【作者】 刘豫；

【导师】 李罗力；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 政治经济学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 公共支出作为公共财政的核心内容，政府公共支出的总量和范围反映了政府及其职能部门对国民社会生活各领域的影响能力和影响程度。从某种意义上讲，公共支出比收入更能体现政府职能。然而，在公共支出过程的委托代理链条中，信息的不完全和不对称现象广泛存在，这必然带来代理人问题、机会主义的存在、交易成本增加，直接影响到资源分配结果。各利益集团通过各种手段影响立法程序和影响资源分配结果。预算环节涉及到各政府部门、各省市部门的事权和财权的分配，直接影响公共产品的供给，造成即使各地驻京办已撤销，跑部“钱”进的事件仍然长期存在；在政府采购环节，大额和大型项目的竞标环节，长期存在内部操纵结果现象；群众对于政府公共支出信息公开的呼声，中央和各省市已经逐步以网络等方式向公众公开更多的公共支出信息，但仍然存在信息可读性弱，信息量少等现象。在政府公共支出过程的层层委托—代理契约中，各个层级的代理人都有出现机会主义行为倾向的可能，以求自身利益的最大化。如何设计一个有效的契约机制，使得代理人能够在追寻自身利益最大化的同时，也最大程度地实现委托人的利益，并向整体的帕累托最优改进，是本文的研究目的。本文以现代契约理论为切入点，通过对公共支出过程中的各级委托代理关系和机会主义分析，构建了基于博弈均衡和交易成本变化的契约均衡分析框架。从理论上研究如何有效的解决各个层级的契约中的权力配置、监督约束、分权、激励以及信息等问题，通过分析各级委托代理关系下的博弈模型中的变量因素,发现信息公开、自由裁量权、预算调整、监督惩罚等因素在公共支出周期中的对博弈均衡和制度创新产生重要影响。纵观西方国家公共支出管理制度演进过程，美国的公共支出管理制度变迁体现了美国宪法的分权制衡原则,具体体现在以国会与总统之间对于预算权力的博弈过程,最终以联邦立法和公共支出管理制度的改革表现出来；当然,制度的演进中也伴随着社会公众对政府受托责任要求的不断提高。再观英国从13世纪初政府预算制度的萌芽到公共支出管理制度的发展完善,其数百年的发展演变中充满了议会与君主的博弈、议会与政府的博弈，其政府预算制度的变迁与议会制度和发展是分不开的，是英国议会以法律形式逐步剥夺君主财政权的过程。西方公共支出管理制度的变迁是在一个稳定的宪法和制度框架中进行的，无论是政府部门间权力的博弈和制衡，还是对于预算理性的追求,都有明晰的宪法依归和制度边界。基于支出周期的公共支出管理制度建立,包括政策制定中的预算制度和实施中的政府采购制度和支付制度、预算执行中的激励机制和事前、事中、事后的监督机制等，保证了西方公共支出的有效运行。在博弈模型变量因素分析和西方公共支出管理制度借鉴的基础上，本文结合中国的现实情况，研究公众与政府、本级政府与各支出部门、支出部门和供货方之间、中央与地方政府之间在公共支出决策中的竞争博弈行为，将博弈模型中的变量因素进行现实化反应，最终提出中国公共支出管理制度改革，既要考虑委托代理关系下各利益集团间的博弈，也要考虑制度背后的交易成本问题，合意的契约关系必将催生出有效的公共支出管理制度。在公共支出管理制度改革的实践中，需要通过制度规范将民主固定下来，构建具有长期稳定性的“道路规则”体系。在公共支出过程中通过“阳光预算-阳光采购-阳光报告”，构建阳光政府的制度创新路径是势在必行的。更多还原

【Abstract】 Public spending is the core part of public finance; the direction and scope demonstrate itseffects on the economy in all kinds of aspects. To some extent, rather than public revenue, publicspending is more likely to demonstrate its governmental functions. However, there are still manyproblems needed to cover, such as principal agent problem, the presence of opportunism,transaction costs, which have a direct influence on the distribution of resource. Each interestgroup takes a variety of means to influence legislation procedure and the impact of resourceallocation result. The budget aspects relate to government departments, the provincial departmentof governance and the property rights allocation, which directly influences the supply of publicgoods. Even if all Beijin offices have removed, the phenomena to offer a bribe still exists for along time. In the government procurement process, especially in large project bidding process,internal manipulation results exist for a long time, the voice to public the government publicspending information is higher than ever. Although our government begins to public more publicspending information through the internet, the information is still not that available.In the principal-agent contract in the process of government public spending，to maximizetheir profits, all levels of agents may appear opportunism behavior. How to design an effectiveincentive mechanism that the agent pursues their own interests while maximizing the interests ofclients at the same time, so as to get the overall improvement of Pareto best is the purpose of thisarticle. This article takes the modern contract theory as the breakthrough point, by analyzing theprocess of public spending in the levels of the principal-agent relationship and opportunism, tobuild the contract equilibrium framework which is based on game equilibrium and transactioncost change. Also, through the analysis of variables under principal-agent relation in game theorymodel, this article studies how to solve each level contract power allocation, supervision andrestraint, decentralization, motivation and information problems so as to find how informationdisclosure, discretion, budget adjustments, supervision, punishment and other factors in publicspending cycle affect the game equilibrium and institution innovation.Throughout the western countries public spending management system evolution, the changeof the United States public spending management system embodies the United StatesConstitution’s the principle of checks and balances and the principle of sovereignty in the people.The decentralization and balance principle embodied in the budget power game between the legislative mechanism (take the president as a representative) and administrative mechanism (takethe Congress t as a representative); the principle of sovereignty in the people embodies citizens’requirements to government accountability continues to increase. The former is more likely toreflect in the federal budget legislation process, while the latter becomes incisive in the previousbudget management system innovation. Looking back to the British government budget system’sbud since the thirteenth Century to maturity, the hundreds of years of evolution is what a processthat the British Parliament gradually stripped of sovereign financial power in the name of thelaws.The evolution of the British government budget system is closely linked with the parliamentarysystem’s formation and development. The changes of western public spending managementsystem step in a steady legal environment. There is the clear constitution and the system boundary,no matter it is about the power game and balance between government departments or the pursuitto budget ration. The built of the public spending management system based on spending circle,including the budget system in policy making, government procurement and payment system inpractice, Incentive mechanism and the supervision mechanism in advance, in the matter, after theevent, keeps the operation of the western public spending effectively.Based on the analysis of variable factors in Game model and the use of western publicspending management system for reference and linked the reality of China, this article focuses onthe competitive game behavior in public spending between the public and the government, thelevel of government and the department of spending, the department of spending and suppliers,and finally get the conclusion that the reform of Chinese public spending management systemneeds to consider not only the game between each interest group under the circumstance ofPrincipal agent relationship, but the transaction costs back to the system. Consensual contractrelationship will certainly create effective public spending management system, in the reform ofpublic spending management system, our government need to fix the democracy by normingsystem so as to build a long-term stability of the "rules of the road" system. It is essential to buildsunshine government system innovation path by” Sunshine budge, Sunshine-procurement,Sunshine-report “in the process of public spending.更多还原