【作者】 张勇；

【导师】 张彤玉；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 政治经济学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 近年来，我国创业投资引导基金蓬勃发展，通过实施创业投资引导基金制度，促进创业风险投资产业发展，搭建创业资本服务中小企业发展的平台，已成为各地政府促进经济产业发展，提高政府资金使用效率的有效途径之一。由于我国创业投资引导基金还属于发展初期，在管理模式、运行模式等方面还处于摸索阶段，因此，有必要结合我国国情，对创业投资引导基金运行机制进行深入研究，为指导我国创业投资引导基金持续健康发展提供理论参考。文章分为三个部分，导论、正文（共五章）和结论与展望。导论部分介绍了论文的研究背景和现实意义，文献综述和理论意义、主要内容和逻辑框架、以及研究的创新和不足；正文部分第二章对论文的基本概念进行了界定，包括创业投资引导基金的定位，运行系统及运行机制，明确了论文研究的主要对象。第三章从理论和现实两个层面对设立创业投资引导基金的必要性进行了论述，并对国外创业投资引导基金发展经验以及我国创业投资引导基金发展现状和存在问题进行了分析总结，进一步明确了论文需要解决的主要问题。第四章到第六章是论文的主体部分，分别针对创业投资引导基金运行过程中可能出现的逆向选择问题、道德风险问题以及利益冲突问题，利用相应的经济学模型进行了研究分析，并提出机制设计的建议。文章的结论与展望部分是对全文的一个总结，针对上述研究内容再次归纳了全文的主要结论，并提出了下一步的研究方向。基于上述研究，本文得到了以下几点主要结论：第一，以引导基金设立建议书为信息载体，通过将信号传递模型和信号甄别模型结合使用，能够有效地解决或减缓创业投资引导基金选择投资管理机构时可能出现的逆向选择问题。第二，引导基金投资经理存在显性和隐形两方面的需求，因此，有必要建立针对性的激励约束机制。引入“锦标赛”思想，建立以创业板投资退出时平均收益为考核基准的线性薪酬机制，能够剔除市场波动等外部因素的影响，更好的评价和激励投资经理的工作；同时，研究还发现声誉机制对投资经理的长期激励是有效的，能够弥补显性薪酬激励的不足。第三，创业投资引导基金运行中具有典型的共同代理特征，针对创业投资引导基金共同代理问题的研究发现，由于委托人（政府和社会投资者）之间利益取向不同，造成对代理人（投资经理）激励效能的弱化。通过建立引导基金协同监管机制，将投资经理多任务间努力的替代关系转化为互补关系，能够有效解决激励效能弱化问题。本文拟创新性的研究主要包括：第一，以引导基金运行机制为研究对象，为创业投资引导基金的研究引入了新的研究视角。第二构建了相对完整的创业投资引导基金运行机制研究框架，同时，从委托—代理的角度切入，抓住了问题的根本，并创新性的运用共同代理理论研究引导基金运行机制问题，突破了传统的双边委托代理理论框架。第三，从我国创业投资引导基金运行中的现实问题出发，运用相关经济学模型，针对创业投资引导基金运行中可能出现的逆向选择问题、道德风险问题和利益冲突问题进行了相应的机制设计，为规范引导基金运营提供了思路。更多还原

【Abstract】 Recently，Venture Capital Guidance Fund (VCGF) has become a hot trend acrossthe country，which promote the development of venture investment industry andcreate a broad platform between venture capital and small-and-medium-sizedenterprises. Now VCGF has become an effective way to improve efficiency in the useof government funds and the national economy. But because of that VCGF belongingto the early stages of development and its management mode， run mode is still in theexploratory stage， it is necessary to study in-depth of the operating mechanism ofVCGF according to China’s national conditions，which provide a theoretical referenceto guide our VCGF sustained and healthy development.This dissertation consists of three parts：introduction，main body，conclusion andfuture works. In the introduction，the background、practical significance and literaturereview of this study were introduced. Main content and the logical framework of thisstudy were presented. The innovation of results and future works were discussed. Inthe second chapter，the basic concepts of the thesis were is defined，including theconnotation、operating system and operating mechanism of the VCGF，which furtherclarified the main target of the thesis. In the third chapter，the Necessity to set upVCGF was discussed from both theoretical and practical levels，and foreign VCGFdevelopment experience，as well as our VCGF status and problems were analyzedand summarized，which further clarify the paper needs to address the problem.Chapter4to6is the main body of the dissertation. The Problem of adverse selection、moral hazard and conflicts of interest which may appear for the running of the VCGFwere research and analysis by the appropriate economic model，and put forward therecommendations of the mechanism design. The last part of the dissertationsummarizes issues of study and discusses the future work.The following conclusions were obtained from the study：First. The adverse selection problem exists in the VCGF to select the investmentmanagement organizations was effectively solved or relieved by combination of usingthe model of the signaling and screening model in which project proposal of theVCGF was the information signal. Second. Because of the explicit needs and hidden needs of the VCGF Investmentmanagers， it was very necessary to establish the incentive and restraint mechanisms.Market fluctuations and other external factors Can be effectively removed byEstablishing the a linear pay system which based on the average income of theinvestment in GEM，Therefore，the investment manager Can be effectively evaluatedand motivated. On the other hand，the study also found that the reputation mechanismon the long-term incentive of investment manager was effective，which was able tocompensate for the lack of incentive pay.Third. Because of the common agency， Incentive performance to agent(investment manager) is weakened when the interests between the principals(government and social investors) are inconsistent. The study found when themechanism of conflict management was established，the Incentive performanceWeakening can be effectively solved by transforming the Multi-Task of investmentmanager from Substitutes into the complementary relationship.There are several innovations in this study：1、the research perspective of theVCGF is broadened by taking operating mechanism as the object of study；2、Building a relatively complete framework of operating mechanism and seizing thekey issue by Starting with the principal-agent problems，moreover,The innovativeuse of common agency theory on operating mechanism of the VCGF Broke throughthe traditional framework of bilateral principal-agent theory；3、According to China’snational conditions，The strategies are designed for The problem of adverse selection,moral hazard problems and conflicts of interest，which provides a guideline for theVCGF operation.更多还原