【作者】 翟伟峰；

【导师】 李长英；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 西方经济学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 本文研究技术溢出条件下对外直接投资和技术授权问题。就对外直接投资而言，论文借助寡头竞争模型，主要从以下三个方面展开了研究：第一，论文研究了存在技术溢出条件下，企业对外直接投资(FDI)方式的选择问题，即如何在新建企业(Greenfield investment)和并购(Merger andAcquisition)之间进行选择。当技术溢出程度较高时，企业的最佳投资方式是新建企业。当技术溢出程度较低时，企业的最佳投资方式是并购。企业的吸收能力是影响技术溢出进而影响投资方式的重要因素，而研发投入是决定企业吸收能力的关键。在允许当地企业研发的拓展模型中，企业的投资方式依赖于研发前当地企业的生产成本和研发效率。本文还利用面板数据对理论模型的部分结论进行了实证检验。第二，研究了一个技术寻求型企业的对外直接投资和发达国家的知识产权保护问题。研究结果表明，只有当技术寻求型企业获得技术溢出后整体生产效率高于东道国企业时，以获取先进技术为目的的FDI才能成功。而且，与现有理论文献认为的严格的知识产权保护有利于发达国家不同，本文的研究结果表明，并不是在所有情况下严格的知识产权保护一定对发达国家有利。在获得技术溢出后，外国企业整体生产效率高于发达国家企业时，多数情况下发达国家降低知识产权保护程度反而有利于社会福利的提高。第三，研究了二次技术溢出对企业对外直接投资和社会福利的影响。与一次技术溢出的作用完全相反，二次技术溢出使得企业更倾向于选择出口，而不是FDI。对于FDI东道国的社会福利而言，无论二次技术溢出程度如何，都低于没有二次技术溢出时的水平；而二次技术溢出对FDI母国社会福利的影响呈U型曲线，当二次技术溢出水平较低时，社会福利随着技术溢出程度的提高而下降，并且低于没有二次技术溢出时的水平；当二次技术溢出较高时，社会福利随着技术溢出程度的提高而上升，并最终高于没有二次技术溢出时的水平。就技术授权而言，论文讨论了一个处于上下游产品市场结构和技术溢出环境中的下游生产性技术拥有企业，如何进行技术授权问题，该企业拥有降低最终品和中间品生产成本的技术。研究结果表明：在双重收费合同形式下，下游技术拥有企业总是选择同时向上下游企业进行技术授权。技术溢出程度的大小对技术拥有企业的授权动机产生影响，在一定情形下，技术溢出程度越高，授权动机越强。对上游企业的技术授权或者同时对上下游企业的技术授权提高了消费者剩余和社会福利；对下游企业授权时，消费者剩余不变或降低，社会福利既有可能上升也有可能下降。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper studies foreign direct investment and licensing under thecircumstance of technology spillovers.As for foreign direct investment, this paper studies three facets under oligopolymodel:Firstly, in the presence of technology spillovers, the paper studies the investmentmode when a firm conducts foreign direct investment, i.e., how to choose betweengreenfield investment and merger and acquisition. When the extent of technologyspillover is high, the optimal investment mode is Greenfield investment. When theextent of technology spillover is low, the optimal investment mode is merger andacquisition. The absorbing capacity is an important factor which has an effect onspillover and the investment mode of a firm, and the R&D expenditure is the keyfactor to the absorbing capacity of a firm. In the extension model in which the localfirm can make R&D, the investment mode of multinational firms is dependent on theproduction cost and R&D efficiency before R&D. This paper also utilizes paneldata to conduct an empirical test for the results of theoretic model.Secondly, this paper studies the foreign direct investment of atechnology-seeking firm and the IPRspolicy of a developed country. The result showsthat only when the whole productivity of technology-seeking firm is higher than firmsin host country, can the FDI success. Contrary to the conventional research resultsthat the stringent IPRspolicy is helpful to developed country, this paper shows thatthis might not be the case at. When the total productivity of the investing firm ishigher than the firm in the developed country, a weak IPRspolicy can increase thesocial welfare.Thirdly, the paper studies the influence of the second time technology spilloverson foreign direct investment and social welfare. Contrary to the effect of the first timespillovers, the second time spillovers make the firm more inclined to choose exprotinstead of FDI. As for host country, regardless of the extent of the second timespillovers, the social welfare is lower than that without it. As for home country, theeffect of the second time spillovers on socical welfare have a U pattern, when the extent of the second time technology spillovers is low, the social welfare is decreasingwith an increase of technology spillovers, and lower than that without it. When theextent of second time technology spillovers is high, the social welfare is increasingwith the increasing of technology spillovers, and higher than that without it at last.As for licensing, the paper studies a manufacturing firm how to license thetechnology in the presence of a market structure including upstream and downstreammarket and technology spillovers, with the firm having technolgy to decrease the costof manufacturing final and intermediate product. The result shows that the firmalways licenses the upstream and downstream firms under two-part tariff. The extentof technology spillovers have an effect on the licensing motivation of the firm, atsome circumstance, the higher extent of technology spillovers, the higher thelicensing motive. It increases the consumer surplus and social welfare that licensingthe upstream and downstream firms at the same time or only licensing the upstreamfirm. The consumer surplus dose not change or decreases, and the social welfaremaybe increase or decrease when licensing the downstream firm.更多还原