【作者】 何佳；

【导师】 江生忠；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 保险学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 完善的保险市场退出制度是保险市场成熟的重要标志。目前，我国保险市场退出制度尚不完善，还没有一家保险公司退出市场。保险企业市场退出影响保险产业组织结构。我国保险产业内存在的许多问题都与缺乏完善的保险市场退出制度密切相关。本文正是以我国保险产业组织结构优化的视角研究我国保险市场退出的必要性、保险市场退出行为以及保险市场退出方式选择等问题。本文第二部分研究保险市场退出的一般理论问题。首先，分析保险产业的基本特征，归纳保险市场退出壁垒的基本特征，然后，概括保险公司市场退出的种类。笔者在分析市场退出与保险产业组织优化之间关系的基础上，描绘了完善的保险市场退出制度有效运行的条件下，优化的保险产业组织结构模式——差别寡头垄断模式，具体表现为：大中小公司并存，市场集中度较高，拥有几家具有国际竞争力的大型保险集团；发展模式多元化，实现多层次规模经济效应；产品差异化；市场进入的经济性壁垒充分发挥作用，市场退出的政策性壁垒降低，保险公司在不同层次规模经济之间转化的摩擦和成本较低。最后，笔者界定了保险市场退出的内涵。本文第三部分阐述保险市场退出的相关经济理论。市场退出是市场竞争的结果，第一节归纳了竞争相关理论。市场退出又是产业组织理论的基本范畴，第二节阐述了产业组织理论的发展。市场退出是企业成长的最终阶段，第三节列举了有代表性的企业成长理论。本文第四部分从实证和理论两个角度论证了我国保险市场退出的必要性。从实证角度，笔者首先分析我国保险市场结构特征；然后，根据我国产寿险业的资本收益率和资本边际收益状况，评价我国产寿险业的效率，得出结论：我国中小保险公司的效率偏低，有退出的必要性；最后，分析我国保险产业组织面临的主要问题，并指出问题的根源是高市场退出壁垒和缺乏完善的市场退出机制。从理论角度，首先，笔者运用市场经济理论和产业组织理论，分析了市场退出对提高保险市场效率、优化保险产业组织结构、解决我国保险市场供求结构性失衡的重要作用，得出结论：保险市场退出是必要的。然后，笔者对我国保险业的规模经济状况进行分析，并建立模型找出保险公司最优规模的影响因素，得出结论：我国保险业规模经济性不明显，中小保险公司兼并是实现规模经济的有效途径。在本部分最后笔者指出我国保险市场退出的本质是保险产业组织结构调整与优化。本文第五部分运用博弈论方法研究保险公司市场退出行为决策。首先，介绍消耗战博弈的理论模型，并建立保险公司消耗战博弈的基本分析框架。然后，采用弗登博格和泰勒尔消耗战模型的思路，分析我国保险公司市场退出决策的影响因素，得出结论：保险公司滞留的预期保费收入越高，保险立法、保险监管越倾向于挽救处于危机的保险公司，保险公司越容易转嫁滞留成本，保险公司越倾向于滞留市场。本文第六部分研究保险公司兼并的相关理论问题。首先，分析保险公司兼并与保险产业组织优化之间的关系。然后，分析保险公司兼并的效率收益，并通过案例分析保险公司兼并的动因。最后，分析保险公司兼并可能产生的反竞争效应，找出兼并反竞争效应的影响因素，即产品差异化、竞争模式及策略反应特征、市场结构。在此基础上得出结论：在价格竞争模式下，应鼓励产品差异化程度高的中小保险公司兼并。本文第七部分研究我国保险市场退出制度的相关问题。首先，分析我国保险市场退出制度框架；考虑到我国保险业的发展现状，笔者认为现阶段我国政府在干预保险市场退出中的目标定位应该兼顾行业稳定和行业效率；在此基础上，笔者提出政府干预保险公司市场退出的行为边界以及具体的政策措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 Perfect market exit system is an important indicator of the maturity of insurancemarket. Currently, China’s insurance market exit system is not yet perfect; so far,there has been no insurance company exiting from the market. Insurance company’sexit from market affects insurance industrial organization. Many problems in China’sinsurance industry are related to lack of perfect insurance market exit system. In thisdissertation, the author studies the necessity of market exit and market exit behaviorand the choice of the mode of market exit from the viewpoint of optimization ofindustrial organization.In the second part, the author studies the basic theoretical issues of market exit.Through the analysis of the features of insurance industry, the author generalizes thecharacteristics of the barriers to insurance market exit; then summarizes the types ofinsurance company’s market exit. The author analyzes the relations between marketexit and optimization of insurance industrial organization, on this basis, the authordepicts the optimal structure of insurance industrial organization under the conditionof effectively functioning of perfect market exit system: differentiated oligopolymodel, that is, large, medium-size and small companies coexist, relatively highmarket concentration, several large insurance groups or insurance conglomerates withinternational competitiveness; diversified developing modes, multi-level economiesof scale; product differentiation; economic barriers to market entry fully play theirpart, policy barriers to market exit reducing, lower transition costs between differentlevels of economies of scale. Finally, the author defines the concept “insurancemarket exit system” and analyzes the contents of this concept.In the third part, the author outlines the relative economics theories of marketexit. Market exit is the result of competition, in section one, the author generalizes thecompetition theories. Market exit is the basic concept of industrial organization theory,in section two, the author outlines the evolution of industrial organization theories.Exit from the market is the last stage of the firm’s growth, in section three, the author lists the theories of the growth of the firm.In the fourth part, the author discusses the necessity of insurance market exit inChina through the empirical analysis and the theoretical analysis. In the empiricalanalysis, the author firstly analyzes the features of China’s insurance market structure;then, according to the return ratio of equity and the marginal return ratio of equity ofChina’s property insurance market and life insurance market, the author evaluates theefficiency of China’s property insurance market and life insurance market, concludesthat the efficiency of the medium scale and small companies is low, and it’s necessaryfor someone to exit from the market; lastly, the author analyzes the main problems ofChina’s insurance industrial organization, and points out the reasons of theseproblems, that is, the high market barriers and lack of perfect market exit mechanism.In the theoretical analysis, firstly, according to market economy theories andindustrial organization theories, the author finds that market exit helps improve theefficiency of insurance market, optimize the structure of insurance industrialorganization and solve the problem of structural imbalance between supply anddemand in insurance market; on this basis, the author concludes that insurance marketexit is necessary. Secondly, the author analyzes the effect of economy of scale andbuilds a model to find out the influencing factors of the optimal scale of insurancecompany, then concludes that the effect of economy of scale in China’s insuranceindustry is not significant, merger between the medium scale and small companies isan effective way to realize the effect of economy of scale. In the end of this part, theauthor points out that, in substance, China’s insurance market exit is adjustment andoptimization of insurance industrial organization.In the fifth part, through the game theory model, the author studies the decisionof insurance company’s exit from market. Firstly, the author introduces the model ofthe war of attrition, and then builds the analytical framework of the war of attritionbetween insurance companies. Secondly, based on the model built by Fudenberg andTirole in1986, the author analyzes the influencing factors of the decision of marketexit for insurance company, and concludes that in the following three cases, insurancecompany prefers to staying in the market, that is, high expected premium income,insurance laws and insurance regulation being apt to remedy the insurance company in crisis, insurance company being readily to transfer the costs of staying in market.In the sixth part, the author studies the theoretical issues of insurance company’smerger. Firstly, the author analyzes the relation of insurance company’s merger andinsurance industrial organization optimization. Secondly, the author analyzes theefficiency benefits from insurance company’s merger. Through the cases around theinternational insurance market, the author presents the motives of insurancecompany’s merger. Lastly, the author analyzes the anti-competition effect ofinsurance company’s merger, and points out the influencing factors of theanti-competition effect of merger, that is, product differentiation, competition modeand strategic reaction characteristic, market structure. On this basis, the authorconcludes that under the competition of price, merger between medium scale andsmall companies whose products are highly differentiated should be promoted.Finally, in the seventh part, the author studies some issues of insurance marketexit system in China. Firstly, the author analyzes the contents of insurance market exitsystem in our country; and then, in consideration of the present condition of ourinsurance market, the author thinks that, at present, the objective of our government’sintervention in insurance market exit should simultaneously focus on the stability andefficiency of insurance industry; on this basis, the author points out the boundaries ofgovernment’s intervention and some specific policies and measures.更多还原