【作者】 纪新伟；

【导师】 张志超；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 财政学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 国有企业利润分配在经历了“统收统支”→“放权让利”→“全部留存”等阶段后，于2007年开始了向投资者分红（主要是向国家上缴利润）的阶段。目前，实务界和学术界对国有企业应该上缴利润这一点已达成共识，但是，在上缴比例（即分红比例）方面仍存在分歧。国有企业的分红比例既要保证国有企业的可持续发展，也要保证投资者得到合理回报，该比例的确定需要在坚实的理论和翔实的数据基础上进行逻辑严谨的论证。本文的研究正是按照这一研究思路，提出了40%-60%的分红区间，解决了国有企业合理分红比例问题。本文的篇章结构如下。引言部分指出了选题背景、研究目的、学术价值与现实意义，给出了本文的研究思路、结构安排与主要创新之处。第一章到第三章是本文的研究基础，包括国有企业分红的相关文献综述、相关理论基础和相关的制度背景。第一章是国有企业分红的相关文献综述。按照信息不对称前提下利益相关者之间的利益冲突关系介绍了信号传递理论（解决现有投资者与潜在投资者之间的信息不对称）、委托代理理论（解决管理者与投资者之间的信息不对称）和利益输送理论（解决大股东和中小股东之间的信息不对称）等方面的相关研究成果，为本文的研究提供文献支持。第二章是国有企业分红的相关理论基础，主要介绍了产权理论、契约理论和国有企业理论，为进一步的分析提供理论指导。产权理论是探讨分红问题的前提。正是在所有权和经营权分离的基础上，所有者才会依据产权理论行使剩余索取权，要求企业分红，否则分红问题不会产生。契约理论从不同的角度探讨合理的分红比例问题，本文主要介绍了其中的委托代理理论、不完全契约理论以及交易成本理论。产权理论和契约理论是针对所有企业分红的理论基础，同样适用于国有企业。但是，国有企业在所有权性质和结构方面与一般企业存在很大差异，因此，本文又针对国有企业的特殊性介绍了国有企业理论。第三章介绍了我国国有企业分红的制度背景，简要回顾了建国后国有企业利润分配的四个阶段：“统收统支”→“放权让利”→“全部留存”→“上缴利润”，厘清制度背景有助于我们基于国情探讨国有企业分红的合理比例。第四章到第六章是本文的数据分析部分，包括上市公司的分红现状、合理分红比例的计算以及可行性论证。第四章采用描述性分析的方式分析了我国A股市场上市公司的红利分配情况，着重对比央企上市公司和所有A股上市公司在股利分配形式、现金分红的具体比例方面进行了描述。第五章是本文的实证分析部分，采用沪深两市2006-2009年的所有央企上市公司和所有A股公司为样本，以使会计业绩最大化的分红比例为研究对象，以总资产收益率为被解释变量，以分红比例为解释变量构建了多元线性回归模型，通过回归分析，得出使会计业绩达到最优的合理的分红比例应该位于40%-60%这一区间内，并对这一结果进行了稳健性检验。第六章是合理分红比例的可行性分析，首先进行了分红比例的国际比较，发现很多国家公司的分红比例在这个区间，说明该比例经过了不同制度背景（包括政治体制和市场体制等方面）的检验，在实践上是可行的。接下来基于中国石油的分红案例分析发现，中国石油在发行H股时承诺按照40%-50%的分红比例进行分配，实际上也一直按照40%以上的分红比例进行分红，而与另一分红比例比较低的石油巨头——中国石化——相比，中国石油的盈利能力和增长能力并不差，从而说明40%-60%这一分红比例在中国国有企业也是可行的。最后是本文的研究结论和政策建议。基于第四章到第六章的数据分析，我们认为，40%-60%的分红比例区间是比较合理的，目前国有企业向国家分红的比例仍有很大的上升空间。但只有在国有企业持续盈利的前提下，提高分红比例才有意义。所以本文的政策建议如何保持国有企业持续盈利和如何使分红比例达到最优区间两个方面展开。我们认为，为确保国企持续盈利，要进行制度设计，明确国企定位；完善公司治理结构，加强规范的董事会建设。为使分红比例达到最优区间，需要加强对国企会计信息的质量控制，夯实分红基础；同时设定目标分红比例，制定明确的提高分红比例的时间表；建立固定比例和变动比例相结合的弹性分红机制；逐步扩大分红范围。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the birth of new China, the distribution of profits generated bystate-owned-enterprise (hereafter SOE) has gone through four stages which are (1)unified state control over income and expenditure (tong shou tong zhi),(2)decentralization of power and transfer of profits (fang quan rang li),(3) fully retained,and (4) paying dividends to investors. Now, there has been a consensus that SOEsshould pay cash dividends. But there are different opinions with regard to the suitablepayout ratio which must ensure both the sustainable development of SOEs and thereasonable profits of investors. The ratio should be determined on the basis of solidtheory, sufficient data analysis, and rigorous arguments. According to that researchlogic, we find that the suitable payout ratio should be40%to60%.The arrangement of the distertaion is as follows. The introductory part describesthe motivation, purpose, and the academic and practical value of the research. Theresearch logic, the arrangement of the chapters and the main contributions are alsointroduced.Chapter one to three provides the research premise which includes the literaturereview, the theoretical and institutional backgrouds with regard to dividend policies ofSOEs.Chapter one reviews the extant literature related to dividens policies of SOEs.According to the different conflicts of interests on the premise of informationasymmetry, we review three areas of dividend policy research. The signaling theoryintends to resolve the information asymmetry between extant investors and potentialinvestors. The principal-agent theory intends to resolve the information asymmetrybetween management and investors while the tunneling theory intends to resolve theinformation asymmetry between large shareholders and minority ones. The literaturereview provides us with more insights on the research logic.Chapter two examines the basic theories related to dividend policies of SOEsincluding theory of property rights, contract theory and theory of SOEs. The theory ofproperty rights is the premise of dividend policy. It is due to the separation of ownership and management that owners have the rights of residual claims and profitsharing according to the theory of property rights. Contract theories examine theoptimal payout ratio from different perspectives which include principal-agent theory,imcomplete contract theory and theory of transction costs. Theory of property rightsand contract theory also apply to SOEs which have the commonalities of firms.Meanwhile, there are significant differences between SOEs and other firms in thenature and structure of ownership. Thus we also discuss theories of SOEs related tothe particularities of SOEs.Chapter three introduces the institutional backgrounds. We make a briefintroduction to the four stages of the distribution relationship between SOEs and thegovernment, which are (1) unified state control over income and expenditure (tongshou tong zhi),(2) decentralization of power and transfer of profits (fang quan rangli),(3) fully retained, and (4) paying dividends to investors. The analysis ofinstitutional backgrounds helps us to better understand the optimal payout ratioconforming to the situation of our country.Chapter four, five and six are the data-analyzing parts, including the practices oflisting firms’ dividend policies, calculation of the optimal payout ratios and analyzingthe feasibility of the optimal ratios.Chapter four provides descriptive summaries of the practices of SOEs’(whichare ultimately owned by the central government, hereafter as CSOE) and all A-sharecompanies’ dividend policies. We compare the difference between CSOEs’and allA-share companies in the timing, types, and cash ratios of dividend paying.Chapter five calculates the optimal payout ratios. The sample includes CSOEsduring the period from2006to2009, comparing to a sample consisting all A-sharecompanies of the same period. Aiming at the maximization of accountingperformance and using the return to total assets as proxy variable, we calculate theoptimal payout ratios by multi-variate regressions. The results indicate that theoptimal payout ratios should be40%to60%.Chapter six analyzes the feasibility of the optimal payout ratios derived fromchapter five. International comparisons show that firms of many countires actuallyadopt a payout ratio between40%and60%, indicating that the ratio is suitable to different institutional backgrounds and feasibile in practice. Then a case analysis ofPetroChina Company Limited (hereafter as PetroChina) indicates that PetroChina haspromised to pay40%-50%of net profits as dividends at the IPO of H-shares in2001.Since the IPO of H-share, PetroChina has indeed paid out more than40%of its netprofits as dividends, even after the IPO of A-shares in2007. In contrast to ChinaPetroleum and Chemical Corporation (hereafter as SINOPEC), which is PetroChina’scounterpart and always pays less than PetroChina, PetroChina is more successful inprofitability and ability of growth. That also indicates the feasibility of our optimalpayout ratios in SOEs.The last chapter concludes our research. Based on our research, we conclude thatthe payout ratio of40%-60%is suitable and feasibile and the current mandatorypayout ratios have the potential to improve. We also recognize that only when theSOEs make sustainable profits can the increase of payout ratios make sense.Therefore our suggestions focus on two facets, which are (1) how to ensure thesustainable profits of SOEs, and (2) how to direct the payout ratios to the optimalones. To ensure the sustainable profits of SOEs, policy-makers must clearly positeSOEs with rigorous design of corresponding systems. The structure of coporategovernance needs to be improved and the broad of directors must be strengthened andstandardized. To direct the payout ratios to the optimal ones, we should strengthen thequality of financial information of SOEs and avoid earnings managements by SOEs.In the meanwhile, the target payout ratios should be set up and a definite timetableshould be laid down. We should also establish a flexible system with fixed andvariable payout ratios，moreover,the scope to pay dividend should be enlarged to allenterprises owned by the state.更多还原