【作者】 张璇；

【导师】 杨善林；

【作者基本信息】 合肥工业大学 ， 企业管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 国有企业创新动力不足一直是学者们研究的焦点问题。一般认为企业研发投资强度即研发投资额与销售收入之比达到2%企业才能基本生存,达到5%才具有竞争力。根据本研究从中国上市公司年报中获得的研发投资数据来看,2002-2009年间,国有上市公司的研发投资强度平均仅为1.10%,国有上市公司应当是国有企业中的“精英”,由此推测,国有企业总体创新投入强度会更低。我国从树立自主创新的目标以来,一直不遗余力的对企业尤其是国有企业进行各种方式的创新补贴激励,本文通过对我国上市公司2002-2009年研发数据的统计分析,国有企业获得资助占创新投入的比重平均为57.89%。如果加上税收政策和货币政策对企业R&D的资助,国家对国有企业的创新激励的力度将会更大。然而国有企业为何仍然没有足够的创新动力,这是否说明目前的创新激励体系并没有产生非常合理的效果?政府应该采取何种激励政策来更有效的促进国有企业研发?这些问题的研究对于政府如何建立有效的国家创新体系、提高国有企业技术进步实现产业升级至关重要。本文采用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法对影响国有企业创新积极性的因素进行研究,并根据国有企业的特点提出有效激励国有企业创新投入的政策建议。本文主要研究内容及其研究结论如下：1.对政府干预影响国有企业创新行为的机理进行了剖析,本文认为股权控制和高管任命是政府干预国有企业的作用途径,而政府对政绩的追求与对国有企业创新激励的目标有所背离。并通过实证研究对二者的关系进行了验证,研究显示：政府干预越强,国有企业的创新投入越小,创新积极性越差,具体来说国有企业的冗员程度越高,其创新积极性越差；政府对GDP和就业率的追求程度与国有企业创新成反比,这些都说明政府干预带来的政策性负担大大的影响了国有企业创新积极性。2.对政府R&D资助政策对中央企业和地方企业创新激励的有效性进行了分析,并通过实证研究得出：相对于间接资助,政府财政直接资助更能促进中央企业技术创新支出的增长,这与中央企业多半承担国家基础创新任务的特点相符合。但是对地方国有企业来说,直接资助的效果不明显,这与地方国有企业受地方政府干预较多、承担了一些政策性负担,并将直接资助作为向政府要补偿的心态有关,相反间接资助这类事后资助的方式对地方国有企业的创新激励会较为有效。此外所得税优惠政策对国有企业创新激励的作用并非十分显著,在非国有企业也未发挥明显的作用。3.对高管激励制度对国有企业创新激励的影响进行了分析,并通过实证研究得出：(1)在中央企业高管激励制度中股权激励制度发挥了对创新激励的主要作用;在地方企业中高管激励仍然以现金薪酬激励为主,并且现金薪酬和股权薪酬均对国有企业的创新激励较为显著,这可能与地方国资委在制定高管现金薪酬时为了鼓励高管增加创新投入而对高管考核时将创新投入扣除在净利润之外有关。(2)但是在进一步考量了政府干预的不同程度之后,本文得出了政府干预程度越高,则地方国有企业的股权激励与创新激励的效果越差,因此股权激励国有企业创新的有效性会在政府干预的影响下减弱。4.在对影响国有企业创新激励的主要制度因素分析的基础上,文章得出过度的政府干预是影响国有企业创新激励的根本制度因素,政府R&D资助政策和高管激励机制的激励效果都会因为政府过度干预的存在而减弱。因此本文从减少政府干预、合理安排政府R&D资助政策以及完善高管激励制度三方面提出了优化国有企业创新激励制度的对策建议。本文的研究贡献主要在于：(1)已有的创新激励问题的研究多从企业内部制度安排入手,较少考虑外部制度环境的影响,而我国国有企业经营行为最大的特点就是受政府干预的程度很高。因此文章从政府干预的视角对国有企业创新激励进行研究可以从根源上找答案,更加有说服力。研究认为减少政府干预是有利于提高国有企业创新积极性最根本的制度安排。而其他制度安排都会受到这一制度因素的影响。(2)文章以国有上市公司的报表数据为样本,对政府给予国有企业创新资助的方式进行了研究。补充了已往研究多半以行业宏观数据为样本进行研究的局限性。并得出不同类型的国有企业资助方式的不同其效果也不同,政府应根据企业创新的特点来进行R&D资助。(3)文章在政府干预的视角下考察了中央企业和地方企业的高管激励制度对创新激励的影响,为政府制定合理的薪酬考核制度鼓励创新活动提供了依据。(4)借助理论分析和实证研究的结果,从减少政府干预,合理安排政府创新资助政策和完善国有企业高管激励制度三方面提出了有利于国有企业创新投入的制度安排。更多还原

【Abstract】 How to incentive the state owned enterprises’(SOE) innovation is an unsolved problem. Ordinarily the enterprise can be survived in a competitive market when the intensity of R&D investment reach2%, and only can be competitive when the intensity reach5%. But when we collect the data from China’s capital market, we find that the average intensity of R&D in SOEs was only1.1%from2002-2009.The listed SOEs are the elites of the whole SOE group, so we can image the intensity of the SOEs will be even lower than1.1%. Since China has set the goal of building an innovation country, China is always trying to incentive the SOEs’ innovation with all kinds of methods. As our data shows that the average intensity of R&D subsidies was over57.89%in the SOEs, and the intensity will be even strong if we add the subsidy of tax policy and monetary policy. But the Chinese SOEs still lack of innovation. Does the government play a correct role in the incentive system? It’s quiet important for the country to reach its goal of building an innovation society.The paper studies the institutional environment which impact SOEs’innovation by both positive analysis and normative analysis, and also presents some suggestions on the policies of how to incentive the enthusiasm of SOEs’ innovation. After reviewing the main studies, we list the brief conclusions of this paper as follows:1. Based on the studies of the mechanism of how government intervenes impact the SOEs’ innovation, the paper finds that the government intervenes the SOEs through controlling the ownership and the assignment of the managers, and the purchasing of political achievements is deviate to the goal of SOEs’ innovation incentive. The positive studies show that:first, the stronger of the government intervenes, the less of the SOEs’ R&D intensity, which means the incentive effect is bad; secondly, the higher of the overstaffing in SOEs, the enthusiasm of SOEs’ innovation is less; the purchasing of GDP and employment rate is negative to the SOEs’ innovation. These results indicate that policy burden impact the enthusiasm of SOEs’ innovation.2. The paper studies the effect of public R&D subsidies on SOEs’ innovation, and the results indicate that:direct subsidies incentive central SOEs’innovation much better than local SOEs; indirect subsidies incentive local SOEs’ innovation effectively, which is coordinate to the fact that the policy burden produced the motivation of requiring subsidies from the government; and tax subsidy has no obvious effect on all kinds of SOEs.3.This paper examines the effect of executives’ incentives on SOEs’ innovation, the findings include:(1) the equity incentive has played an main effect to incentive the innovation in central SOEs, and the cash payment is still the first incentive in local SOEs, but the cash payment and equity incentive are both positive to the SOEs’ innovation, which may relative to the local government has deducted the R&D expenses from net profit to incentive innovation.(2) but when we add the factor of government intervene, the results show that:When the intervene is strong, the effect of incentive is worse. Which indicate that government intervenes will induce the effect of equity incentives.4. Based on the former analysis, the paper finds that government intervene is the fundamental factor which impact the SOEs’innovation, and the effect of government R&D subsidies and the equity incentive will be reduced of the government intervene. And the paper suggests some advices from government intervene, R&D subsidies policy and executive incentive.This paper makes some contributions to the literature in the following four dimensions.(1) This research fills the vacancy of previous study on outside insititutional environment:The SOE’s operation is higher influenced by the government,so the study result shows that reducing government intervene is the fundamental insitution to incentive SOE’s innovation,and other insitutional factors will be impact by government intervene too.(2)Based on the empirical testing of SOE’s individual data, this paper fills the vacancy of previous study only based on industry data, and the paper also proposes that the effection will be different among different kinds of SOEs, and the government should subsidize more reasonable.(3)This research studies how excutive’s incentive system impact innovation under government intervenes in central SOEs and local SOEs,and also provides some evidence for the government to formulate more reasonable compensation policy.(4)Based on the theoretical analysis and empirical analysis,the paper proposes insititutional arrangement from reducing government intervene,reasonable subsidize and executive’s incentive system to incentive SOE’s innovation.更多还原