【作者】 李楠；

【导师】 程炼；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 外国哲学， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 本文关注的是关于意识的难问题,即,如何在自然的世界中为现象属性定位。我希望通过本文的分析讨论为属性二元论——现象属性不是物理的——辩护。达成这个目标需要两个方面的工作：一是给出支持属性二元论为真的论证并捍卫该论证,二是说明对属性二元论的其他质疑都不是致命的。具体地,本文要使用一个新的可设想性论证支持属性二元论。这个论证的成立取决于两个关键的论题,一个是现象概念直显性,一个是模态理性主义。现象概念的直显性论题是关于现象概念的一个特征,指的是：如果我们理解了一个现象属性q的概念Q,那么我们知道属性q的实质是什么。对于现象概念的研究主要来自于物理主义者那一方,来自二元论者的系统性说明还不多。我对日常概念进行分类,把现象概念和其他不具有直显性的日常概念进行对比,得到现象概念在认知方面具独特性的结论,并且使用二维语义学的工具来进一步说明我的结论。另一个关键的论题是模态理性主义,其基本想法是在某种限制下的可设想性蕴涵可能性,经本文讨论得到的限制是,要使用直显性概念对可设想的情景进行描述,且要满足不包含逻辑矛盾这样的要求。对模态理性主义的辩护,将从我们对模态的使用和对可能世界的理解这些一般性考虑入手,此外我还回击了种种反例和反对意见。在给出一个新的可设想性论证支持属性二元论之后,我考虑了对这个论证的种种反驳,尤其是来自于现象概念策略的反对意见,这个策略被认为是最有希望成功的捍卫物理主义的策略,我将对查莫斯的全能论证进行改进,从而全面地回击现象概念策略。第二个方面的工作考虑的是对属性二元论的其他反对意见,主要有心智因果性难题、滑向实体二元论的质疑,以及指责属性二元论是反科学和反自然主义的立场。经过分析和讨论,这些反对意见都不是致命的,属性二元论是一个合理的解决意识问题的选项,是值得慎重对待的。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation addresses the hard problem of consciousness, which is, how to find a place for phenomenal consciousness in the natural world. The goal is to defend Property Dualism—the doctrine that the phenomenal properties are not physical. Two aspects of work are needed to be done:one is to give an argument for Property Dualism and to defend the argument, and the other is to argue that some other problems are not fatal to the acceptance of property dualism.Specifically, I offer a new version of the conceivability argument, the soundness of which relies on two theses:the Revelation Thesis of Phenomenal Concepts (RTPC for short) and Modal Rationalism (MR for short). Revelation is a feature of phenomenal concepts, and RTPC means that if we understand a phenomenal concept Q of a phenomenal property q, then we know the essential conditions for an object to be q. It is the materialists that have the most enthusiasm for the phenomenal concepts, and yet the dualists have not developed a comprehensive framework concerning the phenomenal concepts. I will fill the gap here. By comparing phenomenal concepts with other ordinary concepts, I conclude that phenomenal concepts have a unique feature in revealing the essence of the phenomenal to us. Also I use two-dimensional semantics to illustrate my reasons for RTPC. The basic idea of MR is that conceivability under certain restrictions is a reliable guide to metaphysical possibility. I argue that the restrictions are that one should conceive using revealable concepts and the conceived scenarios cannot contain any logical contradictions. We should accept MR considering our applications of modal notions and our understanding of possible worlds. I also defend MR from some salient counterexamples and objections.Based on RTPC and MR, I give a new version of conceivability argument for Property Dualism and defend its soundness from the objections from the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS for short), which is thought as the most promising strategy in defending materialism. I improve Chalmers’ Master Argument and rebut the PCS once for all.The second aspect of my work deals with other doubts about Property Dualism, including the problem from mental causation, the challenge from Substance Dualism and the accusation of being anti-scientific and anti-naturalism. I argue that these objections are not fatal. In a word, Property Dualism is a tenable theory.更多还原