府违规成本；(6)改革财政分配制度,消除土地政策博弈中的内在动力。本文从消除土地政策博弈中的内在动力出发,系统地提出区域差别化的土地集约利用政策,创造性建立了一整套地方政府综合指标和政绩考核体系,创新了多途径的土地集约利用办法,研究出新的财政分配制度,可望从根本上解决中央与地方政府之间博弈。(1)本文利用博弈理论分析了中央与地方政府在土地资源开发利用中的博弈,并构建了博弈模型。该模型从定量的角度对中央与地方政府的博弈关系进行了分析,能够处理中央和地方政府处理他们之间土地资源开发利用问题。(2)本文对我国现行的土地政策、地方政府发展的压力、地方政府的土地管理、土地产权进行梳理,提出了土地政策的改进方式、分析了土地管理及收益。(3)中央与地方政府的定量博弈模型构建基础上,选择典型案例进行了分析,着重从政策、管理、产权等视角阐述了博弈关系,为中央处理与地方政府的博弈关系提供了支撑手段。更多还原

【Abstract】 The land is the mother of wealth, and economic and social development of mankind almost all built on the land. The central government objectives and local governments have inconsistencies on the development and utilization of land resources. Thus, their pursuit of the interests of difference will produce differences in action, both in the formulation and implementation of land policy with a wide range of interests of the game. Game theory is a theory of conflict and cooperation between the studies of rational decision-makers. It is study how people make decisions, and this decision equilibrium problem when the decision-making body in the event of a direct interaction. How to properly respond to the Game of the central and local governments is a subject of practical and theoretical value in land using.Based on the game theory, this paper carry out the game analysis between central government and local government in land utilization, and the concrete content is as Secondly, the improvement in current land policy is analyezed, including analysis current our country the current land policy, and find out the defects of the land policy, and put forward the land policy improvement suggestion.Thirdly, Land management and property of local government is analyezed. The author analysis the development pressure and the dependence of land of local government; meanwhile, the land management and property interests of local government are analyzed. Fourthly, the game model between central and local government is designed and analyzed. The paper constructed the central and local government’s game model, analyzed of relationship between the central and local government, the land policy, land management, land property interests game are analyzed in detail. Finally,the case between central and local government’s game model is analyzed,and draw the following suggestions:(1) the State shall establish the regional differentiation intensive land use policies;(2)to establish a combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators of performance evaluation mechanism integrated;(3) to innovate more ways of tapping the potential of intensive use of land;(4) to improve land use information technology to improve information-sharing mechanisms on lower land;(5) to give farmers land rights to increase local government compliance costs;(6) to reform the financial distribution system to eliminate the land policy of intrinsic motivation game.This paper is expected to solve the game between central and local government fundamentally, from the elimination of internal force in the game of land policy, systematically puts forward the region difference in land intensive use policy, creatively established system of a set of comprehensive index and the local government performance evaluation, innovative ways of intensive land use measures of finance, new distribution system.(1) This paper constructs the game model of central and local government in land resources development and utilization based on game theory. It analyzes the game relationship between central and local government from a quantitative point of view. It can be more central and local government to deal with them to provide a more reliable model.(2) This paper analyzed our current land policy, the local government development pressure, the local government land management, land property rights, and provided improvement way of land policy, analyzed land management and profit.(3) The construction of quantitative model based on the central and local government, through analysis of typical cases, the design of the central government and the local government land game model, and focused on the land policy, land management, property and content of carrying out the analysis, provides the support for the relationship between the central processing and means of the local government.更多还原